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ABSTRACT 
As the offshore industry matures on the Grand Banks, the desire to tap into more 
marginal oil and gas reserves will be realized and efficient exploitation will be required. 
A study has been undertaken to enable evaluation of wellhead protection concepts for 
subsea marginal developments located on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. The study 
has focused mainly on concepts that maintain probability of well blowout as a result of 
freely floating and scouring icebergs below accepted levels of risk. The investigation 
provides a framework from which intelligent decisions can be made regarding the relative 
benefits and costs of different protection concepts. 
In order to represent both ends of the spectrum in terms of size and architecture, two 
subsea marginal field development scenarios, considered typical for the area, were 
selected. These include (1) single well and (2) clustered multi-well developments tied 
back to an existing production facility. 
A thorough overview of existing wellhead protection technical solutions such as Open 
Glory Holes, Cased Glory Holes, Caisson Wellhead Systems and Protective External 
Barriers were presented. Existing failsafe systems such as surface controlled-subsurface 
safety valves (SCSSV's) were also investigated in detail to determine their reliability and 
potential effectiveness for protection against uncontrolled well blowout in the case of 
catastrophic wellhead damage due to an iceberg encounter. 
A minimum risk acceptance criterion associated with wellhead protection in the region 
was established to be less than 1 x 1 o-s per annum. Utilizing existing methodologies 
developed from simple geometric models along with the appropriate iceberg data, an 
analysis was performed in order to determine the encounter and contact probabilities to 
wellhead facilities as they relate to the various protection concepts. 
To support the selection and decision making process, a cost analysis was performed. The 
methodology used in the analysis involved a full comparison of capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) incorporating the risks associated with iceberg contact. Consequences 
resulting from an iceberg contact such as lost production, environmental cleanup and 
replacement I repair costs are factored by the probability of that event occurring. 
Results of the study indicate that SCSSV's and other fail-safe systems offer an obvious 
solution for reduction in overall risk and up-front development costs. The cost analysis 
indicates the "Modified Cased Hole" protection concept to be most attractive protection 
solution from a combined cost & risk approach. A conventional "unprotected" subsea 
well installation for the Grand Banks may prove to be a feasible development scenario 
given further research. 
Additional work is recommended addressing issues such as well downhole response 
mechanisms, SCSSV reliability and refinement to the inherent conservatisms & 
limitations in well blowout probability calculations. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The Grand Banks are located off the east coast of Newfoundland, covering an area of 
approximately 270,000 km2 that is centered at 46° N latitude and 51° W longitude. 
General water depths across much of the banks range between 60 to 150m. Exploration 
ofhydrocarbons in the region has been ongoing since 1966 and major oil fields have been 
discovered on the North Eastern Grand Banks at several locations such as Hibernia, Terra 
Nova, White Rose and Hebron/Ben Nevis (see Figure 1). The Grand Banks region has 
estimated recoverable oil and gas reserves and resources equalling 2.1 billion barrels of 
oil, 5.4 trillion cubic feet of gas and 313 million barrels of natural gas liquids (C-NOPB, 
2005). 
Figure 1 Major Oil Field Discoveries on Grand Banks (Compliments of Terra 
Nova Project Website) 
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From an environmental perspective, the Grand Banks are recognized as one of the most 
hostile offshore operating environments in the world, since it is influenced by a range of 
adverse conditions. The seasonal invasion of icebergs in the area is well known as the 
most formidable environmental influence because of their size, mass and energy. The 
waters offshore Labrador and Newfoundland are often referred to as "Iceberg Alley" as 
high numbers of icebergs move through the area each year. Historically, more than 480 
icebergs cross the 48th parallel annually, but there is considerable variability around this 
mean number from year to year (liP, 2005). The icebergs are highly variable in terms of 
their size, keel depth and shape. Iceberg sizes range from a few metres to hundreds of 
metres and masses varying from hundreds to millions of tonnes. 
Icebergs that are carried southward mainly from Western Greenland by Baffin and 
Labrador currents are known to float freely at deep drafts and occasionally ground and 
disrupt the seabed. Such events create iceberg scours and pits that could potentially 
damage structures installed on or near the surface of the seabed. Studies have shown 
icebergs scour at an average depth of 0.50 m and drift at a speed of 0.34 m/s in the Grand 
Banks region (Croasdale et al., 2000; MEDS, 1997). 
Current developments of oil and gas on the Grand Banks have all incorporated some form 
of subsea infrastructure such as wellheads, trees, manifolds and flowlines. Seabed 
facilities such as these have been used more and more in other hydrocarbon producing 
areas such as the North Sea and Gulf of Mexico, and will also become an integral part of 
future developments on the Grand Banks. As the offshore industry matures on the Grand 
2 
Banks, the desire to tap into more marginal oil and gas reserves will be realized and play 
a key role in the regions exploitation of resources. In cases such as marginal field 
economics, subsea developments can bring significant reductions in development costs 
and tip the balance in favour of development. Such developments will most likely 
involve the use of a subsea satellite well or well cluster(s) tied back to an existing 
production facility via a subsea flowline. Existing developments such as Hibernia, Terra 
Nova and soon White Rose have all incorporated future expansion capabilities to 
accommodate tie-in of marginal fields. 
One of the most crucial components of any subsea development is the wellhead, which 
provides pressure integrity for the well against an uncontrollable discharge of downhole 
fluid. Contrary to other subsea components such as manifolds, templates and flowlines, 
any damage to a wellhead could have major environmental consequences. In the 
unfortunate event of an uncontrolled subsea well blow-out caused by an iceberg collision, 
high potential for pollution and damage to the environment resulting from a major oil 
spill could occur. 
Safe and economic utilization of subsea technologies requires that the risk of damage be 
reduced to an acceptable level. In terms of design, a key consideration relates to the risk 
of iceberg damage, and whether to protect subsea facilities from potential impacts of free 
floating and scouring icebergs. In order to ensure that the design and layout of subsea 
wellheads meets predetermined acceptable risk criteria, a requirement for some form of 
protection is necessary. Possible solutions include placing the equipment deep enough 
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below the seabed to avoid contact or by means of a protective structure. The decision can 
also be made to accept occasional damage with repairs and/or replacement where the 
systems can be designed to be failsafe to avoid environmental damage. 
To date, a number of alternative protection methods have been proposed and 
implemented on vanous offshore projects throughout the world. Such protection 
concepts include: 
• Open Glory Holes 
• Cased Glory Holes (or Submarine Silos) 
• Caisson Wellhead Systems 
• Protective External Barriers 
Thus far on the Grand Banks, two forms of wellhead protection methods have been 
successfully implemented to protect wellheads from iceberg scour damage. These 
include excavated open glory holes for both the Terra Nova and White Rose development 
projects and a total of seven caisson wellhead systems installed on exploration wells 
drilled by Mobil and Petro-Canada. 
1.1 Objectives 
The present study aims to evaluate various wellhead protection concepts for subsea 
marginal developments located on the Grand Banks. The investigation seeks to provide 
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the framework from which intelligent decisions can be made regarding the relative 
benefits and costs of different protection concepts while maintaining an acceptable level 
of risk. In order to achieve this goal, the following objectives will be addressed: 
• Provide an overview of the Grand Banks iceberg environment including scour 
density, frequencies and scour characteristics for the region; 
• Establish representative development scenarios for typical subsea marginal field 
developments on the Grand Banks; 
• Present a thorough overview of existing technical solutions for wellhead 
protection and identify potential novel concepts; 
• Establish minimum risk acceptance criteria associated with wellhead protection 
concepts for the Grand Banks region; 
• Present methodology and conduct an analysis to determine the appropriate 
encounter and contact probabilities to seabed facilities located on the Grand 
Banks; 
• Perform a cost of risk analysis in order to identify the most optimum wellhead 
protection solution for representative marginal subsea developments on the Grand 
Banks. 
5 
2.0 GRAND BANKS ICEBERG ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 General 
Icebergs that migrate to the Grand Banks are primarily calved off glaciers from 
Greenland and Baffin Island. The calved icebergs enter the waters of Baffin Bay and 
Davis Straight and drift south, following the powerful Labrador Current until they reach 
the Northwest Newfoundland shelf. At this point the current divides the iceberg 
population into two streams as illustrated in Figure 2. The majority of the icebergs flow 
either through the Avalon Channel along the coast of Newfoundland or through the 
Flemish Pass along the eastern edge of the Banks. A small number of icebergs also 
traverse directly across the banks (Cammaert & Muggeridge, 1988). It is estimated that it 
takes approximately three years for an iceberg to drift from its source glacier to the grand 
Banks (Kollmeyer, 1977). 
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We are fortunate in having relatively good historical data on the number and locations of 
icebergs on the Grand Banks. The main sources of data have been accumulated by the 
International Ice Patrol (liP), the oil and gas industry, and research institutes. As a part 
of the initiative of the Canadian Government through its Program on Energy Research 
and Development (PERD), a database was initiated in 1998 to assimilate all of the 
information on the annual iceberg population on the East Coast. The database is updated 
each year and improvements made to existing data. 
The data collected in the PERD Iceberg Database goes back to 1810 as presented in Hill 
(1999). Hill presents an impressive compilation of 14,270 iceberg sightings from 
historical records such as shipping journals, gazettes, log books and diaries, and more 
recently the liP between the years 1810 and 1958. Singh et al. (1998, 1999), Verbit et al. 
(2000, 2001 & 2002) and Comfort & Verbit (2003 & 2005) has added to this database to 
total 209,182 iceberg sightings on the Grand Banks between 1810 and 2004. 
Approximately 86% of the data contained in the PERD Iceberg Database has been 
collected by the liP. The database includes general sighting information such as location, 
date, the shape and size of icebergs, and specific information such as waterline length, 
width, height, draft, and mass of icebergs. Figure 3 below shows the liP iceberg 
sightings obtained during aerial surveys, which provides a good illustration of the iceberg 
extent encompassing the Grand Banks region (PERD, 2001 ). 
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Figure 3 Distribution of liP Iceberg Sightings Obtained During Aerial Surveys 
(PERD, 2001) 
The occurrence of icebergs on the Grand Banks is highly variable. Marko et al. (1991) 
concluded that sea ice extent was one of the key parameters explaining variability in the 
number of icebergs crossing south of 48~. The effectiveness of sea ice, in this respect, 
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is dependant upon its abilities to prevent iceberg grounding and subsequent melting on 
shallow continental shelves together with its capacity for reducing free-drifting iceberg 
mass losses by suppressing elevated sea surface temperatures and wave heights (Marko et 
al., 1991). The number of icebergs reaching the Grand Banks is significantly higher in 
years when sea ice off Labrador extends out over the main part of the Labrador Current. 
In addition, ocean currents, variable climatic factors and local temperatures have a large 
influence with respect to the number of icebergs that make the journey to the Grand 
Banks. 
A number of factors have been identified as effecting iceberg motion, including size, 
shape, mass, wind, water currents, waves, sea ice movement, ocean surface slope and 
coriolis force. It has been found that iceberg drift off the Grand Banks is directed 
primarily by the ocean currents (Cammaert, 1988). 
One way to describe icebergs is by their above-water shape. One of five (5) different 
shapes is commonly assigned to icebergs for reporting purposes. These are shown in 
Figure 4 below. 
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PINNACLED (P) 
Large central spire or pyramid of one or more 
spires dominating shape. 
SPHERICAL (S) 
A smooth and solid iceberg that has been 
rounded from rolling or bobbing in the water 
DRYDOCKED (DD) 
Eroded such that a large U-shaped slot is formed, 
with twin columns or pinnacles. The slot extends 
into the water line or close to it. 
WEDGED(W) 
Tilted iceberg with distinct cliff on one edge. 
TABULAR(T) 
Horizontal or flat-topped iceberg formed by 
calving from an ice shelf. 
d!!3~ 
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Figure 4 Iceberg Shapes (CANATEC et al., 1999) 
Icebergs off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador range in size from massive tabular 
and blocky icebergs in excess of several million tonnes to small bergs weighing 1% of 
this. Categories of iceberg sizes which are used for recording iceberg statistics range 
from very large (greater than 1 0 million tonnes and hundreds of meters long) to large, 
medium and small icebergs and on to bergy bits then growlers, which are grand piano 
size pieces. The average iceberg mass for the Grand Banks area is one to two hundred 
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thousand tonnes, which is about the size of a cubic 15 storey building. See Table 1 for 
Iceberg size definitions. 
Table 1 Iceberg Size Definitions (CANATEC et al., 1999) 
Iceberg Heights Length 
Approximate 
Iceberg Size Weight 
(m) (m) 
(tonnes) 
Growler Under 1 Under 5 1,000 
Bergy Bit 1 to 5 5 to 15 10,000 
Small 5 to 15 16 to 60 100,000 
Medium 16 to 50 61 to 120 2,000,000 
Large 51 to 75 121 to 220 10,000,000 
Very Large Over 75 Over220 Over 10,000,000 
On average, approximately 3000 icebergs drift annually into the Labrador Shelf area 
from Baffin Bay (Lever et al., 1989). The overall variation of icebergs numbers crossing 
south of 48~ latitude spans three orders of magnitude. For example, based on annual 
reports from the liP between 1900 and 2004, the number of icebergs has varied from zero 
to over 2200 per year as illustrated in Figure 5. The mean number of icebergs passing 
south of 48~ is 478 icebergs with a standard deviation of 492 (liP, 2005). 
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Figure 5 Total Number of Icebergs Crossing South of 48°N Latitude Annually 
(liP, 2005) 
Generally, high annual iceberg numbers occur in groups of 3 or 4 consecutive years, with 
local minimum counts tending to occur at intervals of 4 to 9 years (Marko et al., 1994). 
The iceberg flux is seasonal, extending from February until July, with April and May 
being the most prominent months (see Figure 6). 
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The issue of global warming and climate change and its effects on iceberg severity on the 
Grand Banks has captured increased attention from the oil and gas industry in recent 
years. Brown (1993) concluded that ice and iceberg severities were considered unlikely 
to undergo major changes in the immediate future. However, over the next 50-100 years, 
if increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases result in consistent regional warming of 
2 to 4°C, sea-ice retreat and lower Grand Banks iceberg severity are considered not 
unlikely long-term outcomes. However, the response of the east coast region to a gradual 
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations could well include short periods that favor 
higher sea-ice and iceberg severities (Brown, 1993). Further to this, Marko et al. (1994) 
concludes that no amelioration of ice and iceberg severity off eastern North America has, 
as yet, been identified in roughly a century of globally rising temperatures. Moreover, 
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because of the inferred dominant influence of sea ice, it is extremely unlikely that 
postulated future increases in iceberg calving and simultaneous sea ice retreats could 
increase iceberg numbers south of 48~ without significant changes in the regional ocean 
and atmospheric circulations. 
It is clear that future developments on the Grand Banks will be exposed to different 
iceberg populations, depending upon where they are located in the relative area. Oil and 
gas prospects that lie in deeper water areas towards the north and east sides of the Banks 
will experience more frequent and larger icebergs than in shallower central and southern 
portions. 
Iceberg frequency is generally expressed in terms of areal density. Iceberg areal density 
is defined as the average number of icebergs that would be expected in a specified region 
(typically a degree square) expected at a given point in time as determined from historical 
iceberg sightings. The most reliable source of iceberg sightings on the Grand Banks in 
terms of frequency and coverage of surveys is the liP, who regularly issue bulletins 
throughout the iceberg season showing the number of icebergs sighted per degree square 
(King et al., 2003). Areal density charts such as the one presented in Figure 7 by Jordaan 
et al. (1999) are derived from data collected over the years by the liP. 
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Figure 7 
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Areal Density of Icebergs on the Northern Grand Banks (Top Values 
Based on Data from 1960-2000 & Bottom Values Based on Data from 
1981-2000) (Jordaan et al., 1999) 
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In this example, Jordaan has analyzed iceberg sightings with waterline lengths ~ 16m and 
calculated the mean annual areal density per degree square for the Grand Banks and the 
adjacent regions based on data from the last 20 years (1981-2000) and the entire 1960-
2000 period. A difference has been noted in areal densities for each time period, which 
could be attributed to either improved detection techniques or long-term iceberg 
frequency fluctuations (King, 2002). 
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2.2 Iceberg Scour on the Grand Banks 
A fraction of the icebergs that penetrate onto the Grand Banks into water with depths less 
than their draft will make direct contact with the seabed in the form of a scour or pit. 
Iceberg scours commonly take the form of relatively long furrows and circular to 
elliptical pits in the surficial sediments. The furrows are formed by icebergs moving in 
contact with the seabed. Pits are possibly formed by the bearing capacity failure of the 
seabed for loads of icebergs at rest or catastrophically when icebergs split and roll into 
the seabed. Icebergs can oscillate vertically, repeatedly impacting the seabed while 
drifting to produce crater chains - a series of pits along their drift track (Lewis et al., 
1987). An artistic impression of an iceberg scour is presented in Figure 8 below. 
Figure 8 Artistic Impression of Iceberg Scour (Compliments of C-CORE) 
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The fact that large, deep draft icebergs may contact the seabed raises a number of 
concerns in the design of subsea facilities. Reliable information is required regarding the 
likelihood of iceberg contact, the probable depth of disturbance and the interaction forces 
generated to effectively design a safe and economical subsea installation. In order to 
estimate the probability of collision between icebergs and seabed structures, it is 
necessary to determine how frequently the icebergs scour and pit the seabed. Although 
there has been a substantial amount of work in recent years in an attempt to establish 
scour density and frequency estimates, the intent here is to a give a brief overview of 
some of those findings. 
2.2.1 Scour Density 
Iceberg scours are distributed throughout the Grand Banks. The distribution is uneven 
due to the variations in iceberg drift patterns, water depth and seabed soil type and slope. 
The Grand Banks Scour Catalogue (GBSC) represents the most up-to-date compilation of 
all ice scour data collected in the region since 1979. It was compiled by Canadian 
Seabed Research Ltd. for the Geological Survey of Canada, Atlantic between 1992 and 
1995 (Myers et al., 1996) and updated again in 1999 (Canadian Seabed Research Ltd., 
2000). The GBSC is an evolving database of information that is updated on a regular 
basis to include new scour information as it becomes available. 
As of the 1999 update, the catalog contained records of 5720 scour features including 
3887 individual scours (furrows or linear features) and 1773 iceberg created pits (craters 
or areal features). The catalog includes information on the feature type (i.e. scour or 
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crater/pit), location, and physical dimensions. The study area as shown in Figure 9 was 
selected as it includes the most active area of offshore petroleum exploration, significant 
discoveries and production licenses within the Jeanne d'Arc sub-basin in water depths 
from 80-150m. The area includes Northeast Grand Banks, Flemish Pass and western 
portion of the Flemish Cap (Crosadale et al., 2000). The study region represents an area 
of approximately 100,000 km2• 
Figure 9 GBSC Study Area Showing Survey Lines (Croasdale et al., 2000) 
For the most part, regional mapping of iceberg scours recorded in the GBSC have been 
identified and measured from various geophysical data sets from site surveys conducted 
since the late 1970's. A variety of detection techniques were used including: sidescan 
sonars, sub-bottom profilers, single beam and more recently, multibeam echo sounders. 
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It was concluded by Croasdale et al. (2000) that interpreter variability could lead to a 
minimum of 30% variation in scour density estimates. Scour depth data suffer from 
limitations of instrument resolution, degradation and infill, which all lead to 
underestimation of shallow scours and statistics biased to deeper scours. In addition, 
longer scours are often under represented in the database as they extend beyond the 
survey area. 
The GBSC has been an important tool in assessing scour density (number of scourslkm2) 
for the Grand Banks region despite the inherent shortfalls. Scour density values for 
individual 1 km2 grid cells range from 0- 30 scours/km2 within the study. The highest 
scour densities are those associated with most recent surveys using modem higher 
resolution equipment, suggesting scour events were either not visible on the lower 
resolution data or not interpreted on these earlier surveys (Croasdale et al., 2000). 
Mean scour density values within selected bathymetric (depth) intervals were determined 
by Croasdale et al. (2000) based on the 1999 update of the GBSC. The mean scour 
density is 0.56 scours/km2 for the total survey coverage in water depths less than 110 
meters, and 0.86 scours/km2 for the total coverage in water depths greater than 110 
meters. The highest mean density, at 1.2-1.3 scours/km2, occurs between 100-150 meters 
water depth. Lower density in deeper water may be related to a lower number of deep ice 
keels. The progressively lower mean density values in shallower water are probably due, 
in large part, to the reworking of scoured sediments by increased levels of hydrodynamic 
activity which has led to the obliteration of some scours over time, particularly those 
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formed in sands. The GBSC includes relatively few scours for water depths greater than 
150m on the Northeast Grand Banks, and no scours from the Flemish Pass region 
(Croasdale et al., 2000). 
As a result of work conducted by C-CORE (2001a), further additions have been made to 
the GBSC to include more recent sidescan and multibeam seabed surveys conducted in 
the region surrounding the White Rose Development. The recent surveys in the area 
were analyzed and the data incorporated into the catalog. A total of 1455 iceberg scour 
records for the represented area (approximately 150 km2) around White Rose were 
extracted. Scour density within the White Rose area ranged from 0 to 6 scours/0.25 km2, 
with a mean scour density of 2.64 scours/km2. Represented by Region 1, the study area 
used to determine scour Characteristics at White Rose is presented in Figure 10, overleaf. 
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Figure 10 White Rose Study Area (C-CORE, 2001a) 
A summary of scour density estimates from various sources is presented in Table 2, 
overleaf. 
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Table 2 Summary of Scour Density Estimates from Various Sources for the 
North-East Grand Banks 
Reference 
Water Depth Scour Density 
(m) (scourslkm2) 
s 110 0.56 
Croasdale et al. (2000i > 110 0.86 
100-150 1.2-1.3 
C-CORE (2001ai 110-140 2.64 
Notes: 
1. Representative for GBSC overall coverage area. 
2. Specific to representative study area surrounding White Rose development location. 
Includes addition of recent survey data of the study area to the GBSC. 
2.2.2 Scour Frequency 
The issue of determining reliable scour frequencies is a major component for undertaking 
an accurate risk assessment. The scour density information described above shows 
interesting spatial trends, but is not directly applicable in establishing risk to subsea 
facilities. To assess the probability of a point, area, or linear feature on the seabed being 
contacted by a scouring iceberg, scour frequency information is necessary. Lewis et al. 
(1987) proposed four types of analyses that have been developed to determine the rates of 
scour on the Grand Banks. The following techniques were presented and explored in the 
paper: 
• Geological Inference 
• Grounding Model 
• Repetitive Mapping 
• Scour Degradation 
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2.2.2.1 Geological Inference 
Utilizing the method of geological inference, average, apparent, long-term scouring rates 
for the Grand Banks region can be obtained from the ratio of seabed scour densities 
(scours/km2) to the inferred age of the scour population. Lewis et al. (1987) suggested 
that the relatively young, low-density iceberg scour population on the Grand Banks began 
appearing approximately 2500 years ago. They used this as a basis for calculating a 
scour rate 4.0 x 10-4/km2/year for the Hibernia site. The same approach was used by C-
CORE (2001a) based on the observed scour densities from the GBSC for the White Rose 
region to arrive at a scour rate of 1.0 x 1 o-3 /km2/year. 
Croasdale et al. (2000) suggests that the probable minimum and maximum estimates of 
scour age differ by almost an order of magnitude. They attempt to quantify this 
discrepancy by calculating an upper and lower bound based on scours estimated to have 
occurred over different geological time periods. They state that the recent geological 
record for the Grand Banks region indicates that 12,000 to 15,000 years ago, the water 
depth was 11Om lower than it is today suggesting that current regions of the Grand Banks 
were above sea level. If all the scours still exist since 12,000 years ago for example, the 
lower bound frequency would correspond to 8.3 x 10-5/km2/year. On the other hand, in-
filling and reworking rates for the shallow water regions (less than 11Om) suggest that on 
average, scours created in the past 2500 years are still detectable. Thus, this case 
corresponds to the upper bound scour frequency equal to 4.0 x 10-4/km2/year. 
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2.2.2.2 Grounding Model 
Lewis et al. (1987) presents a numerical grounding model as a means of calculating scour 
frequency. The model calculates the spatial distribution and mean frequency of iceberg 
groundings for 9.3 x 9.3 km cells based on input of long-term iceberg drift, iceberg draft 
distribution and the interaction of these parameters with bathymetry. Using this method, 
Lewis modeled the scour rate for the Hibernia region and calculated a scour rate of about 
3.5 X 10-3/km2/year. 
Additional propriety works in this area has been conducted to predict iceberg grounding 
rates for the Grand Banks region. Petro-Canada has developed an in-house iceberg 
collision simulation model called BERGSIM in order to determine iceberg collision risks 
relating to offshore facilities. Grounding models have also been developed and refined 
over the years by a number of sources to aid in predictions and provide useful risk 
assessments to local oil and gas companies. 
Croasdale et al. (2000) applied a simple analytical based approach to predict scour 
frequency based on input of long-term mean iceberg flux and iceberg draft distribution. 
Using the degree square containing the Hibernia field as an example, they calculated a 
scour rate of 4.0 x 10-4/km2/year. 
Perhaps the most recent and comprehensive work was performed by King et al. (2003) 
who developed a model to allow the grounding rate of iceberg keels to be estimated. The 
model uses data on iceberg frequency, draft distribution, mean drift speed, distribution of 
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drift direction, water depth, and seabed slope and orientation. King used this approach to 
conduct a sample calculation for the White Rose region and computed a grounding rate 
equal to 6.2 X 10-4/km2/year. 
2.2.2.3 Repetitive Mapping 
Repetitive mapping surveys allow the scour frequency to be calculated by identifying any 
new scours features that have occurred at a given area over a given time interval between 
surveys. A number of repetitive surveys have been conducted on the Grand Banks with 
few new scours identified. Lewis et al. (1987) presented results of a survey area 120 km 
Northwest of Hibernia that was compared using sidescan sonograms over a six year 
period with surveys taken in both 1980 and 1986. There were no new scour features 
identified. Results presented by Geonautics Ltd. (1991) show one (1) new scour feature 
in a 490 km2 area over a period of 11 years, which corresponds to a scour frequency of 
1.9 X 1 0-4/km2/year. 
Further work by Myers et al. (1996) identified two (2) new scours from resurveyed lines 
between Hibernia and White Rose, over an area of 273 km2 based on an elapsed time of 
11 years corresponding to a scour frequency of6.7 x 10-4/km2/year. 
Unlike regions such as the Beaufort Sea where scours are more prevalent, the usefulness 
of this method for estimating scour rates on the Grand Banks is limited due to the 
relatively low scour rates. In addition, the survey coverage and instrument resolution are 
all considerations when using this method. 
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2.2.2.4 Scour Degradation 
Ice scours are degraded and eroded over time. Lewis et al. (1987) describes a method to 
estimate scouring rates from information on scour degradation and infilling rates for the 
Grand Banks. The approach assumes that the present scour population reflects an 
equilibrium between the rates of scour obliteration and scour formation. Thus by 
determining the rate of obliteration, the rate of replenishment or formation can be 
predicted. Based on this approach, Lewis et al. (1987) estimate that the present scour 
conditions at the Hibernia area would equal to a scour rate of about 1.0 x 10-3. The 
effects of water depth and soil type need to be better understood before this approach can 
be used with any degree of confidence. 
2.2.2.5 Summary 
There is a level of uncertainty associated with each of the techniques presented above that 
must be taken into consideration when determining iceberg scour frequencies. For 
example, when utilizing the method of geological inference, estimating the age of the 
accumulated scours has potential for error. Croasdale et al. (2000) computes a factor of 
about 5 between the upper and lower bound scour frequency. This approach 
demonstrates the potential level of uncertainty involved when using such methods. A 
summary of scour frequency estimates utilizing the techniques outlined above from 
various sources is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Summary of Scour Frequency Estimates for the North-East Grand 
Banks from Various Sources 
Reference Method 
Frequency Estimate 
(scours/km2/year) 
King et al. (2003) Grounding Model 6.2 x w-4 
C-CORE (2001a) Geological Inference 1.0 x w-3 
Geological Inference- Upper Bound 4.0 X 10-4 
Croasdale et al. (2000) Geological Inference - Lower Bound 8.3 X 10-5 
Grounding Model 4.0 X 10-4 
Meyers et al. ( 1996) Repetitive Mapping 6.7 x w-4 
Geonautics Limited (1991) Repetitive Mapping 1.9x 10-4 
Geological Inference 4.0 X 10-4 
Lewis et al. (1987) Grounding Model 3.5 X 10-3 
Repetitive Mapping 1.0 X 10-3 
Scour Degradation 1.0 x w-3 
2.2.3 Scour Characteristics 
Scour characteristics have been determined from various geophysical data sets conducted 
on the Grand Banks using a variety of detection techniques. The GBSC has been an 
important tool in bringing this information together and determining spatial distribution 
and statistical properties of scour depth, width, length, orientation and iceberg pits. 
2.2.3.1 Scour Depth 
Sour depth distribution is often regarded as the most important issue for risk to subsea 
facilities as it is required to determine the proportion of scours that penetrate deep enough 
into the seabed to damage an installation located on or beneath the mudline. It is also one 
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of the most difficult to characterize because the resolution of the seabed surveys results in 
the under-sampling of shallow depths, influencing the overall depth distribution. When 
measured scour depths are below the survey resolution they are sometimes assigned a 
value equal to the resolution (McKenna et al., 2003). Scour infilling is another factor to 
consider with respect to scour depth measurement distribution, especially in non-cohesive 
sediment as some level of scour infilling occurs during, or immediately following the 
scouring process. In addition, variations in depth across the width and differences in 
elevation between the start and endpoint of the scour (rise-up) result in difficulties 
evaluating traditional survey data to determine precise scour depths. 
Croasdale et al. (2000) presents a maximum scour depth reported in the GBSC of 7m 
occurring in the I 50-170m water depth range. For the 90-11 Om water depth range, the 
maximum depth is 3m with a mean of 0.48m. Mean and standard deviations of scour 
depth reported by Terra Nova ( 1997) are in close agreement with those of Croasdale et al. 
(2000). For the reported range of water depths of 80- 120m, the mean depth was 0.6m. 
Mean scour depth calculated for the White Rose region is considerably lower at 0.34m. 
This difference is due, in part, to the analysis technique used in the study to account for 
sub-resolution scour depth measurements. In addition, pits or craters may have been 
included to derive the Terra Nova result (C-CORE, 2001a). 
2.2.3.2 Scour Width 
Scour width is required for the calculation of scour crossing frequency over subsea 
structures. Scour width is perhaps the most defined of all scour characteristics and is 
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relatively insensitive to location and water depth (Croasdale et al., 2000). Scour width is 
traditionally measured from crest to crest of the berms formed on the edges of the scour. 
The mean width of iceberg scour marks on the Grand Banks is approximately 25m. For 
the 90 -11Om water depth range, Croasdale et al. (2000) reports mean and maximum 
widths of 26m and 200m respectively. Similarly, mean scour depths reported by Terra 
Nova (1997) and C-CORE (2001a) are 25m and 24.9m for water depth ranges of 80-
120m and 110-140m, respectively. 
2.2.3.3 Scour Length 
The mean scour length is required to calculate the frequency at which scours cross over 
subsea structures. Determining accurate scour lengths is sometimes difficult to achieve 
depending on the survey data available and methods employed. In many cases, only one 
or neither end of the scour is actually surveyed, resulting in mean scour lengths to be 
consistently underestimated. 
For the northeastern Grand Banks, mean scour lengths are between 500m and lOOOm, 
and have a coefficient of variation of about 1.5 (Croasdale et al., 2000; C-CORE, 2001a). 
For the 90 -110m water depth range, Croasdale et al. (2000) reports mean and maximum 
lengths of 650m and 9,400m respectively. Mean scour lengths reported by Terra Nova 
(1997) and C-CORE (2001a) are 565m and 588m for water depth ranges of80- 120m and 
110-140m, respectively. No significant relationship is noted between scour length and 
water depth. 
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2.2.3.4 Scour Orientation 
For the most part it is very difficult to determine the actual direction of scouring icebergs 
unless there is clear definition of a scour initiation and a terminal pit. Scour orientation 
measurements in the GBSC range from 0°-179° by convention and do not indicate the 
actual scouring direction. Croasdale et al. (2000) reported that the majority of the scours 
in both directions are orientated N-S to NE-SW, with an inferred south to southwest 
scouring direction, consistent with the flow of the Labrador current across the region. In 
addition, it was recognized that preferred iceberg scour orientation was actually 
perpendicular to the bathymetric contours. Results presented by C-CORE (2001a) had a 
similar trend but they went a little further and determined the orientation of scours 
relative to the seabed slope. The results show that there is a tendency for icebergs to 
scour in a direction about -35° relative to the down-slope direction, which corresponds to 
NNE for the study region. 
2.2.3.5 Iceberg Pits 
Pit features are not included with scours because they are best treated independently in 
risk analysis. Approximately 30% of the GBSC records are iceberg-created pits and have 
an average depth of 3.0m (Croasdale et al., 2000). In contrast, the mean depth of pits 
reported by C-CORE (2001a) for the White Rose study area is 1.1m with a mean linear 
dimension equal to 57m. Within the 1455 scours identified, there were 263 pit or crater 
events contributing only 6% to the area of disturbed seabed study area around White 
Rose. Pits as deep as 1Om have been documented on the Grand Banks. Lewis (1987) 
presents details of a pit detected by sidescan sonar in 87 m of water, 11km east-southeast 
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of Hibernia P-15 well having a depth of approximately 1Om and diameter of about 150m. 
Work by C-CORE (2001a) corroborates this evidence. 
2.2.3.6 Summary 
In general, scour depth, width and length reported by Croasdale et al. (2000), Terra Nova 
(1997) and C-CORE (2001a) are in close agreement. Mean scour depth calculated for the 
White Rose region is considerably lower, however, this is attributed to the analysis 
technique utilized to account for sub-resolution scour depth measurements. 
The work conducted by Croasdale et al. (2000) indicates that there are weak correlations 
between scour characteristics such as depth, width, water depth, sediment type and 
orientation. 
A summary of statistical properties for scour depth, width and length according to water 
depth as outlined above are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 Comparison of Scour Characteristics from Various Sources 
Water Length Width Depth 
Reference 
Depth (m) (m) (m) 
(m) Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
C-CORE (2001a) 110-140 588 784 24.9 14.4 0.34 0.30 
Croasdale et al. (2000) All depths 542 743 26 17 0.72 0.70 
Croasdale et al. (2000) ~110m 560 714 24 17 0.50 0.40 
Croasdale et al. (2000) >110m 523 775 28 18 0.88 0.82 
Terra Nova (1997) 80-120 565 618 25 14 0.60 0.30 
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3.0 MARGINAL SUBSEA DEVELOPMENTS 
3.1 General 
To date, four major oil fields (Hibernia, Terra Nova, White Rose and Hebron) have been 
discovered on the Grand Banks. Three of which, Hibernia, Terra Nova and White Rose 
have been brought on stream with permission from the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore 
Petroleum Board (C-NOPB) to produce on average 220,000 bopd, 150,000 bopd and 
100,000 bopd, respectively. The Hebron development is still under commercial and 
technical evaluation. In addition to the four major oil fields, more than ten smaller oil 
and gas discoveries have also been made on the Grand Banks (see Figure 11 ). 
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Figure 11 
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These mmor fields, which include discoveries such as West Ben Nevis, Mara and 
Springdale, collectively have estimated in-situ oil reserves of approximately 290 million 
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barrels and gas reserves of about 1.3 trillion cubic feet (C-NOPB, 2006). Typical oil 
reserve estimates for smaller fields are in the order of 10 to 30 million barrel range, with 
well productivities expected to be quite low. Since most of these smaller fields are the 
result of one discovery well, there is some uncertainty relating to their current oil reserve 
estimates and they could change considerably, should further delineation drilling be 
carried out. A summary of the petroleum reserves and resources for the Grand Banks as 
compiled by the C-NOPB is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 Petroleum Reserves<•> and Resources<2> Grand Banks (C-NOPB, 2005) 
Field Name Oil Gas NGL'st-'J 
mjx 10{} million mjx 10{} billion mjx 10{} million 
bbl cu. ft. bbl 
Hibernia 197.8 1244 50.6 179 32.2 202 
TerraNova 56.3 354 1.3 45 0.5 3 
Hebron 92.4 581 - - - -
White Rose 45.0 283 76.7 2722 15.3 96 
West Ben Nevis 5.7 36 - - - -
Mara 3.6 23 - - - -
Ben Nevis 18.1 114 12.1 429 4.7 30 
North Ben 2.9 18 3.3 116 0.7 4 
Nevis 2.2 14 6.7 238 - -
Springdale 2.1 13 - - - -
Nautilus 1.6 10 - - - -
King's Cove 1.3 8 - - - -
South Tempest 1.1 7 - - - -
East Rankin 0.9 6 - - - -
Fortune 0.6 4 4.1 144 1.2 8 
South Mara 5.7 36 - - - -
West Bonne - - 13.3 472 1.8 11 
Bay - - 0.8 30 0.2 1 
North Dana 
Trave 437.3 2751 168.9 5990 56.6 355 
Sub-Total 
Notes: 
(1) "Reserves" are volumes ofhydrocarbons proven by drilling, testing and interpretation of 
geological ,geophysical and engineering data, that are considered to be recoverable using current 
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technology and under present and anticipated economic conditions. Hibernia, Terra Nova, and are 
classified as reserves. 
(2) "Resources" are volumes of hydrocarbons, expressed at 50% probability of occurrence, 
recoverable that have not been delineated and have unknown economic viability. 
(3) Natural Gas Liquids 
(4) Produced oil reserves also include a small quantity of natural gas liquids. Produced volumes 
as of December 31 2005 
Although these smaller fields do not appear to contain sufficient oil reserves to justify 
stand-alone development, they may be quite attractive as individual satellite field(s) tied 
back to an existing production facility, or in combination, when considered as candidates 
for simultaneous or sequential development (Wright et al., 1997). 
Further exploitation of small and marginal fields will be essential for development of a 
mature oil and gas industry offshore Newfoundland. Existing infrastructure in the region 
such as Hibernia and Terra Nova can be utilized to make fields economic which 
otherwise may not be profitable. Innovative development solutions for the short life span 
of small/marginal fields are required particularly in harsh environments. Stimulating 
fiscal regimes for small field development is as important as state-of-the art technology, 
which reduces development costs and reaches pockets of oil/gas reserves, which a few 
years ago would have been left in the ground as un-producible. The technology to 
produce satellite fields has developed rapidly, and is routinely being used in many mature 
oil and gas provinces to develop small field reserves (10 to 50 million barrels) that are 
present around either fixed or floating production facilities. 
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The most likely development approach for marginal field development involves the use 
of a subsea system of wells tied back to an existing production facility via a flowline, 
commonly referred to as a tieback or step-out. The stimulus for this type of development 
approach has sprung almost entirely from demand in the North Sea, where operators are 
constantly trying to find new ways of making use of processing capacity on their 
platforms. Small reservoirs that are located around producing fields have been accessed 
by subsea wells, with their oil being piped back to existing platforms over distances up to 
10 km, for processing and subsequent export to market (Wright et al., 1997). 
Although there have not been any subsea marginal developments undertaken on the 
Grand Banks to date, local oil and gas operators have already started to evaluate these 
marginal fields as means to boost their production in the region. For example, tapping 
into marginal satellite fields and linking them to the Hibernia facility has been under 
consideration for quite some time. Hibernia Management and Development Company 
(HMDC) has been undertaking exploratory opportunities such as appraisal drilling in the 
A val on portion of the Hibernia field in order to extend the life of the project and such 
development opportunities are currently being evaluated. In addition, Petro-Canada, 
Husky and Norsk Hydro have all been investigating the feasibility of tieback 
opportunities to the existing Terra Nova & White Rose FPSO's. 
At present on the Grand Banks, all produced fluids from subsea wells are transported as a 
multi-phase fluid to the host production facility. The current industry record for the 
longest subsea tieback is 99.2 km, a wellhead to host platform step-out for Shell's Mensa 
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subsea development in the Gulf of Mexico. Plans to set a new world record are already 
in progress with the development of the Statoil's Snow White (Soohvit) project in the 
Barents Sea off northern Norway, due onstream late 2007. The project involves a tieback 
distance of 160 km from the field location via a single 27 inch multiphase pipeline to 
shore (Statoil Sn0hvit Website, 2006). The maximum step-out distance for any subsea 
development is a function of a number of elements including the reservoir temperature, 
pressure, extent of natural drive available, water temperature, water depth and the 
constituents of the fluid itself. If for example, the distances over which produced fluids 
can be transported are increased, the profitability of marginal wells may become greater 
and reduce the need for large production facilities such as the Hibernia GBS and the 
Terra Nova & White Rose FPSO's. 
Flow assurance issues such as hydrate and wax management need close attention as a 
result of very cold on-bottom water temperatures in the area. Secondary flow assurance 
concerns include management of scale and sand. In comparison to the North Sea and 
Gulf of Mexico, offshore Newfoundland has the most onerous requirements for wax 
management from an insulation standpoint (Offshore Magazine, 2004). 
Recent technological advances in multi-phase pumping, metering and separation systems 
for boosting production from individual production wells to production facilities have 
made great strides in recent years. Marginal fields that were uneconomical just a few 
years ago have been brought on stream as a result. Multi-phase pumping systems boost 
dramatically the distance fluids can be transferred while flow meters provide data on well 
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performance and in some cases eliminate the need for a separate production test line. 
Separation systems offer a number advantages such as reducing the risk of hydrate 
formation, reduce backpressure and thus increase tieback length and offers re-injection 
opportunities for separated gas and water in to the reservoir to sustain or increase oil 
production. Other advanced flow assurance technologies such as advanced passive 
flowline insulation and actively-heated flowlines offer some potential solution for the 
harsh Grand Banks environment where colder sea temperatures exacerbate common 
problems. 
Even with the recent technological advances for development of subsea marginal 
developments, there will still be challenges in this area as a result of the harsh 
environmental conditions that exist on the Grand Banks. Obviously, iceberg scour is a 
key consideration for this subsea development approach, particularly as flowline tieback 
lengths increase. The costs and more marginal economics that are normally associated 
with small reserve developments will magnify the importance of the iceberg scour 
consideration for this development scenario. 
3.2 Subsea Production Systems 
One of the forces driving increased use of subsea production systems is the dramatic 
reduction in costs when compared with conventional methods. In many cases, the use of 
a subsea tieback is the only viable option to develop these resources (Devegowda & 
Scott, 2003). 
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Subsea production systems are made up of a number of components that work together as 
an integrated system to provide a means of distributing downhole fluids to a desired 
production facility. The main components of any subsea production system susceptible 
to threats from icebergs include the following: 
• Wellhead 
• Tree 
• Manifold 
• Template 
• Flowline 
• Control System 
• Control Umbilical 
Depending on the type of marginal development, single or multi-well, a number of the 
above components (i.e. manifold and template) may not be required or incorporated into 
the design. A brief description of each of these components is summarized below. 
3.2.1 Wellhead 
Most commonly located at the seafloor, the subsea wellhead provides pressure integrity 
for the well and acts as a structural foundation for a subsea drilling completion. The 
general function of a subsea wellhead system is to support and seal well casing strings, as 
well as supporting the blowout preventer (BOP) stack during drilling and control 
equipment (i.e. subsea tree) after completion. It must be designed as such to transmit 
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applied loads to the casing strings and into the surrounding soil (API RP 17 A, 2002). See 
Figure 12 for illustrations of typical subsea wellheads. 
Figure 12 Typical Subsea Wellheads (Compliments ofDril-Quip) 
3.2.2 Tree 
Connecting to the top of the wellhead, the subsea tree (or Xmas tree) is the primary well 
control device. It consists of an assembly of components whose purpose is to contain 
reservoir pressure and permit access to the reservoir for maintenance and measurement. 
Trees normally consist of an arrangement of remotely controlled valves and piping to 
control the flow of oil and gas to and from the wells (see Figure 13). 
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Figure 13 Typical Subsea Xmas Trees (Compliments of Offshore-Technology) 
Subsea trees are used to control gas and/or oil production from a well, or water or gas 
injection into a well. Once in place, routine visual inspection and minor maintenance is 
generally carried out by the use of remotely operated vehicles (ROV's). The ROV's are 
outfitted with the necessary tooling systems to interface with the tree. The interventions 
can be either mechanical such as turning valve stems or hydraulic for direct actuator 
control (i.e. hot stab). In order for the ROV's to gain clear access to the trees at all times, 
an ROV access corridor of approximately 3m to 5m (will vary depending on the ROV 
type) must be specified around outer the extremity of tree footprint. 
Subsea trees are available in a wide range of sizes and configurations. They include 
conventional versus insert or caisson trees, vertical versus horizontal and single versus 
multiple completion capacity. Plan dimensions of conventional vertical subsea trees are 
generally less than 5m x 5m and have heights above seabed level of about 5m to Sm. 
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For iceberg prone areas and in heavily traveled shipping lanes and fishing areas, trees can 
be situated below the seabed in order to provide protection. These concepts will be 
explored in more detail in Section 4.0. 
3.2.3 Manifold 
A subsea manifold is a system of piping and associated equipment used to collect 
production fluids from multiple wells or distribute injection fluids (see Figure 14 below). 
Figure 14 Typical Subsea Manifolds (Compliments of Offshore-Technology) 
Production fluids are generally directed into flowlines sent back to the production facility 
while the injection fluids (water or gas) travel in the opposite direction and are directed 
into the wellbore and reservoir. In addition, gas lift and chemical injection fluids are also 
commonly distributed through manifolds. The associated equipment may include valves, 
connectors for flowline and tree interfaces and chokes for flow control. The manifold 
system may incorporate a control system and is sometimes an integral part of a template, 
or as in most cases, installed as a separate unit on its own. As with subsea trees, clear 
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ROV access is required around the perimeter of the manifold structure for inspection, 
maintenance and required operations. Dimensions of manifolds vary greatly in size and 
depend on the particular application and the number of wells it has been designed to 
accommodate. 
3.2.4 Template 
Development wells can be completed as individual stand-alone satellite wells or as 
template wells. Templates are basically steel structures, incorporating a variety of 
equipment guides, designed to provide structural support for a number of wellheads, 
Xmas trees and in some cases provisions for manifolds into a single subsea component 
assembly (see Figure 15 below). 
Figure 15 Typical Subsea Templates (Compliments of FMC Kongsberg) 
After the wells have been drilled, the template serves as a mounting base and provides 
structural support for wellhead equipment and manifold. Template production trees can 
be connected directly to a production facility via flowlines and risers. As with manifolds, 
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templates require clear ROV access and vary greatly in size. Templates used on the Terra 
Nova subsea development have varying number of wells (2-5) with plan dimensions of 
approximately 12m by 14m and stand approximately 8m in height. 
3.2.5 Flowlines 
Subsea flowlines provide a means of transporting fluid throughout a subsea production 
system. Flowlines function as production lines where fluid is routed to the production 
facility and injection lines, to bring chemicals, water and gas to the well bore and 
reservoir. Flowlines required for subsea production systems can be divided into three 
different categories: 
• Inter-field flowlines: connecting the production facility to single field satellite 
well(s) or manifold I template structure(s) consisting of a number of wells; 
• Intra-field flowlines: connecting field manifold I template structures to one another; 
• Satellite well flowlines: connecting each satellite well to a field manifold I template. 
Figure 16 illustrates a typical subsea flowline layout whereby inter-field flowlines are 
utilized to tie-back a number of subsea manifolds to a central floating production system. 
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Figure 16 Typical Subsea Flowline Layout (Compliments of Offshore-
Technology) 
The length and size of flowlines depend on the final field layout and subsea architecture. 
Flowlines may be buried in trenches or left on the surface depending on flow assurance, 
stability and protection requirements. The flowlines can be of either rigid steel or flexible 
construction. Breakaway connectors are sometimes provided at the connections to the trees 
and/or manifolds to minimize damage in the event of iceberg impact or fishing gear 
interaction. Depending on the subsea architecture, flowline ends are sometimes terminated 
into structures such as pipeline end terminations or manifolds commonly referred to PLET' s 
and PLEM's, respectively. For some subsea developments, enhanced subsea flowline 
systems in the form of bundles are used. Flowline bundles are generally made up of a 
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number of rigid flowlines and hydraulic control lines which are all contained inside an 
external carrier pipe. Flowline bundles often incorporate manifold systems in the form of 
towheads and have active heating systems for improved flow assurance. See Figure 17 
below which shows a typical flexible flowline and flowline bundle. 
Figure 17 Typical Flexible Flowline and Bundle (Compliments of Technip and 
Subsea 7) 
3.2.6 Control System 
The subsea control system provides a communication control link between the production 
facility and the subsea system. Currently, the preferred industry control method involves 
the use of multiplex electro-hydraulic systems. Control modules are generally mounted 
on the individual trees or manifold components and signals are fed to the modules from 
the surface. The control system includes monitoring of well pressure and temperature, 
valve positioning, voltage, electric current, hydraulic pressure and electronic system 
condition monitoring. 
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3.2.7 Control Umbilical 
As an integral component of the subsea control system, the subsea control umbilical 
provides the direct hard communication link between the production facility and the 
subsea system. Umbilicals can be made up of a number of services including hydraulic 
supply, chemical injection lines, electrical and power communication cables (see Figure 
18). The umbilical hoses, lines and cables are generally bundled together in a single line 
and wrapped in an armor layer type construction. Services provided by the umbilical are 
distributed to the wells and manifolds as required. Distribution to multiple satellite wells, 
for example, can be provided by means of short control umbilicals in the form of jumpers 
or flying leads originating from a subsea distribution unit (SDU) for which the main control 
umbilical is terminated. 
Figure 18 Typical Subsea Control Umbilicals (Compliments of DUCO) 
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3.3 Subsea System Layout 
The layout and architecture of any subsea production system will depend on number of 
inter-related factors including: 
• Oil and gas reserves; 
• Field development strategy; 
• Well design and construction limitations; 
• Well testing requirements; 
• Flow assurance considerations; 
• Wellhead protection philosophy; 
• Drilling, workover and offloading limitations; 
• Subsea hardware selection; 
• Seabed conditions; 
• Subsea equipment installation logistics and cost. 
Figure 19 shows a schematic of a typical subsea development system with all 
components located at seabed level. 
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Depending on the development scenario, marginal subsea developments can vary greatly 
in architecture and layout. Subsea technology in this area includes both single-well and 
multi-well completions incorporating various combinations of subsea components as 
summarized above. A marginal development can consist of one single satellite well or a 
number of wells including one or more production, lift or injector wells. Subsea layout 
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options for marginal fields are generally grouped into two categories; satellite or 
clustered developments. 
Subsea wells that are developed as isolated single satellites can be broken into two 
groups: 
• A single satellite well, tied back to an existing production facility via a flowline 
or; 
• Two or more wells that are drilled as satellites and tied back to a 
manifold/template structure located central to the wells via short flowline sections 
and in-turn tied back to an existing production facility via a flowline. 
Similarly, a cluster development also consist of two forms: 
• Two or more wells that are drilled through a template/manifold structure that is 
tied back to an existing production facility via a flowline or; 
• Two or more wells that are drilled and tied into an adjacent manifold structure via 
flowline jumpers and in-tum tied back to an existing production facility via a 
flowline. 
Functionally, both the satellite and cluster well systems work the same, however, 
components are arranged differently. A hybrid of these two arrangements can exist but 
they will not be explored as a part of this investigation. 
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Multi-well developments are typically faced with the compromise of locating wellheads 
to minimize flowine length and also to minimize drilling deviation angles. Generally, 
shortening the flowline lengths will be at the expense of higher deviation angles. In most 
cases, the minimization of flowline lengths will prevail over the minimization of 
deviation angles (CanOcean, 1990). There are a number of other reasons why clustered 
well arrangements are generally more attractive than satellites for multi-well 
developments on the Grand Banks. These include: 
1. A voids anchor interference problems from drilling vessels and thereby reduces 
risk of equipment damage. 
2. Clustering close to manifold reduces or eliminates well-to-manifold flowlines, 
thereby reducing cost and eliminating the need for pigging and thermal insulation 
between the wellhead and manifold. 
3. Eliminates any additional requirements of flowline trenching for protection 
against fishing and iceberg scour. 
4. Offers advantages during drilling operations by the ability to access several well 
locations without the need to re-moor the drill rig. 
Where well templates are not used for multi-well developments, subsea wells are 
generally spaced at a minimum of 25m away from any other permanent equipment to 
protect the wellhead from falling drilling and workover equipment. In the early days, it 
was very common that many wells would be drilled from a single subsea template, but 
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this has been largely replaced by the use of wells that are completed individually. In 
comparison with manifolds, the geographical spread of template installations is much 
smaller. Manifolds are favored in cluster developments as they allow greater flexibility 
in terms of further tie-ins and daisy-chaining of future developments. In addition, single 
well completions are generally less complex than integrated templates, and offer 
flexibility in terms drilling because the wells can be completed before installing the 
template I manifold system. 
3.4 Representative Marginal Developments 
For the purpose of this study, two representative development systems relating to a 
subsea marginal development on the Grand Banks have been identified. They have been 
selected based on feedback from local oil and gas operating companies in the area and 
represent realistic development approaches. In addition, they are based on the use of 
conventional development equipment with no significant departures from current 
technology. Accordingly, the chosen systems represent both ends of the spectrum in 
terms of size and architecture and represent a realistic development approach for a range 
of cases. They are as follows: 
Case 1: This system is representative of a small field requiring only a single well tied 
back to an existing production facility. 
Case 2: This system is representative of a larger multi-well development, which is tied 
back to an existing production facility. The six wells are laid out as a cluster 
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development with a manifold central to the wells that are grouped in two rows of 3 on 
either side of the manifold. 
Development details of both systems are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 Representative Subsea Marginal Developments for the Grand Banks 
Description Case 1 Case2 
Recoverable Oil Reserves 20 50 
(mmbbls)1 
Step-out Distance (km) 5 10 
Water Depth (m) 80-150 80-150 
Number of Wells (total) 1 6 
- Production 1 3 
-Injector - 3 
Well Productivity (bopd) 15,000 20,000 
Peak Production (bopd) 15,000 40,000 
Field Life (years) 6 8 
Number of Flowlines 2 4 
- Production 2 2 
-Injector - 1 
- Lift - 1 
Number of Control Umbilicals 1 1 
Number of Manifolds/Templates - 1 x6 slot 
Notes: 
1. Only oil reserves have been considered as they represent the most probable 
development scenario at this time for the regions marginal fields. 
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Figures 20 and 21 below present a schematic of each of the chosen subsea marginal 
developments as detailed in Table 3.2. 
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Figure 20 Representative Subsea Marginal Development- Case 1 
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4.0 WELLHEAD PROTECTION CONCEPTS 
4.1 General 
The threat of icebergs on the Grand Banks has led to the requirement for protection of 
wellheads and has thus become an integral part of subsea developments in the region. 
Regulatory requirements stipulate that appropriate measures in the design of subsea 
protection system components (i.e. wellheads) are taken to minimize the risk of damage 
to the environment from threats such as icebergs. Although the probability of scouring 
icebergs is relatively low on the Grand Banks, the associated risks are high, thus some 
form of protection has been generally accepted in the local Oil & Gas industry in order to 
ensure security of subsea wells. 
The selection of a particular wellhead protection system for a given field should not be a 
stand alone decision but depends on a number of inter-related factors such as field size, 
number of wells in the development, the subsea architecture and hardware, and field 
development flexibility required. In addition, aspects such as safety, environment, 
economics, operability and reliability will undoubtedly play a large role in decision-
making processes. 
Various conceptual methods to protect wellheads from iceberg scour damage exist and 
have been evaluated over the years. Some of which have been successfully implemented 
in areas such as the Beaufort Sea and on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. This section 
describes the wellhead protection options currently available. In addition, a number of 
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novel concepts have been presented, some of which are variations or hybrids/extensions 
to existing concepts. 
4.2 Existing Failsafe Systems 
Currently, failsafe systems are adopted as a part of the design on every well drilled and 
perform an important safety function, especially for offshore installations. These safety 
systems are required to prevent injury to persons, damage to equipment, and serious 
pollution. 
Subsea completions, which include integral wellhead components, should be designed to 
withstand a catastrophic failure in which the subsea tree is removed forcibly from the 
well, sometimes causing substantial damage to the upper wellbore. In the case of the 
Grand Banks region, this could occur when an anchor chain or fishing net is dragged over 
a subsea tree or from a more cataclysmic event such as an iceberg contact/scour event. 
The most common type of failsafe systems adopted for well installations is the subsurface 
safety valve (SSV). Safety valves are vitally essential in offshore wells with harsh 
environments such as on the Grand Banks. These components are installed in wells with 
the hope that they will never be needed and offer significant safety margins by 
incorporating automatic shut-off valves in the wellbore. In the event of a major incident, 
however, this critical safety devise is subject to high demands. They provide the ultimate 
protection against uncontrolled flow between a producing formation and the surface in 
case of a catastrophic damage to wellhead equipment. 
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Two types of subsurface safety valves are available: surface controlled and subsurface 
controlled. Given the difficulties in testing or confirming the efficiency of these valves, 
surface-controlled safety valves are much more common. Set in the upper wellbore 
below the mudline, a surfaced controlled-subsurface safety valve (SCSSV) is installed to 
provide emergency closure of the producing conduits in the event of an emergency such 
as a wellhead failure. The safety-valve system is designed to be fail-safe, so that the 
wellbore is isolated in the event of any system failure or damage to the surface 
production-control facilities. There are two basic operating mechanisms: valves operated 
by an increase in fluid flow and valves operated by a decrease in ambient pressure. 
Figure 22 provides a typical illustration of the valves inner workings. The valves are 
hydraulically operated and fail-safe, that is, if the control signal or power is lost the 
valves will fail in the closed position. 
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Two general failure modes can be identified in subsea completions: mechanical failure 
above and below the tubing hanger. In failure below the tubing hanger, which is the 
more serious of the two, the SCSSV's must be located at a position in the tubing that is 
below the calculated point of failure or area of influence (Nuttall, 1991). The SCSSV is 
run as an integral part of the completion string, normally positioned a minimum of 30m 
below the mudline. Recently, SCSSV's have been set at depths greater than lOOOm 
below mean seabed level in the Gulf of Mexico, setting an industry record (Schlumberger 
Website). 
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Perhaps the most regulated component of an oil and gas well, the SCSSV must satisfy 
stringent technical, quality and operational requirements. The industry has made huge 
technical advances over the past few decades with great improvements in product 
reliability and Mean Time to Failure (MTTF), which is a measure of how long a 
particular component or even the whole network is expected stay working. A significant 
improvement in SCSSV performance has resulted, from an initial MTTF of 14.2 years 
(1983) to the most recent result of36.7 years (1999). This represents a tremendous boost 
in well production availability and availability of the SCSSV as a safety barrier (Moines 
& Strand, 2000). 
The first safety devise to control subsurface flow was used in US inland waters during the 
mid 1940's. This Otis Engineering valve was dropped into the wellbore when a storm 
was imminent and acted as a check valve to shut off flow if the rate exceeded a 
predetermined value. A 1969 blowout in a well in the Santa Barbara Channel off 
California, USA, led to 197 4 regulations that required the use of subsurface safety 
systems on all offshore platforms and installations in US federal waters (Garner et al., 
2003). Many of the worlds other countries exploring for and developing oil and gas 
reserves have since followed suit. 
Regulations for requirements of these safety valves vary between oil and gas provinces 
throughout the world. For all wells drilled in Canada, there is a specific requirement for 
the inclusion of a SCSSV. As stipulated by the C-NOPB under the Newfoundland 
Offshore Area Petroleum Production and Conservation Regulations, under Section 25 (1) 
to (4), require that: 
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"(1) Subject to subsection (2), an operator shall ensure that a development well is 
equipped with a SCSSV that is installed 
(a) in the tubing at least 30m below the seafloor; and 
(b) in the annulus of the well at least 30 m below the sea floor where gas lift is 
used and where the wellhead is located above sea level. 
(2) Where a development well is located in a zone where permafrost is present in 
unconsolidated sediments, the operator shall install an SCSSV in the tubing at least 30 m 
below the base of the permafrost. 
(3) An operator shall not operate a development well unless the specifications, design, 
installation, operation and testing of each SCSSV installed on the well are in accordance 
with API Spec 14A Specification for Subsurface Safety Valve Equipment, and the API RP 
14B Recommended Practice for Design, Installation, Repair and Operation ofSubsurface 
Safety Valve Systems. 
(4) An operator shall ensure that every SCSSV installed in a development well is 
(a) pressure tested forthwith after installation; and 
(b) function tested at least once every six months after the test referred to in 
paragraph (a)." 
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In addition to the legislative requirement of SCSSV' s, operators generally specify a 
requirement for a double barrier in wells that can sustain natural flow. Additional 
downhole safety barriers such as production packers, annulus, gas-lift and inflow control I 
safety valves are sometimes installed on wells and provide extra protection to SCSSV's 
in case of an emergency. These are, however, adopted as secondary failsafe system to 
SCSSV's for well completions and are not specified for all well completion systems. As 
a part of the Terra Nova Development Plan, it was specified that each well would have 
two barriers in the wellbore. These barriers will consist of a packer and a surface-controlled 
subsurface safety valve (SCSSV) in the tubing string of all wells. In addition, each well 
would have a master and an annulus valve in the subsea or insert tree. All valves were 
specified as being of a fail-closed design. 
Prior to the development of Terra Nova, Petro Canada looked at the reliability of a single 
SCSSV during concept evaluation stages and decided to install two such valves on all 
production wells located at a depth of approximately 200m from mean seabed. Although 
the valves are highly reliable, a decision was made not to rely on these valves because in 
a situation where an iceberg makes contact with a wellhead, there would be concerns of 
the tubing being pulled/yanked and unable to maintain integrity of the well (S. O'Brien, 
personal communications, 2003). 
4.3 Open Glory Hole 
The open or uncased glory hole protection concept consists of a large depression 
excavated in the ocean floor (See Figure 23). The hole allows standard equipment such 
as wellheads and satellite Xmas trees or multi-well templates to be placed in the bottom 
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of the glory hole below the potential scour depth of a large iceberg. Structures in these 
open holes are only affected by scouring icebergs, since the structures would not extend 
above the mudline. For this reason, icebergs should not impact the production equipment 
and remedial work should not be required. 
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The excavated depression is generally made large enough to allow for stable side slopes 
to insure stability of the soil. The glory hole should be sufficient to accommodate 
equipment requirements while at the same time provide adequate freeboard above the top 
of the equipment to allow for iceberg mechanisms such as scour, heave, pitch and 
rotation as it enters the hole. 
Open glory hole excavation requires an extensive and costly construction period prior to 
commencement of drilling operations. A variety of factors such as soil conditions, water 
depth, environmental conditions and the remoteness of the work influence the overall 
cost of such excavations. A number of methods have been proposed and used over the 
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years to excavate these holes; most of which have been developed for dredging of 
harbors, shipping channels and offshore diamond mining. 
The history of open glory holes date back to early exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea 
during the late 1970's. The first 3.7m diameter bit was designed built and tested by Dome 
Petroleum Ltd. in 1978 as a glory hole excavation tool but met with limited success, 
however, the basic concept proved effective for excavating glory holes (Shields, 1994). 
Prior to 1982, glory holes excavated for the purpose of protecting subsea wellhead 
facilities from ice keel scour in the Beaufort Sea were completed entirely using large 
diameter bits deployed from drill ships. Since then, glory holes have been completed 
using a variety of dredging technology such as cutter suction, trailer and hydraulic grab 
dredging techniques (Stewart & Goldby, 1984). Three such excavation methods have 
been utilized to date on the on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland in order to successfully 
excavate a total of eight glory holes for both the Terra Nova and White Rose subsea 
development projects. Using an offshore construction vessel as its platform, large 
diameter reverse circulation drilling, trailing suction hopper dredging and clamshell grab 
systems have each been employed for the excavation of these glory holes with varying 
results. 
The size of a glory hole depends on the equipment that is to be installed and this, in tum, 
depends on the number of wells that are to be completed within the glory hole. Base 
dimensions, for example, of the largest glory hole excavated for Terra Nova that consists 
of a 10 well multi-template system was 65m by 25m, roughly equivalent in size to a 
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tennis stadium while the mudline dimensions reached up to 120m (Allen, 2000). Glory 
hole dimensions must be such to allow for sufficient space to install equipment and make 
flowline connections etc. In addition, a minimum clearance of approximately 3.5m 
around all equipment is required at the operational level to allow standard subsea 
completions and accommodate ROV access for routine visual inspection, operations and 
maintenance once the equipment is in place. These minimum dimensions will vary 
slightly depending on the type of equipment, subsea layout/architecture and ROV 
specification. 
Glory hole depths depend on the height of the structure placed in the glory hole, since the 
clearance above the structure is the main consideration. The required depth of a glory 
hole for the Grand Banks region is in the order of 9m to 1Om, which is the necessary 
depth to allow minimum height of the conventional wellheads above the seabed with a 
margin of several meters to allow for iceberg scour and other iceberg movement 
mechanisms such as heave as it enters the glory hole. 
Excavation of side slopes is dependant on both practical requirements and soil stability. 
Glory holes excavated in the dense soil conditions of the Grand Banks have been 
excavated with side slopes of 3:1 (horizontal:vertical) and steeper. To facilitate the 
installation of flowlines and umbilicals, one of the four sides can be constructed with a 
more gradual slope of5:1, commonly called a "Ramp". 
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C-CORE (1997) conducted a study into the behavior of icebergs entering an open glory 
hole. A force equilibrium model of icebergs during steady state scouring of the seabed 
was combined with a model of transient motion to estimate the maximum penetrations of 
iceberg keels below the mudline for icebergs encountering deep open glory holes. The 
model results indicate that significant reductions in the probability of a scouring iceberg 
keel contacting seabed facilities can be achieved by placing those facilities in deep open 
glory holes. 
Although a variety of research has been undertaken relating to the adequacy of glory 
holes, the value of these depressions in the seabed are questionable because of the 
potential for rubble to be pushed ahead of the large ice structures as it scours the seafloor. 
Equipment is still potentially susceptible to damage by scour debris and penetration by an 
unstable iceberg, which can heave, pitch and roll into it. In addition to the uncertainties 
relating to iceberg scour, these depressions do not provide protection from anchors or 
fishing net damage. 
4.4 Cased Glory Holes (or Submarine Silo) 
Cased glory holes and submarine silos are similar in concept to open glory holes but 
allow a much reduced excavation volume by use of a reinforced casing or cylindrical 
structure (steel or concrete) around the hole perimeter (See Figure 24). 
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Cased glory holes and submarine silos integrate a casing or cylindrical structure set at a 
depth that provides protection and adequate clearance below the seafloor for the wellhead 
and Xmas tree that will be placed inside. The casing structures for some concepts extend 
slightly above the mudline, exposing it to contact from scouring, as well as freely floating 
icebergs with drafts between the water depth and the top of the structure. The upper 
section of the casing has been traditionally isolated by a weak shear joint located at a pre-
determined elevation below seabed level. In the case of iceberg impact, the casing is 
sheared at the weak joint and the upper section of the casing is sacrificed, leaving the 
lower section of the casing, wellhead and Xmas tree intact. An iceberg impact would 
break the glory hole casing at the shear point, leaving the bottom part intact and the 
production tree and wellhead undamaged. The cased glory hole or silo is expected to be 
reusable after impact. Remedial work could consist of cleaning up the debris in the cased 
glory hole, installing a new top section of glory hole casing, and reconnecting flowlines and 
umbilicals. In addition, a roof can be provided to protect the conventional trees against 
dropped objects, dragging anchors, fishing gear and natural silting. 
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The cased holes or silos are large diameter cylindrical structures, typically 6m to 1Om in 
diameter and up to 20m in depth. The purpose of the casing is to make the hole less 
vulnerable to sloughing, ravelling and sand deposition. The internal diameter of the 
cased hole will be large enough to accommodate the tree as well as provide necessary 
ROVaccess. 
Installation can be carried out from a drilling rig or other construction vessel types. The 
cased holes can be installed prior to or during drilling operations. Systems developed to 
excavate cased glory holes and submarine silos include reverse circulation drilling that 
makes use of large diameter drilling technology borrowed from the mining and tunneling 
industries. Other installation techniques such as jetting and suction anchor technology 
can be adopted for areas where the soils are relatively soft and homogeneous; however, 
these systems are not practical for general conditions encountered on the Grand Banks. 
The first commercial well drilled from a floating drilling platform using a cased glory hole 
system that was developed by Tornado Drill® and Gulf Canada. The 7.3m diameter cased 
glory hole for Gulfs Amauligak 0-86 well was drilled from the Kulluk during June of 1988 
to a depth of 13.6m and took 12.5 hours to complete (Gilbert et al., 1989). 
The silo concept for the Grand Banks was first investigated by Mobil for their use on the 
Avalon development at Hibernia to house subsea wellheads. A silo was drilled by the 
drilling contractor Sedco on one of the Hibernia appraisal wells (Ames et al., 1987). During 
69 
the summer of 1990 a field trial to assess the feasibility of using the Tornado Drill® 
technology on the Grand Banks demonstrated that a cased glory hole system could 
potentially be used for the Terra Nova Field development. During this campaign, two 
attempts were made to excavate a cased glory hole from the Sedco 710 semi-submersible 
drilling unit at the Terra Nova 0-90 location. The system called for installing a 7.3 m 
diameter steel casing by mounting a large-diameter drill bit in the bottom of it and drilling 
the bit and casing into the seafloor to a depth of 10 to 12m. A combination of time 
constraints, procedural and mechanical problems halted the program at a depth of 9 .4m 
before the planned drilling depth was reached and the full casing was installed (Gilbert and 
Hampton, 1990). 
Based on innovations developed for the Beaufort Sea exploratory wells, the first submarine 
silo structure in the North Sea for the protection of wellhead and Xmas tree equipment was 
successfully installed in 200m of water during the summer of 1993. The structure was 
developed by Saga Petroleum a.s for protection of one water injection well on the Tordis 
Field from heavy trawl and fishing activity in the region. The silo consists of a 9m diameter, 
7.7m high steel cylinder and it was penetrated 6.5m into the seabed. The 1.2m section 
which remained above the seabed were chamfered to make the unit overtrawlable 
(Guttormsen & Wikdal, 1994). 
NAOEA (1996) conducted a study relating to the technical design aspects of a subsea silo 
type structure for wellhead protection and the findings indicated that interaction loads of 
massive icebergs were found to be in the order of 10-30 MN with significant downward 
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components as well as horizontal. Another significant result of the numerical modeling is 
that the load on the keel of the iceberg may cause it to become unstable and if the berg 
were to capsize on top of a silo it is very doubtful that any practical structure could 
withstand the impact. Controlled failure schemes, such as the weak shear joint concept, 
may be effective for cased holes mounted at the seabed level under horizontal loading. 
However, this study indicates that the possible rotation of marginally stable icebergs 
would seriously damage any object with which it comes in contact. 
The cased glory hole or silo system can be adapted to any field size or configuration but 
is particularly suited to single satellite and clustered wellheads. Standard Xmas tree 
design can be used, thus making use of proven technology. The hole must also be large 
enough to accommodate a BOP during the drilling phase but small enough to be run 
through the moon pool of a designated semi-submersible drilling rig or construction vessel. 
Concepts proposed by Ames et al. (1987) and Gilbert et al. (1989) have multi-well 
drilling and completion templates that can accommodate wellhead and tree assemblies 
positioned inside large silos or cased holes ranging from 6.1m to 15m in diameter 
respectively. 
Potential refinements to existing concepts could include installing the structure such that 
the top of the casing I silo is below the maximum scour depth, which would essentially 
eliminate the shear joint and upper casing segments. To protect the equipment below from 
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scour debris for systems that have a shear joint, an inner protective shield above the tree can 
be added to reduce damage and make the task of cleanup following a scour much easier. 
4.5 Caisson Wellhead System 
The caisson wellhead system avoids the need for large-scale excavation of the seabed as 
required for the open and cased glory hole concepts. The approach places those 
components essential to the integrity of the well inside a caisson, at a depth below the 
mudline as to provide permanent protection against environmental and reservoir damage 
from icebergs. It differs from the conventional subsea production tree in that the caisson 
tree is divided into a lower and upper tree assembly. The design provides for installation of 
an insert tree containing lower master control valves installed on the critical wellhead 
components inside a larger than normal casing beneath the seafloor and below expected 
scour depth. The large casing is used to provide access for the wellhead connector and 
the lower tree valves. It uses modified drilling equipment to establish a wellhead to a 
depth of up to 20m meters below the seabed (See Figure 25). 
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Figure25 Caisson Wellhead System 
Wellhead caissons will require the remaining tree functions to be exposed at seabed level 
but this surface equipment is limited to acceptable sacrificial components such as the 
drilling guide base and upper valve block and production tree. Because the upper tree 
portion stands proud of mean seabed level, the caisson wellhead system will be 
threatened by both freely floating and scouring icebergs. The seafloor tree portion of the 
caisson completion can be protected against dropped object protection, dragging anchors, 
fishing gear and natural silting by use of protective covering. 
The caissons are designed to have a weak shear point in the well bore casing located at a 
pre-determined location below the seabed (typically equal to that of the maximum 
anticipated ice scour) to minimize damage to the insert tree. In addition, a breakaway 
flange above the master valve block can be incorporated to reduce the amount of damage 
during the shearing process. In the event of iceberg impact, the upper well bore casing 
and Xmas tree are sacrificed, while leaving intact the hydraulically operated failsafe 
lower production and annulus master valves and wellhead. If a caisson well were 
damaged from iceberg impact, remedial work would consist of removing the surface debris, 
dredging around the wellhead to gain access, and re-entry. If the well could not be re-
entered, another well would have to be drilled to abandon the caisson well. 
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Installation of these systems is carried out from a conventional drilling rig as a part of the 
normal drilling program. However, special running tools and consumable caisson 
materials are required. 
Caisson wellhead systems were originally conceived to protect against fishing gear 
damage. The first 0.762m (30 in.) diameter caisson completion system was installed in 
1981 in the South China Sea. Two 0.914m (36 in.) diameter caisson drilling systems 
were also installed on the East Coast of Canada in 1983-84 (Mcintosh et al., 1987). 
Since then five applications of this concept have been adopted on the Grand Banks to 
protect wellheads from iceberg scour protection. As a part of the Terra Nova Field 
exploration program, Petro-Canada used caisson wellhead systems on five suspended 
delineation wells drilled between 1985 and 1988. The high-pressure wellheads were 
placed in 1.067m (42 in.) diameter steel caissons, 21 m below the seafloor. The five 
existing caisson wells have been drilled and tested in a manner suitable for re-use and can 
potentially be completed as production wells, complete with gas lift capability when the 
appropriate time arises or when the field is proven to be commercial. 
In companson to the mudline profile of conventional Xmas trees, which stand 
approximately 7 -8m in height, the seafloor tree portion of a Caisson completion maintains a 
low profile at 3-4m thus reducing the risk of impact with free floating icebergs. 
CFER (1988) undertook a study for Petro-Canada Resources in order to investigate the 
collapse behavior of the existing 1.067m caisson completion systems and to assess the 
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effectiveness of the system in protecting components essential to the integrity of the 
wellhead against damage that could result from various iceberg-caisson interaction 
scenarios. Using a relatively unsophisticated analytical approach, the findings indicated 
that if all of the variable parameters associated with caisson collapse strength and soil 
properties are favorable, the weak joint will act as intended and the wellhead will be 
protected in the event of collision with a translating iceberg. However, the potential 
variation in caisson strength and soil parameters is sufficient to suggest that, in some 
situations caisson collapse and subsequent wellhead damage could occur before load 
relief is achieved though weak joint separation. Load application in this study was 
restricted to an assumed maximum ice scour depth of 2.5m below the mudline. 
Exploration wells that are located in iceberg-infested waters such as the Grand Banks 
have been traditionally abandoned after testing, mainly because the wellheads have no 
protection against iceberg impact. If a caisson wellhead is used and the well is 
successful, the well will initially be suspended and later re-entered for production. This is 
one key advantage to this type of system as it allows the exploration wells to be used for 
a later development. Obviously the use of a caisson wellhead system results in an 
incremental cost associated with additional rig time and equipments that must be borne at 
the time of drilling. The cost of drilling wells on the Grand Banks and the likelihood of 
future subsea development now justify retaining certain exploration wells for further 
testing and/or completion. 
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Because the production tree is located at mudline level, there is good ROV access for 
routine visual inspection, operations and maintenance. This however is a trade-off 
between the inaccessibility of the insert tree consisting of the lower master valves, which 
give rise to many service and maintenance concerns. 
4.6 Protective External Barrier 
External barriers can be developed by use of a number of materials including rock berms 
and rigid retaining structures made of steel and/or reinforced concrete. Protective 
barriers, located at the mudline, are essentially constructed or installed around the 
wellhead and Xmas tree to shield the equipment inside by either blocking or grounding 
the freely floating or scouring icebergs (See Figure 26). 
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Submerged rock berms are constructed walls on the seafloor formed by the dumping of 
rock material onto the seabed. The protection philosophy simply implies that by building 
rock barriers around an installation to be protected, the free floating or scouring iceberg is 
halted in its path and unable to penetrate the berm to cause damage to the installation. 
One of the main problems with this protection concept is that scouring icebergs always 
have to start moving again and has potential to work its way through the berm and enter 
the protected area. 
Global forces developed due to the impact of very large icebergs on fixed subsea 
structures such as these are in the order of IOO's ofMN's. Whereas External Barriers are 
considered to be technically possible, the associated costs are considered prohibitive and 
are not feasible on economic grounds alone. Massive structures requiring extensive 
offshore installation campaigns are required. Further uncertainties such as the selection 
of ice load design criteria for such structures and the use of unproven technology make 
this option unattractive to local oil & gas operators. In addition, protective barriers offer 
a limited amount of protection from anchors or fishing activities and in general are 
susceptible to greater levels of risk in comparison to other protection concepts because 
they sit proud of the mudline and occupy large areas. 
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4.7 Novel Concepts 
In addition to the existing wellhead protection concepts, a number of novel concepts are 
briefly presented below. Some of the concepts are variations or hybrids/extensions to 
existing concepts while others are novel in their own right. 
4. 7.1 Suction Anchor Technology or/ Large Diameter Driven Caisson 
Using existing technology such as suction anchors or large diameter caissons could 
technically provide a practical solution for iceberg protection. The concept itself is 
essentially a deviation to the Cased Glory Hole I Silo concept (see Figure 27). However, 
due to the dense soil conditions and high presence of cobbles, boulders and hardpan, this 
concept is deemed not practical for Grand Banks region. In addition, installing this 
concept would prove to be expensive since it would require an extensive offshore 
campaign, involving a number of offshore equipment spreads (i.e. pile driving and soil 
excavation spreads). 
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Figure 27 Suction Anchor Technology or/ Large Diameter Driven Caisson 
4.7.2 Large Diameter Driven Pile Barrier 
Utilizing large diameter driven piles to protect a wellhead situated at seabed level is 
essentially a deviation to Protective External Barrier concept (see Figure 28). Although 
this concept provides a practical solution to wellhead protection, there are a number of 
technical issues relating to its ability to resist against local and global iceberg impact 
forces. Due to the highly variable soil conditions and presence of boulders, there is also a 
moderate to high risk of encountering pile refusal during installation activities. As with 
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the protective external barrier, this concept would reqmre an extensive installation 
campaign requiring a large offshore construction vessel and associated equipment spread. 
In addition, materials costs for large diameter piles are relatively high. 
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Figure 28 Large Diameter Driven Pile Barrier 
4. 7.3 Bowling Alley 
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The Bowling Alley concept is essentially a deviation from the traditional Open Glory 
Hole but allows for a minimized excavation volume by situating the manifold outside of 
the excavated hole (see Figure 29). The concept is most appropriate for multi-well 
developments and assumes that the manifold located at the mudline is sacrificial. 
Excavation of the seabed depression is ideally suited to trailer hopper suction dredging 
technology already proven in the area. One big drawback of this concept relates to the 
possibility of the trench becoming a routing guide for a scouring iceberg. Thus, in the 
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case of a scouring iceberg there is an overall increase in risk of contact to multiple wells 
for any single iceberg event. 
"BOWLING ALLEY" 
EXCAVATED SEABED DEPRESSION 
Figure 29 Bowling Alley 
4. 7.4 Bathymetric Shielding 
The simplest of all novel concepts, bathymetric shielding eliminates any requirements for 
conventional wellhead protection as illustrated in Figure 30. This concept utilizes 
existing depressions I undulations in the seabed for protection against icebergs and takes 
into account predominate drift direction for icebergs in the general development region. 
Although this concept offers huge development cost savings, it is site specific and 
depends entirely on the seabed condition at the proposed development area. Decision-
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making relating to this concept relies heavily on iceberg data such as iceberg drift 
direction, drift speed and scour depth collected for the proposed region. 
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Considered as an alternative excavation method for the open glory hole, the use of 
explosives could potentially offer cost savings during the installation phase by allowing 
the hole to be created in a very short period of time (see Figure 31). However, the hole 
formed after detonation will require extensive remedial work to condition bottom of hole 
suitable for placement of subsea equipment such as manifolds and Xmas trees. Although 
considered as a technically feasible solution, this concept will however struggle to meet 
local environmental regulations and is thus considered not a viable alternative. 
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Figure 31 Explosives 
4.7.6 Conventional Xmas Tree With Downhole Weak Shear Joint 
This concept is a modification to conventional Xmas tree installed at seabed level 
whereby a downhole weak shear joint is incorporated into the well conductor pipe (see 
Figure 32). The incorporation of a weak shear joint essentially minimizes the downhole 
structural response in event of iceberg contact to Xmas tree/wellhead and thus increases 
the probability of proper SCSSV functionality. The concept eliminates the need for 
onerous wellhead protection requirements and assumes that the Xmas tree located at the 
mudline is sacrificial. Although there are some additional costs associated with installing 
a conductor with a weak shear joint, there are huge development cost savings when 
compared with other concepts. In addition, conductor weak shear joints have been 
successfully installed on appraisal wells previously drilled on the Grand Banks. 
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Figure 32 Conventional Xmas Tree With Downhole Weak Shear Joint 
4.7.7 Modified Cased Hole 
As presented in Figure 33, the modified cased hole incorporates features in order to 
improve the functionality of the overall concept. The modified concept eliminates the 
existing casing shear plane and upper casing segments by incorporating sloped excavated 
sidewalls for the upper portion of the casing under threat from iceberg scour. Depending on 
the soil conditions, soil reinforcement fabric may be required to stabilize the upper side 
slopes. The addition of an inner protective shield above the tree can also be incorporated to 
reduce damage in the event of a scour and make the task of cleanup following a scour event 
much easier. Installation and material costs for this modified version would be only slightly 
greater than the original design. 
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5.0 RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 
5.1 General 
Due to the fact that Grand Banks is situated in an area prone to icebergs, there is 
significant concern relating to interaction of icebergs with subsea equipment. In order to 
evaluate whether the inherent risks for various subsea wellhead protection concepts are 
tolerable, acceptance criteria must be established to serve as a baseline. Establishing 
acceptance criteria relating to levels of risk is not a straightforward process. 
Consideration must be given to both frequency and consequence of an event occurring. 
In the case of subsea wellhead protection, the greatest concern lies with high potential for 
pollution and damage to the environment rather than loss of life. Major environmental 
consequences can result if a subsea blowout occurs, however, subsea wellhead failure 
does not usually lead to serious consequences with regard to human life. 
Risk acceptance criteria (RAC) is generally used to express a risk level that is considered 
tolerable for a given activity. The RAC constitute a reference for the evaluation of the 
need for risk reducing measures and should be available prior to commencing any risk 
analysis (NORSOK, 2001). Before establishing an acceptable level of risk relating to 
wellhead protection for the Grand Banks region, some general background is necessary 
and an overview of the following relevant areas has been undertaken: 
• General Levels of Risk 
• Regulatory Requirements 
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• Existing Risk Criteria for the Grand Banks 
• Codes and Standards 
5.2 General Levels of Risk 
Risk is composed of two elements, frequency and consequence and can be defined as the 
product of the frequency with which an event is anticipated to occur and the consequence 
of the event's outcome. Risk to personnel is often defined in terms of the annual 
probabilities of injury and fatality for an individual. In our everyday life we face many 
risks that are impossible to avoid and are a result of our everyday activities. As a 
common example, the individual risk (IR) of a personal causality while driving 10,000 
miles per annum is in the order of 1 in 10,000 (1 x 1 o-4) in any given year. This type of 
risk is applicable to the general public where the risks are "involuntary" and exist as a 
part of our society. 
For a person working at a work site, a higher risk level is generally tolerable because they 
gain from being employed at the site -this is "voluntary risk". The risk to individual 
workers may easily be as high as 1 x 1 o-3 per year or more. Recent publications such as 
Wells (1996) as presented in Table 7, provide a summary of target risks that serve as a 
good guideline for the level of risk to the individual acceptable in a working 
environment. 
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Table 7 Risk Values Recommended by Wells (1996) 
Description 
Target Values of Maximum Risk Not to 
be Exceeded 
Employee Individual Risk 
All Process Causes 1 0"4 per year 
Specific Process Causes 1 0"5 per year 
Public Individual Risk 
All Process Causes 1 o·' per year 
Specific Process Causes 1 o·b per year 
Risk of Major Incidents (societal risk) 
Near Miss from All Process Causes 1 0"4 per year 
Accident from All Process Causes 1 0"5 per year 
Catastrophic Accident from All Process Causes 1 o-() per year 
Accident from Specific Process Causes 1 o·b per year 
Catastrophic Accident, Specific Process Causes 10-7 per year 
In the case of an offshore system, the total risk may include causes such as fire, ship 
collision, capsize, and wave loads in addition to ice loads. Statistics that relate to the 
offshore oil and gas industry provide a general indication as to the level of risk associated 
within that industry. Until recently, there have been no offshore production operations 
off the East Coast of Canada, so there is no track record that can be used to determine a 
suitable criterion for IR. However, other industries in Canada and North America, and 
offshore industry in other parts of the world have been examined to assist in setting 
realistic targets. Historical average IR's for the offshore industry based on data from the 
Norwegian and UK sectors of the North Sea (excluding the Piper Alpha data) are 
summarized in Table 8. It must be noted that the Piper Alpha disaster statistics has a 
significant affect on the historical IR levels. It has been neglected by industry because it 
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is believed that this was a "once off event" and would lead to higher levels of risk for 
establishing risk criteria. 
Table 8 Historical Average Individual Risk Data (Husky, 2000) 
Occupation 
AverageiR 
(Excluding Piper Alpha) 
Construction 1.05 X 10-3 
Drilling 8.76 X 10-4 
Production 8.76 X 10-4 
Maintenance 1.93 X 10-3 
Diving 2.19 X 10-3 
Cranes 2.72 X 10-.; 
Domestic 1.75 X 10-4 
Average 1.4 X 10-J 
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the UK Department of Energy's annual 
Brown Book 
Similarly, upon review of the data presented by the Worldwide Offshore Accident 
Database (WOAD, 1998), risk levels to the individual are in the order of 10-3 per year. 
This data includes information on both mobile and fixed offshore units such as jackups, 
semi submersibles, jacket structures and tension leg platforms. Many of the 
accidents/incidents are associated with drilling operations, and greater than half of the 
fatalities were associated with this activity in the years 1980-1997. 
In making design decisions relating to risk, it is important to consider both the 
probabilities and consequences of the events of importance. In the context of this thesis, 
major consequences can result if a subsea blowout occurs, which is of main concern 
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when it comes to subsea wellhead protection. This type of risk is commonly termed 
environmental risk (ER) and can be measured in terms of the amount of oil spillage 
associated with various accident scenarios along with the likelihood of these scenarios. 
Frequency data for accidental spill/release statistics for all units worldwide published by 
WOAD (1998) indicate that rates for large oil spills (1,000 to 10,000 tonnes) is less than 
of 1 o-3. Spill frequency is best expressed in terms of a risk exposure factor based on the 
number of oil wells drilled or billion of barrels of oil produced. If a major spill is defined 
as 150,000 barrels or larger, five such spills have occurred in the history of worldwide 
offshore drilling. This represents a frequency of oil well blowout spills greater than 
150,000 barrels of9.4 x 10-5 per well drilled, or 1 such spill for every 10,600 wells drilled 
(Petro-Canada, 1998). 
5.3 Regulatory Requirements 
As a result of the accident on Piper Alpha on the 6th of July 1988 when 165 people died, a 
public enquiry was held under the chairmanship of Lord Cullen. The recommendations 
from the Cullen Report lead the UK offshore oil and gas industry into adopting a 'Safety 
Case' regime characterized by an acceptance that the direct responsibility for the ongoing 
management of safety is the responsibility of the operator and not the regulator. This 
risk-based approach stipulates that the operators be required to demonstrate to the 
regulator (make a 'case') that they are controlling their risks properly and doing 
everything 'reasonably practicable' for safe operation. 
90 
One of the objectives of a 'Safety Case' is to demonstrate that risk from potential major 
accident events has been reduced to a level "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP). 
ALARP expresses that the risk level is reduced (through a documented and systematic 
process) so far that no further cost effective measure is identified. The requirement to 
establish a cost effective solution implies that risk reduction is implemented until the cost 
of further risk reduction is grossly disproportional to the risk reducing effect (NORSOK, 
2001). The ALARP principle (see Figure 34) used for risk acceptance is applicable to 
risk to personnel, environment and assets alike. 
Figure 34 
Unacceptable risk 
(Upper tolerance limit) 
ALARP region 
Acceptable risk 
(Lower tolerability limit) 
The ALARP Principle (NORSOK, 2001) 
Like the UK offshore, regulatory bodies in Canada have adopted a similar approach. For 
oil and gas developments off the Grand Banks, all operators must fulfill the requirements 
as stipulated by the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NOPB) under 
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the Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Installations Regulations. The Installation 
Regulations, under Section 43 (3) and (4), require that: 
"(3) Target levels of safety for the risk to life and the risk of damage to the 
environment associated with all activities within each phase of the life of the 
production installation shall be defined and shall be submitted to the Chief at the 
time the operator applies for a development plan approval. 
(4) The target levels of safety referred to in subsection (3) shall be based on 
assessments that are 
(a) quantitative, where it can be demonstrated that input data are available in the 
quantity and of the quality necessary to demonstrate the reliability of the results; 
and 
(b) qualitative, where quantitative assessment methods are inappropriate or not 
suitable. " 
In addition, the C-NOPB proposes guidelines that provide an outline as to what should be 
contained in a Safety Plan. A Safety Plan has to be submitted to the C-NOPB by the 
operator as a prerequisite to obtaining an authorization to conduct petroleum related work 
or activities in the Newfoundland Offshore Area. The Operators Safety Plan Guideline 
under Section 2.1, states that: 
"One of the goals of the Safety Plan should be a demonstration that the "Target 
Levels of Safety" submitted as part of the Development Plan have been met and 
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that risks have been reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable. 
However, as the targets referred to above apply to major hazards identified at the 
development concept phase, additional information should be included to 
demonstrate that all significant risks have been considered and are as low as 
reasonably practicable. " 
5.4 Existing Risk Acceptance Criteria for The Grand Banks 
Petro-Canada's Target Levels of Safety for the Terra Nova project (Petro-Canada, 1998) 
describes the acceptable risk levels for incidents related to Terra Nova on an annual basis. 
Within the Target Levels of Safety requirements, Petro-Canada has essentially adopted 
the ALARP framework. This framework prescribes 1 o-4 as a minimum tolerability for 
safety level events with the goal that annual frequencies meet or exceed 10"5 annually. 
Risk for the Terra Nova project should therefore be mitigated at levels above 10"5 where 
practicable, and justification provided where not possible to do so. Table 9 illustrates the 
upper and lower bounds for risk within this ALARP framework. 
Table 9 ALARP Requirements for Terra Nova (Petro-Canada, 1998) 
For any single incident For all incidents 
Intolerable Greater than 1 X 1 0"4 per year Greater than 1 X 1 o-~ per year 
ALARP Region From 1 X 10"4 to 1 X w-) per year From 1 X 1 o-j to 1 X 1 0"4 per year 
Lower band of tolerability Less than 1 x 10"5 per year Less than 1 X 1 0"4 per year 
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Further to this risk base criteria, the relevant risk levels associated with this investigation 
relate to temporary ecological damage. Temporary Ecological Damage criteria are 
considered paramount in the analysis of iceberg impact risks described in this report 
because of the potential for hydrocarbon loss and blowout, should impact occur. Major 
hazard environmental risk is expressed in terms of the 'frequency of oil spills in excess of 
50 barrels'. Petro-Canada's target levels of safety state that the frequency of release 
causing temporary damage to the ecological system in the exposed areas, shall be 1 x 104 
per year for an individual incident and 1 X 10-3 for all incidents. 
Similar to Terra Nova, Husky Oil has adopted the ALARP framework for its White Rose 
project but has imposed more stringent requirements. Target levels of safety for 
individual risk used for the White Rose project are summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10 ALARP Requirements for White Rose (Husky, 2000) 
Level Individual Risk Description 
Intolerable IR> 10-
3 Unacceptable, risk control measures must be taken 
It must be demonstmted that all practical means of risk 
ALARP 10-3 > IR > 10-6 reductions have been employed to ensure that the risk is as 
low as reasonably practicable 
No need to consider further safety measures 
Negligible IR < 10-6 
(For example an IR ofl0-6 means thatthere is a 0.000001 
probability of fatality per year for an individual on the 
installation) 
For design purposes, a "trigger" value of 50 barrels has been defined by both Petro-
Canada and Husky. For an ecological event(s) resulting in hydrocarbon loss to the 
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environment in excess of this criterion, the scenario must be designed out. As for Terra 
Nova, scenarios for White Rose (of spills> 50 barrels) that cannot be designed against 
should be demonstrated to have an aggregate frequency of< 1 X 1 0-J per year. 
It should be noted that for ER, specific risk criteria cannot generally be quantitatively 
defined because of the very nature of possible routes to environmental impairment that 
are difficult to assess using subjectively generated probabilities (Husky, 2000). Where 
quantitative predictive methods allow, the expected oil spill frequency for actual 
operations, for example, iceberg scour collision damage to a subsea wellhead, can be 
compared with historical experience to determine whether the risk of oil spill is 
significantly different. These risks can be managed and reduced using practicable 
methods such as incorporating wellhead protection techniques into the design and 
adopting iceberg management systems. 
5.5 Codes and Standards 
Structures are generally designed to meet specified standards as set out in national codes. 
These codes are developed to insure adequate levels of safety to personnel and to the 
environment, and are developed in consensus by industry, government, and other interest 
groups. 
As outlined above, the C-NOPB defines regulatory requirements for the Grand Banks. 
Their rules refer to Canadian and international offshore standards extensively. 
Unfortunately, there are no codes, standards or regulations that specifically deal with ice 
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effects on sea floor facilities such as wellheads. Allyn (2000) undertook an extensive 
study relating the use of codes for ice loads and structures on the Grand Banks and 
concluded that the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) offshore codes provide the 
best design guidance relating to the Grand Banks ice issues. 
The standard produced by CSA titled: 8471-04 General Requirements, Design Criteria, 
the Environment, and Loads, was reviewed in detail. The standard sets forth 
requirements and guidance on design principles, safety levels, and loads to be used in 
connection with the design, construction, transportation, installation, and 
decommissioning of fixed offshore structures. Clause 4.13 states that: 
"When scour, including ice scour, is expected to occur, the depth and lateral 
extent of scouring shall be evaluated on a site-specific basis and accounted for in 
the design ". 
There is no further references to ice scour, but there is substantial guidance on safety 
issues. The standard states in clause 4.5.1 that one of the main objectives of the design 
shall be to ensure that: 
"(a) the structure and foundation can sustain, during their life, all anticipated 
loads and deformations with an acceptable level of safety (see clause 4.5.2)." 
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The standard then introduces an important aspect in clause 4.5.2 relating to risk levels in 
the form of two "Safety Classes". It defines two safety classes for the verification of the 
safety of the structure or any of its structural elements: 
"Safety Class 1 -failure would result in great risk to life or a high potential for 
environmental damage, for the loading condition under consideration; 
Safety Class 2 -failure would result in small risk to life and a low potential for 
environmental damage, for the loading condition under consideration. " 
Further guidance is provided in the notes provided at the end of the clause: 
"(1) If loading hazards can be predicted sufficiently ahead of time to carry out a 
predefined emergency response plan that ensures personnel safety and 
environmental protection, then, for that particular loading condition, the 
structure may be Safety Class 2. 
(2) A safety class may be assigned to the structure as a whole or to its individual 
structural elements. For example, a structure designated Safety Class 1 as a 
whole may have certain of its structural elements designated Safety Class 2. 
(3) See Appendix A (of the Standard) for further information on the application of 
safety classes and on the associated reliability levels assumed in this Standard. " 
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As a part of formulating the CSA standard, exceedance probabilities and associated load 
factors were chosen in combination with factored resistances to result in a reliability level 
consistent with the target values for the appropriate safety classes. In the case of iceberg 
loads, which are rare events on the Grand Banks, it is recommended that the design loads 
be chosen based on an annual probability of exceedance between 10-3 and 10-4 (see Table 
11). 
Table 11 Annual Exceedence Probabilities For Specified Loads- CSA 8471-04, 
Table A2 (CSA, 2004) 
Safety Class 1 Safety Class 2 
Annual Annual 
Exceedence Load Factor Exceedence Load Factor 
Probability, PE Probability,pE 
Specified loads, E1, 
Based on frequent 10-2 1.35 10-2 0.9 
environmental 
processes 
Specified loads, E, 
based on rare 104 to 10-3 1.0 10-2 1.0 
environmental 
events 
Specified 
accidental load, A 10-4 to 10-3 1.0 N/A N/A 
Note: Rare environmental events have an annual probability of occurrence of less than 0.5. 
Values of target reliability levels given in the standard were determined from calibrations 
made to existing design rules for offshore structures and basic considerations of safety of 
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life and environment. For the calibration exercise, a range of conditions were considered 
with values of probability of failure falling in the range of 1 o-4 to 1 o-6 per annum for most 
conditions. The main reliability target of 1 o-s per annum was chosen for Safety Class 1 
and is illustrated in Figure 35. 
Figure 35 
Target \lalue 
lntolerable 
Illustration of Targets in the CSA Code for Safety Class 1 (Allyn, 
2000) 
Similarly, target safety levels for Safety Class 2 and for serviceability (Impaired function) 
were given as 10-3 and 10-1 per annum, respectively as summarized in Table 12. 
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Table 12 Safety Classes and Reliability Levels- CSA S471-04, Table Al (CSA, 
2004) 
Target Annual 
Consequences of Failure Reliability Level 
Safety Class 1 Great risk to life or high potential for 1-1 o-5 
environmental pollution or damage 
Safety Class 2 Small risk to life and low potential for 1-1 o-3 
environmental pollution or damage 
Serviceability Impaired function 1-10-1 
In addition to the CSA standards, a review of equivalent international codes has been 
undertaken with focus on information pertaining to risk and reliability levels, 
specification of distinct safety classes and guidance related to iceberg scour. In general, 
there was not a large amount of detail given to iceberg scour, however, ISO 19902, 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Fixed Steel Offshore Structures (Draft 
International Standards 2003) presents a strategy whereby "life safety classes" 
(representing manned and unmanned installations) and "consequence categories" (low, 
med & high) are used (ISO, 2003). The required reliability or annual probabilities of 
exceedance associated with design loads or actions depend on each of these. 
ISO 19902 takes an approach whereby structures can be categorized by various levels of 
exposure to determine criteria that are appropriate for the intended service of the 
structure. This applies to the design of new structures and to the assessment of existing 
structures. 
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The life-safety category addresses personnel on the platform and the likelihood of 
successful evacuation before a design environmental event occurs. Clause 6.6.2 states 
that: 
The category for life-safety shall be determined from: 
a) Sl Manned non-evacuated 
b) S2 Manned evacuated 
c) S3 Unmanned 
The consequence category considers the potential risk to life of personnel brought in to 
react to any incident, the potential risk of environmental damage and the potential risk of 
economic losses. Clause 6.6.3 states that: 
Factors that should be considered in determining the consequence category include: 
• Life-safety of personnel on, or near to, the platform brought in to react to any 
consequence of failure, but not personnel that are part of the normal complement 
of the platform; 
• Damage to the environment; 
• Anticipated losses to the owner, to other installation owners, to industry and/or to 
other third parties as well as to society in general. 
The consequence category shall be determined from: 
a) Cl High consequence category 
b) C2 Medium consequence category 
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c) C3 Low consequence category 
It is recognized that consequence category definitions include a degree ofjudgment. The 
category that applies to a structure shall be determined by the owner of the structure 
prior to the design of a new structure and shall be agreed by the regulator where 
applicable. 
The 3 categories for each of life-safety and consequence can be combined into 9 exposure 
limits as presented below in Table 13. 
Table 13 Determination of Exposure Level- ISO 19902, Table 6.6-1 (ISO, 
2003) 
Consequence Category 
Life-safety Category Cl High C2Medium ClLow 
Consequence Consequence Consequence 
Sl Manned Non-evacuated Ll Ll Ll 
S2 Manned Evacuated Ll L2 L2 
S3 Unmanned Ll L2 L3 
In 1999, the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) embarked on an initiative to revise 
the existing Offshore Standards including CSA S471. This revised CSA code has set the 
basis for harmonization with the ISO Offshore Structures Code (Frederking et al., 2004). 
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5.6 Application to Wellhead Protection 
With all wellhead installations, there is potential threat to the environment by means of 
pollution. In order to minimize this risk, these systems are generally provided with 
barriers in the well bore, including a surface-controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV) 
and a fail-closed master valve in the subsea or insert tree. For wellheads that are 
susceptible to potential damage from scouring icebergs these threats are even greater. 
Under these conditions alternative protection techniques as discussed in Chapter 4 must 
be strongly considered along with employing iceberg management programs. 
Major environmental consequences can result if a subsea blowout occurs as a result of 
iceberg impact, and is thus the main concern when considering wellheads. A subsea 
release of well fluid from oil producers would result in a pool forming on the sea surface. 
The location of the subsea wells would be such that they would be considerable distance 
from the main installation and risks to personnel are considered remote. In addition to 
the environmental ramifications, the business consequences of significant damage to an 
asset could also be very high, particularly if a wellhead was lost because of iceberg scour. 
Securing a well that has been damaged could conceivably take months and cost tO's of 
millions of dollars. Well productivities for typical producer wells on the Grand Banks 
reach as high as 30,000 bbl ( 4800 m3) per day. If such of an event were to occur, it 
would potentially be catastrophic to the environment and oil and gas community alike. 
With regard to the two levels of safety as presented in CSA S471-04, Safety Class 1 
would result in great risk to life or a high potential for environmental damage. For the 
103 
case of a subsea blowout, extreme consequences would result if a release of thousands of 
m
3 per day for several or more days occurred. This would correspond to the case where a 
wellhead that was damaged as a result of an extremely deep scour or damage to the 
valves causing loss of integrity to the well. In this case, blowout of a well on iceberg 
contact presumes that the downhole SCSSV fails to function correctly. Subsea system 
components such as wellheads and Xmas trees fall into Safety Class 1 because they offer 
high potential for environmental damage if impacted directly by an iceberg. 
Safety Class 2, which would result in small risk to life and low potential for 
environmental damage, would only apply in this case if the reliability of the emergency 
response measures and/or backup control systems was clearly demonstrated to be 
adequate for any eventuality. Obviously, systems offering this level of reliability would 
be difficult to achieve for events such a subsea well blowouts that normally take days to 
even months to bring under control. Subsea system components such as flowlines, 
umbilicals and manifolds fall into Safety Class 2 because they offer small risk to human 
life and low potential for environmental damage if impacted directly by an iceberg. These 
subsea components are generally located at or above seabed level and are essentially 
considered sacrificial parts of the overall subsea system. Subsea facilities, such as these 
are designed with failsafe systems to minimize any adverse environmental effects in the 
event of failure or damage. Having the flowlines and manifolds on the seafloor will 
provide access for inspection, testing, repair, replacement or removal. In order to minimize 
spills caused by possible ice scour, the affected subsea facilities will be shut in and flushed 
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with injection water. Emergency shutdown valves and weak links are installed to 
minimize environmental harm from accidental damage. 
For the purpose of this study, it will be assumed that any contact between an iceberg and 
an Xmas tree or wellhead could result in a blowout, resulting in an uncontrolled oil flow 
from the well releasing large quantities of hydrocarbons into the environment. This is 
clearly a Safety Class 1 event. Other installations, such as flow lines, where the potential 
damage to the environment is small, should be treated using Safety Class 2 guidelines. 
5. 7 Recommendations 
Allyn (2000) states that the safety class targets that are specified in the CSA fixed 
structure design code can be used to gauge the consistency in reliability targets for 
seafloor facilities such as wellheads. However, large uncertainties relating to the nature 
and risk of iceberg scour on the Grand Banks, along with the unknowns about the 
effectiveness of various protection schemes, make this type of assessment approach quite 
challenging. 
In the absence of more specific methodology and guidelines to deal with protection of 
subsea facilities, it is recommended that the CSA target safety levels and design strategies 
be followed as summarized previously in Table 12. In terms of Safety Class, wellheads 
should be considered as Class 1, since failure or damage could lead to significant 
hydrocarbon release resulting in adverse environmental damage. For this case, the CSA 
standard recommends an annual target safety level of 1 o-s. When considering the two 
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cases proposed m this investigation, this would apply to the following facility 
arrangements: 
• Case 1 - One isolated single well, or 
• Case 2 - Several wells clustered around a single manifold. 
The annual target level for a single well or a multi-well cluster installation incorporating 
each proposed protection concept is therefore 1 o-5• 
For particular developments systems such as Case 2 that consist of multi-wells, each well 
will have an associated probability of failure. Obviously the consequence of failure 
increases with the number of wells and it is advisable to increase the reliability level of 
the individual wells so as to maintain the probability of a serious (Safety Class 1) 
consequence at an acceptable level. Since more than one well may be contacted by a 
single iceberg, it may be prudent to design each well in the cluster for a target of less than 
10-5 per year. This can be achieved, for example, by increasing the depth of the shear 
plane for caisson completion systems or increasing the burial depth of trees for cased and 
open glory holes. Reducing the overall footprint of a multi-well installation will also 
reduce the overall risk and increase the total reliability of the system. In addition, iceberg 
management programs will also serve to reduce overall risk to these subsea installations. 
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6.0 PROBABILITY OF ICEBERG CONTACT TO WELLHEAD FACILITIES 
6.1 General 
A considerable amount of work has been undertaken over the last two decades in an 
attempt to estimate the risks to subsea facilities from encroaching icebergs on the Grand 
Banks. One of the earliest studies to determine such risk to offshore platforms on the 
Grand Banks was carried out by Blenkarn & Knapp (1969). They estimated the number 
of icebergs passing through a one-half degree rectangle based on International Ice Patrol 
sightings from 1948 to 1956. Reddy et al. (1980) elaborated on this approach and 
showed how to use Monte Carlo simulation to determine confidence limits on the impact 
probabilities estimated using the method of Blenkarn and Knapp with empirical Bayesian 
techniques. 
During the extensive oil exploration in the Arctic during the early 1980's, geometric 
solutions for determining the probabilities of impacts by ice floes onto fixed platforms 
were developed by the oil and gas industry. Around the same time, Petro-Canada (1984) 
undertook an extensive study to quantify the probability of damage to subsea installations 
due to iceberg collision or scouring on the eastern Grand Banks. The study investigated 
the probability of damage to individual subsea installations, such as satellite wells, 
manifolds, templates, and flowlines, as well as the overall probability of damage to the 
entire subsea system. The iceberg collision risk simulator BERGSIM was subsequently 
developed by Petro-Canada in 1984 as a part of the study to estimate the probabilities of 
icebergs on the Grand Banks colliding with fixed structures. During the last two decades, 
further work in this area has been undertaken by local oil and gas operators plus a variety 
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of local and national institutes, universities, government bodies and engmeermg 
consultants (Reddy et al., 1980; Sanderson, 1988; Fuglem et al., 1996; C-CORE, 1998; 
Croasdale et al., 2000; King et al., 2003). As a result, a number of variations to these 
early approaches have been developed and published in a number of sources to estimate 
probability of iceberg contact. 
Two basic kinds of data are generally adopted to express the density of icebergs for use in 
calculations for iceberg contact probability; iceberg flux and areal density. Iceberg flux 
analysis uses data relating to flux across a line (e.g. 48° latitude) in a time interval, at a 
given point in time. The use of flux data is rather difficult as the motion of icebergs 
includes a large random component, combined with a net directional component, and thus 
requires the estimation of meander coefficients. 
In comparison, the use of areal density data as discussed in Chapter 2.1 corresponds to a 
"snapshot" of the area under consideration. The theory for this approach was first 
presented by Sanderson (1988), who developed an approach to determine the frequency 
of multi-year floe impacts (or iceberg impacts) with structures such as Molikpaq in the 
Beaufort Sea. The area used for this approach could be any area but generally a degree 
square is the unit used. A degree square varies in size with latitude but is a convenient 
measure in view of the liP data collection practices. The areal density would be simply 
the number of icebergs in a degree square at a given point in time, and values would be 
available for the entire iceberg season, at various points in time. 
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Simulation methods such as BERGSIM can be based on both areal density as well as flux 
data; however, these methods are more complicated and are not necessary if collision 
probabilities are all that is needed in the calculation. For risk analysis calculations, the 
most reliable method of calculation is made using areal density data because they are 
simpler and less prone to measurement errors than methods requiring estimates of iceberg 
flux (Jordaan et al., 1999). For this reason, areal density data will be used in the analysis 
to determine probability of iceberg contact, presented herein. 
Evaluating risk to wellhead and tree facilities essentially involves two separate issues -
iceberg collision with wellhead facilities and the damage caused as a result. Calculating 
the probability of collision is relatively easy to determine by means of simple geometric 
models given the appropriate iceberg data. Assessing the level of damage, however, 
requires an assessment of structural response mechanisms, iceberg strength, and iceberg 
behavior following first contact (Croasdale et al., 2000). The later issue is outside of the 
scope of the present study and will not be addressed. 
As outlined in Section 3 .2, subsea production systems include components such as 
wellheads, trees, manifolds, templates and flowlines. For the purpose of this 
investigation, the emphasis will be focused primarily on subsea wellhead and tree 
components as they represent the most critical elements when considering protection 
from iceberg collision. 
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Subsea facilities located above seabed level and those located below are at risk from 
icebergs. Since scouring is relatively an infrequent occurrence, the probability of contact 
to structures located below seabed level is significantly lower than for structures 
projecting above the mudline. The intent of this chapter is to present a methodology in 
order to determine the appropriate interaction probabilities to wellhead facilities as they 
relate to the various protection scenarios (as outlined in Section 4.0). Figure 36 is a 
flowchart that illustrates the general approach used for determining annual iceberg 
contact probabilities for facilities located both above and below seabed level. 
Iceberg Waterline Length 
Iceberg Draft I I Water Depth 
ANNUAL CONTACT 
PROBABILITY 
- Freely Floating Icebergs 
- Scouring Icebergs 
STRUCTURE DIMENSIONS 
- Above Seabed Level 
- Below Seabed Level 
ICEBERG 
-Drift Speed 
- Areal Density 
-Keel Shape 
- Scour Frequency 
Figure 36 Flowchart Showing General Approach used to Determine Annual 
Contact Probabilities 
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The effect of iceberg management and its ability to reduce risk levels will also be 
discussed. 
The estimates presented herein are determined for the general area of focus that 
encompasses the northeast Grand Banks, as it represents a region of significant oil and 
gas development opportunity. This area is defined by degree square 46° to 47°N and 48° 
to 49° W. In addition, a water depth of 1OOm will be used throughout this study as it is 
representative of water depths encountered on the northeast Grand Banks. 
6.2 Facilities Above Seabed Level 
Subsea facilities that are positioned completely or partially above the seabed level are at 
risk from freely floating and scouring icebergs. The total probability of iceberg contact 
can be given by the following expression: 
(6.1) 
Where 17 is the total annual probability of iceberg contact, 1Jd is the annual probability of 
contact with freely floating icebergs and 17 sis the annual probability of contact with 
scouring icebergs. The methodology for estimating the probability of contact for both 
freely floating and scouring icebergs for subsea facilities above mudline is described in 
subsequent Sections 6.2.1 & 6.2.2. 
111 
6.2.1 Contact Frequency with Freely Floating Icebergs 
Iceberg collisions from freely floating icebergs to subsea facilities may occur from 
icebergs with drafts between the water depth and the depth of the top of the structure. 
The annual contact probability from freely floating icebergs can be estimated from the 
average iceberg population (per unit area), average drift speed, and the sum of iceberg 
keel and structure widths at the point of contact. C-CORE (2001b) presented the 
following relationship in order to calculate the annual frequency of contact for freely 
floating icebergs with a subsea structure: 
(6.2) 
Where 17d is the annual contact frequency of freely floating icebergs with a structure 
extending a distance 'h' above the mud line; pd is the areal density of icebergs with 
drafts between dw (the water depth) and dw-h (the water depth less the height of the 
structure); Ld is the effective width of iceberg keels in the dw to dw-h depth range; Dd is 
the effective diameter of the structure; and v is the mean iceberg drift speed. If the areal 
density is given as an annual average number per degree square, and dimensions are in 
meters and speed is in m/s, a conversion factor K ( 3.7 x 10-3 m-2 s) is required to obtain 
1ld· 
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6.2.1.1 Iceberg Areal Density 
As discussed in Section 2.2, areal density ( p) refers to the average number of icebergs 
that would be expected to be seen in a particular region (typically a degree square) in a 
particular time frame (typically a year). Jordaan et al. (1999) have analyzed iceberg 
sightings from liP data and calculated the mean annual areal density per degree square 
for the Grand Banks and adjacent regions, which are shown in Figure 7. Based on the 
more conservative areal density values calculated from data collected over last 20 years 
(1981-2000), a mean annual areal density of0.77 icebergs I year I degree square has been 
selected, representing the area defined by degree square 46° to 47°N and 48° to 49° W. 
The areal density of icebergs with drafts deep enough to make contact with a subsea 
structure is calculated from the total iceberg areal density ( p ) and the proportion (p) of 
the iceberg population with drafts deep enough to strike the subsea structure. The 
product of these two parameters yields pd as given below: 
(6.3) 
6.2.1.2 Iceberg Draft Distribution 
To determine the proportion of icebergs with sufficient draft to impact a wellhead 
structure, the distribution of iceberg drafts must be determined. The general approach 
most readily used in the industry is to define iceberg size in terms of waterline length and 
generate other iceberg parameters using relationships based on waterline length. Iceberg 
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waterline length distribution is fairly well documented, thus, by utilizing the appropriate 
iceberg length/draft relationship, it is possible to generate the iceberg draft distribution 
(King, 2002). 
The iceberg waterline length distribution on the northeast Grand Banks have been 
determined to have an exponential distribution with a mean of 59m (Jordaan et al., 1995). 
King (2002) analyzed 211 known iceberg draft measurements obtained off the coast of 
Newfoundland and determined that the mean iceberg waterline length for this data set 
was 115m with a mean draft of 80m. King presented the following relationship between 
iceberg waterline length (L) and draft (D): 
D = 3.23£0'68 (6.4) 
Where the standard deviation of the residuals is 0.25. Since the mean waterline length 
for icebergs with measured drafts is 115 m, it is obvious that this dataset is biased 
towards larger icebergs and cannot be used directly to generate a draft distribution. Thus, 
to generate a sample of iceberg drafts, a large sample of waterline lengths, exponentially 
distributed with a mean of 59 m was generated and the corresponding drafts were 
calculated using the following equation derived by (King, 2002): 
D; = exp(ln(3.23) + 0.68ln(L;) + N(0,0.25)) (6.5) 
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Where N (0, 0. 2 5) is a random variable with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.25. 
Only icebergs with waterline lengths ~ 16m were considered because the areal density 
value does not include icebergs smaller than this value. 
Based on the above approach, the exceedence probability distribution of iceberg drafts is 
presented in Figure 37. Although this distribution can be modified to account for icebergs 
with drafts greater that the water depth in the study region that will ground and be filtered 
out of the keel population, King (2002) showed that the influence of bathymetric filtering 
was minimal for a water depth of 1OOm. 
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6.2.1.3 Effective Keel Width 
The width of an iceberg keel at the level of a subsea structure also affects iceberg 
probability of contact, since a wider keel has a higher probability of impact. Field 
measurements of icebergs on the Grand Banks were documented in the Mobil Hibernia 
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Development Studies (Dobrocky, 1984). The data were obtained usmg sonar 
measurements of each iceberg at various positions around the iceberg's circumference 
and at various depths. Mean values of iceberg width were computed at each sonar depth 
for each iceberg in the data set. These widths were plotted against distance above the 
iceberg keel and then normalized with respect to iceberg draft allowing the profiles to be 
used to generate iceberg keel widths for a variety of iceberg drafts and elevations. 
Croasdale et al. (2000) derived a second-order least squares fit of normalized iceberg 
width (w*) as a function of normalized height above the keel (z*) for the bottom 30% of 
the iceberg data. This relationship was given as: 
w* = -9.31z*2 + 5.3z* + 0.26 (6.6) 
Where z * = z I D;; w* = wID; ; z is the distance measure upward from the keel tip (m); 
w is the iceberg width (m) at a given z ; and Dis the iceberg draft (m). 
To ensure correspondence between iceberg shape and scour geometry, the data was 
scaled to fit the mean scour width and mean scour depth measurements for the study area, 
which correspond to 24m and 0.5m respectively (taken from Table 4). This assumes that 
the mean scour width was measured at the mudline. The scaling is illustrated in Figure 
38, whereby the original quadratic fit was shifted downward by a constant value to 
maintain the original shape of the curve. 
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When calculating the effective keel width, the assumed iceberg draft and point of contact 
between the iceberg keel and the structure is important. For water depths in the range of 
1OOm, it is reasonable to assume that the iceberg keel width increases monotonically with 
elevation above the bottom of the keel so unless the structure is strangely shaped the 
point of contact will be at the top. 
118 
. 
0.3 
A sensitivity analysis for effective keel width was carried out for a number of keel I 
structure interaction scenarios based on Equation (6.6). Results revealed that for freely 
floating icebergs, the most conservative approach was to assume that the iceberg draft is 
equal or slightly less than the water depth and has an effective keel width at a level equal 
to the top of the structure. However, freely floating icebergs capable of striking a 
structure above the seabed will have keels that extend from the top of the structure, dw-h, 
down to a point just above the seabed, dw (at which point you're dealing with scouring 
icebergs). Thus, the average keel will extend halfway down the structure with the contact 
point at the top of the structure as illustrated in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39 
Iceberg Keel 
Structure 
I~ 
Iceberg Keel and Structure Interaction Arrangement for Freely 
Floating Icebergs 
6.2.1.4 Iceberg Drift Speed 
Iceberg drift velocities can be determined from iceberg sightings obtained during drilling 
operations on the Grand Banks. Iceberg velocities representative for the area defined by 
degree square 46° to 4 7° N and 48° to 49° W have been determined using iceberg 
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sightings from the Marine Environmental Data Service Canadian Offshore Oil and Gas 
Environmental Data (MEDS, 1997) database, as well as recent sightings obtained during 
iceberg management operations. 
Based on findings from a number of recent studies (C-CORE, 2001d; C-CORE, 2002; 
King, 2002; King et al., 2003) using the MEDS (1997) data and recent iceberg sighting 
data, average iceberg drift velocities were calculated for areas in the vicinity of Terra 
Nova, White Rose and Hibernia. The mean iceberg drift speeds for these areas ranged 
from 0.33 to 0.36 m/s, with an average of 0.34 m/s. Icebergs identified as towed or 
grounded were excluded from all sample analysis. As each of the study areas above fall 
within the area defined by degree square 46° to 4 7° N and 48° to 49° W, a representative 
mean drift speed of 0.34 m/s will be used throughout this report. 
Although drift vectors can be used to generate the drift direction distributions in order to 
show that the iceberg drift regime varies locally (King et al., 2003), directional drift data 
has not been analyzed for the purpose of this study. By assuming a mean drift speed that 
is independent of direction and a uniform distribution of drift direction, a non-directional 
approach will be taken which assumes that the probability of contact with a subsea 
facility is equal from all compass directions. 
6.2.2 Contact Frequency with Scouring Icebergs 
In addition to freely floating icebergs, collisions from scouring icebergs may also occur 
to subsea facilities when contact is made with the structure above the mudline. The 
annual contact probability from scouring icebergs can be estimated from the annual scour 
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frequency (per unit area), mean scour length, and the sum of iceberg keel and structure 
widths at the point of contact. C-CORE (2001b) presented the following relationship in 
order to calculate the annual frequency of contact for scouring icebergs with a subsea 
structure: 
(6.7) 
Where 1J s is the annual contact frequency of scouring icebergs with a structure extending 
a distance 'h' above the mud line; fs is the annual scour frequency per unit area; Ld is the 
effective width of iceberg keels in the dw to dw-h depth range; Dd is the effective 
diameter of the structure; and Ls is the mean scour length. 
6.2.2.1 Annual Scour Frequency 
As presented in Section 2.3.2, scour frequency can be estimated using a number of 
approaches (i.e. geological inference, grounding model, repetitive mapping and scour 
degradation). Scour rates presented in Table 3 for the northeast Grand Banks region 
range from 8.3 x 10-5 scours/km2/year using lower bound geological inference (Croasdale 
et al., 2000) to 3.5 x 1 o-3 scours/km2/year using a grounding model derived by Lewis et 
al. (1987). Recent grounding model work completed by King (2003) computes 
grounding rates that lie approximately half way in between scour rates as presented in 
Table 3. Using directional iceberg drift data for Hibernia and White Rose, King (2002) 
calculated scour frequencies of 7.8 x 10-4 and 7.3 x 10-4 scours/km2/year, respectively. 
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This compares to 1.2 x 10-3 and 8.4 x 10-4 scours/km2/year using a non-directional 
approach of the same grounding model. 
For the purpose of this investigation, an annual scour frequency of 1 x 1 o-3 
scours/km2/year (or 1 x 10-9 scours/m2/year) has been selected, which is representative 
for the study region. This is an average of the Hibernia and White Rose scour rates from 
the King (2002) grounding model assuming non-directional drift data. 
6.2.2.2 Effective Keel Width 
Taking a similar approach as for freely floating icebergs, the effective keel width for 
scouring icebergs can be calculated by assuming a mean scour depth for the study region. 
The mean scour depth in water depths less than 110m on the Grand Banks is 0.5m 
(Croasdale et al., 2000) as presented in Table 4. Using the same relationship presented in 
Equation (6.6), the effective keel width can be calculated based on the iceberg keel and 
structure interaction arrangement as presented in Figure 40. 
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Figure 40 
Iceberg Keel 
Structure 0.5m (mean scour depth) 
Iceberg Keel and Structure Interaction Arrangement for Scouring 
Icebergs 
6.2.2.3 Mean Scour Length 
The mean scour length in water depths less than 11Om on the Grand Banks is 560m 
(Croasdale et al., 2000) as presented in Table 4. This value is considered to be an under 
estimate of the scour length since many of the scours were truncated by the survey (i.e. 
the scours extended outside the sidescan swath). C-CORE (2001d) assessed the effect of 
truncation on the mean scour length in order to determine a corrected mean scour length 
for a range of swath widths. By means of trial and error, an approximate breakdown 
according to swath width was used in order to determine the actual scour length 
distribution. Results from a two-parameter Gamma distribution and a scaled cumulative 
distribution function from the measured data were averaged to come up with a correction 
factor equal to 1.11. Applying this gives a corrected mean scour length of 1.11 x 560m = 
622m. 
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6.3 Facilities Located Below Seabed Level 
For structures located below seabed level the probability of contact from scourmg 
icebergs decreases with increasing burial depth. In order to properly determine this 
probability of contact, Croasdale et al. (2000) made the distinction between small and 
large holes. The distinction has been made since scouring icebergs may penetrate (drop 
or dip) as they enter large open holes. As presented in Table 4, the mean scour width on 
the northeast Grand Banks for water depths ::::; 11Om is 24m. Drilled holes such as cased 
glory holes and caisson completion systems have diameters that are generally 
significantly smaller than 24m in comparison to open glory holes that can have based 
dimensions greater than 1OOm. Thus, for the purpose of this investigation, any holes 
greater than 24m are to be considered as large open holes or glory holes, while all others 
will fall into the small diameter hole or structure category. 
For scouring icebergs with installations below seabed, the effective keel width Ld will be 
assumed to be equal to the 24m. This value corresponds to the mean scour width in water 
depths ::::; 11Om on the Grand Banks (Croasdale et al., 2000). By using the distribution of 
scour widths for the region, this is somewhat of a conservative approach as it assumes a 
mean scour width at seabed level rather than at a distance below mudline. This approach 
is necessary due to the lack of adequate information relating to iceberg keel widths 
collected to date in the region. 
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6.3.1 Small Diameter Hole or Structure 
For a small diameter structure (~ 24m) such as a downhole caisson wellhead, the 
probability of contact to a specific depth below the mudline can be determined using a 
modified version of Equation (6.7) (Croasdale et al. 2000). The probability of 
exceedance for iceberg scour depth, P(z )8 , determined from a fit of scour data from 
the1999 update of the GBSC can be applied, yielding the following relationship: 
(6.8) 
where P(z )8 = e -z 1 P ; z is the depth below the mudline and; Jl is the mean scour depth 
(0.5m as per Table 4). 
It is interesting to note from the exponential distribution presented in Figure 41, the 
probability of scours occurring with depths greater than 3m is quite low. 
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6.3.2 Large Open Hole or Glory Hole 
The likelihood of an iceberg coming into contact with a facility located in a large open 
hole depends first of all, on the likelihood of an iceberg scouring directly over the hole as 
presented in Section 6.2.2. Given this scenario, transient and wave induced motions of 
scouring icebergs can result in penetrations below seabed (C-CORE, 1997). 
For large diameter holes, the probability of contact to a specific depth below seabed level 
is again determined using a modified version of Equation (6.7) (Croasdale et al. 2000). 
In this case P(z )L is the probability of exceedance for the iceberg keel penetrating a depth 
z into the hole. The relationship thus becomes: 
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(6.9) 
Calculating this is complex and involves determining the keel offset from the center of 
mass and the heave and pitch dynamics of the iceberg as it enters the hole. The 
probability of exceedance P(z )L has been estimated using a number of approaches. 
C-CORE (1997) conducted a study for the Terra Nova region and used a force 
equilibrium model to determine the heave and pitch of icebergs during steady state 
scouring of the seabed. The output of this model was used as input into a model of 
transient motions and predicted wave induced motions to estimate the maximum 
penetration of iceberg keels below mudline for a scouring iceberg encountering deep 
open holes. Probabilities of exceedance P(z )L were plotted against maximum penetration 
as illustrated on Figure 42 below. 
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to Transient Motions, and Wave-induced Motions (C-CORE, 1997) 
In contrast, C-CORE (200 1 e) estimated P(z )L from the distribution of excess drafts for 
scouring icebergs in the White Rose region based on information from the Grand Banks 
scour database (see Figure 43). The change in water depth between endpoints for 
measured scour marks (also called rise-up) were used as the basis for estimating the 
increase in draft of scouring icebergs upon reaching a large open hole. The excess draft 
results from a combination of heave and pitch motions of the iceberg were estimated 
based on seabed records from the GBSC. As it is equally likely that an iceberg may scour 
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into a glory hole anywhere along the length of the scour, the expected excess draft of an 
iceberg on entry to a glory hole was assumed to be half the rise-up assuming the 
relationship between rise-up and scour length is linear. 
2 3 4 6 
Rise-up [m] 
8 10 
Figure 43 Measured Scour Rise-up Distribution for White Rose Region (C-
CORE, 200le) 
12 
Upon comparison of the probability of exceedance P(z )L results for each of these two 
approaches, it is observed that they are of a similar magnitude, with C-CORE (2001e) 
having a slightly higher range for excess drafts between lm and 3m (see Figure 42 & 43). 
Because completely different and independent models were used in each case, it does 
suggest that discrepancies are expected. Due to the fact that rise-up values are actual 
measured data, they are deemed more appropriate in this case. Thus, the upper bound of 
the values plotted for the more conservative C-CORE (2001e) approach will be used for 
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the analysis performed herein. These upper bound values are represented by the red line 
presented in Figure 43. 
6.4 Sample Calculation of Total Contact Frequency 
A sample calculation for the total contact frequency of a subsea facility located both 
above and below seabed level is outlined below. 
6.4.1 Facility Above Seabed Level 
For the structure situated above seabed level, it is assumed that the structure has a height 
of 5.5m and an effective diameter of 5m as illustrated in Figure 44. 
Figure 44 
Iceberg 
Freely 
Floating 
Scouring 
Schematic of Seabed Facility Located Above Seabed Level 
The relevant input values are given in Table 14 overleaf. 
130 
Table 14 Input Parameters for Total Contact Probability of a Subsea Facility 
Located Above Seabed Level 
Parameter Symbol Value Source I Reference 
Structure Height h 5.5m Representative of Xmas tree installation 
Structure Diameter (or effective Dd 5m Representative of diameter) Xmas tree installation 
Water Depth dw lOOm Assumed 
representative of area 
Areal Density p 0.77 I degree Jordaan et al. (1999) 
square 
Conversion Factor K 3.7 x 10-3 m-2 s C-CORE (2001d) 
Mean Iceberg Waterline Length L 59m Jordaan et al. (1995) 
The Proportion of Icebergs with King (2002) Drafts Between dw and dw-h p 0.0215 
(1OOm and 94.5m) C-CORE (2002) 
Effective Keel Width (freely Ld 39.1 m Dobrocky (1984) floating icebergs) Croasdale et al. (2000) 
Mean Iceberg Drift Speed v 0.34 m/s MEDS (1997) 
Annual Scour frequency Is 1 X 10-
3 
King (2002) 
scours/km2 /year 
Mean Scour Depth - 0.5m Croasdale et al. (2000) 
Scour length Correction Factor - 1.11 C-CORE (2001e) 
Effective Keel Width (scouring Ld 54.6m Dobrocky (1984) icebergs) Croasdale et al. (2000) 
Mean Scour Length Ls 622m Croasdale et al. (2000) 
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The areal density of floating icebergs with sufficient draft to strike a subsea installation 
with a height of 5 .5m in 1OOm of water can be calculated as: 
pd = 0.77 X 0.0215 = 1.65 X 10-2 
Assuming Ld = 39.1m (mean iceberg keel width), Dd = 5m (structure diameter), and 
v =0.34 m/s (mean iceberg drift speed), the encounter frequency with free-drifting 
icebergs can be calculated as: 
1Jd = 3.7x10-3 xl.65x10-2 x(39.1+5)x0.34 = 9.18x10-4 
The annual probability of contact for scouring icebergs can be calculated as: 
1ls = 1 X 10-9 X (54.6 + 5)x 622 = 3.7 X 10-5 
Thus, the total contact frequencies for freely floating and scouring icebergs for the entire 
structure is calculated to be: 
17 = 9.18x10-4 +3.7x1o-s = 9.55x10-4 
Based on the results presented above, it is evident the contribution to overall contact 
probability from scouring icebergs is minor in comparison to free floating icebergs. 
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The annual probability for contacts above seabed level from freely floating icebergs is 
presented in Figure 45. In this graph the annual contact probability is plotted against 
structure diameter for a range of different structure heights (1, 2, 5 & 10 m). The plots 
show that the probability of contact increases with structure diameter and with structure 
height above seabed. 
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Figure 45 Annual Contact Probabilities Calculated for Freely Floating Icebergs 
and Structures Above Seabed Level 
The annual probability for contacts above seabed level from scouring icebergs is 
presented in Figure 46, overleaf. In this graph the annual contact probability is again 
plotted against structure diameter for a variety of different structure heights (1, 2, 5 & 10 
m). The probability of contact increases with structure diameter and structure height. 
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Figure 46 Annual Contact Probabilities Calculated for Scouring Icebergs and 
Structures Above Seabed Level 
As can be concluded by comparing Figures 45 & 46, the annual contact probability for 
scouring icebergs is at least an order of magnitude lower than for those which are freely 
floating. 
6.4.2 Facility Located Below Seabed Level 
For the structure situated below level, it is assumed that the structure is situated in a large 
open hole (i.e. glory hole) with mudline footprint dimensions equal to lOOm x 75m. The 
structure is 7m high and centrally located in a 1Om deep hole, giving a clearance between 
top of structure to mean seabed of 3m. This arrangement is illustrated in Figure 47. 
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Figure 47 
Scouring 
100 m x 75 m hole 
3m 
Structure h =7 m 
Schematic of Seabed Facility Located Below Seabed Level in a Large 
Open Hole 
The relevant input values are given in Table 15, overleaf. 
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Table 15 Input Parameters for Total Contact Probability of a Subsea Facility 
Located Below Seabed Level 
Parameter Symbol Value Source I Reference 
Structure Height h 7m Representative of Xmas tree installation 
Representative of 
Hole Effective Diameter Dd 111m typical glory hole 
excavation 
Water Depth dw 100m Assumed 
representative of area 
Probability of Exceedance for 
P(z)L C-CORE (200 1 e), the Iceberg Keel Penetrating a 0.028 
depth 3m into the hole 
Annual Scour frequency Is 1 x w-
3 
King (2002) 
scours/krn2/year 
Mean Scour Depth - 0.5 m Croasdale et al. (2000) 
Scour length Correction Factor - 1.11 C-CORE (2001e) 
Effective Keel Width (equal to Ld 24m Croasdale et al. (2000) 
mean scour width) 
Mean Scour Length Ls 622m Croasdale et al. (2000) 
The effective hole diameter can be calculated as: 
Dd = (2ht)(hole length+ hole width)= (2ht)(100 + 75) =111m 
Assuming P(z )L = 0.028 (probability of exceedance for the iceberg keel penetrating a 
depth 3m into the hole); fs = 1 x 10-9 scours/m2/year (annual scour frequency); Ld =24m 
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(mean iceberg keel width), Da = 111m (effective hole diameter), and Ls = 622 rn (mean 
scour length), the total contact frequency for a structure located in a large open hole can 
be calculated as: 
lls = 0.028xlx10-9 x{24+111)x622 = 2.4x10-6 
Contact probabilities resulting from the model analysis of small diameter holes or 
structures located below the rnudline are presented in Figure 48. The annual contact 
probability is plotted against depth below seabed level. As one would expect, the 
probability of contact decreases with increasing depth below seabed. Figure 48 indicates 
that there is very little sensitivity to the results with varying hole sizes. 
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Figure 48 Annual Contact Probabilities Calculated for Scouring Icebergs with 
Hole Diameters ~ 24m Below Seabed Level 
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Total contact probabilities resulting from the model analysis of facilities located in large 
diameter holes are presented in Figure 49. As given in the relationship for Equation (6.8) 
the annual probability that an iceberg will penetrate to a given depth in the hole is 
calculated by combining the excess draft of icebergs entering a large open hole (Figure 
43) with the probability that an iceberg reaches the hole (Section 6.2.2). Considering a 
range of hole sizes, a corresponding range for the probability of iceberg penetration to 
various depths is obtained. It should be noted that the actual footprint of the installation 
inside the hole is much smaller than the chosen mudline dimensions of the hole due to the 
sloping sides required for stability. While it is possible that an iceberg enters the hole 
without damaging the wellhead, this possibility has not been considered explicitly. For 
the calculations an effective diameter of (2/n)(hole length + hole width) was used to 
represent the width of the hole by assuming equally likely scour orientations. Figure 49 
overleaf indicates that there is very little sensitivity to the results with varying hole sizes 
more than mean scour width. 
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6.5 Iceberg Management 
A key element to being able to work in the Grand Banks environment is active ice 
management. When the oil industry first began to explore for oil and gas off Canada's 
East coast in the late 1960's, iceberg management was almost unheard of. However, the 
need to protect drilling vessels from iceberg damage while at the same time, minimizing 
drilling downtime, quickly lead to the development of various iceberg management 
techniques (Crocker et al., 1998). During the past 30 years of exploration and delineation 
drilling on the Grand Banks, ice management techniques for managing ice and working 
safely in the environment have been developed and refined. The majority of the current 
iceberg management activities conducted on the Grand Banks are limited to iceberg 
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deflection techniques. These being synthetic line towing, dual vessel towing for medium 
to large icebergs, and prop wash and water canon deflection for smaller ice masses. 
Physical management systems usmg supply vessels and comprehensive detection 
techniques have been developed by oil and gas operators in the region to help reduce the 
risk of iceberg damage to offshore installations. Terra Nova for example, has a 
comprehensive ice management strategy based on detection, monitoring and deflection, 
to prevent iceberg encroachment into the vicinity of the field. The program employs 
boats, aircraft and the platform's own S-Band marine radar system to detect nearby 
icebergs and track their movement. However, the application of such an ice management 
strategy does not guarantee that the encroachment of icebergs into the area will be 
completely avoided. In the long term, it is envisioned that proper implementation of an 
iceberg management system could potentially result in an order of magnitude decrease in 
the annual iceberg contact probability of subsea facilities. 
In practice, the potential for iceberg contacts can be reduced significantly by effective 
detection and physical iceberg management techniques. For subsea facilities, only 
relatively large icebergs with drafts equal or greater than the water depth will present a 
threat. Of these encroaching deep draft icebergs, only those remaining undetected, and 
unsuccessfully managed pose a threat to a subsea facility. This is illustrated in Figure 50 
overleaf, in which the subsea installation is at risk from an "Impact". 
140 
Figure 50 
Icebergs Potentially Impacting a Subsea Installation 
Can't Detect 
Impact 
OK Impact 
Decision Tree Illustrating the Influence of Iceberg Detection and 
Management on the Probability of an Iceberg Impacting a Subsea 
Installation 
Mckenna et al. (2003) developed the following relationship to calculate the proportion of 
icebergs drifting directly toward a fixed installation that actually reach it is: 
~mpact = (1 - pdet) + pdet (1 - ~ow) (6.10) 
where P det is the probability of detection success and P1ow is the probability of success for 
physical management operations. 
While iceberg detection and physical management success depend on a number of 
parameters; the most important are sea state and iceberg size. Due to the prevalence of 
fog on the Grand Banks, the primary means of iceberg detection is marine radar with 
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detection success primarily dependent on range. Physical management success is based 
on data from past practice and depends on the time and resources available for the 
operation. Towing success is defined as the probability that an iceberg directed at a 
facility is deflected successfully. Typically, icebergs that cannot be managed are small 
ones in higher sea states and those that are unstable. 
Notwithstanding Equation (6.10), overall tow success probability is approximately 85% 
based on historical data associated with drilling operations off Canada's east coast (e.g. 
Bishop, 1989; PERD, 2002a). Detection probabilities are typically much higher and 
approach 100% for short ranges from an installation. Failure to detect icebergs is most 
likely during storms (PERD, 2002b). If, for example, detection success is 98% and tow 
success is 85%, the proportion of icebergs reaching the installation is calculated from 
Equation (6.10) to be ~mpact = 16.7%. For 100% detection success, the proportion of 
icebergs potentially reaching the installation that actually reach it would be 
~mpact = (1- P,ow) = 15%. 
While these iceberg features are easy to detect, and may be less likely to roll or slip tow 
lines, the tow forces required to cause deflection are extremely large. For even medium 
size free floating icebergs (i.e. up to 2 million tones) and icebergs that are scouring the 
seabed, overall tow success is believed to be very low. In addition, the layout of subsea 
facilities such as satellite developments with long flowline routes may make reliable 
avoidance by deflection difficult. However, protection of seabed facilities for extended 
reach satellite wells and pipelines could be achieved through adequate towing resources 
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and proper utilization of these resources. Although unproven, another management 
technique that could prove very valuable for reducing risk to subsea facilities is draft 
reduction, whereby the draft of an iceberg is reduced such that the resulting iceberg keel 
is above the top of any structure. Draft reduction methods using cutting tools are 
currently under research with plans for a full-scale field program in the near future. 
Prototype tests conducted near shore by C-CORE have offered some promising results 
for this technology (Ralph, 2004). 
Implementation of iceberg management systems alone is unlikely to justify the safe 
operation of unprotected satellite wells. It will, however, mitigate economic 
consequences and provide assurance that a particular seabed installation meets target 
safety levels in spite of uncertainties associated with iceberg contact probabilities. 
For calculations of overall contact probability to the various wellhead protection systems 
presented in Chapter 7, provisions for effective ice management activities will also be 
evaluated. 
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7.0 WELLHEAD PROTECTION SYSTEM LAYOUT & ASSOCIATED 
ENCOUNTER PROBABILITIES 
7.1 General 
As presented in Section 3.4, two representative development systems relating to a subsea 
marginal development on the Grand Banks have been identified. For each of these two 
Cases (1 & 2), a number of wellhead systems have been defined and will be evaluated 
based on the probability of an iceberg encounter and required target level of safety. 
The single wellhead systems defined for Case 1 include: 
Case 1: Single Satellite Well Development 
1a) Conventional Xmas tree installed at seabed level (Base Case); 
1 b) Conventional Xmas tree installed at seabed level with downhole weak shear joint; 
1 c) Conventional Xmas tree installed in an open glory hole; 
1d) Conventional Xmas tree installed in a cased glory hole; 
1 e) Conventional Xmas tree installed in a modified cased glory hole; 
1 f) Caisson wellhead completion system with sacrificial Xmas tree. 
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The multiple wellhead systems defined for Case 2 include: 
Case 2: Clustered Mulit-well Development 
2a) Six conventional Xmas trees placed at seabed level, in two rows of three and tied into 
a common manifold; 
2b) Six conventional Xmas trees with downhole weak shear joint placed at seabed level, 
in two rows of three and tied into a common manifold; 
2c) Six conventional Xmas trees in two rows of three and a common manifold placed in a 
large open glory hole; 
2d) Six conventional Xmas trees placed in cased holes, in two rows of three and tied into 
a common manifold; 
2e) Six conventional Xmas trees placed in modified cased holes, in two rows of three and 
tied into a common manifold; 
2f) Six caisson wellhead completion systems with sacrificial Xmas tree, in two rows of 
three and tied into a common manifold. 
The specifications on which these systems are based are described in the subsequent 
sections. 
Due to the inherent high capital cost and increased overall risk associated with external 
protective barriers, they have been ruled out as being a viable protection solution and will 
not be considered further in this investigation. Furthermore, of the seven novel 
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protection concepts presented in Section 4.7, only the Xmas tree with downhole weak 
shear plane and the modified cased glory hole options will be evaluated further as these 
concepts offer the most favorable features from a commercial, technical, and 
environmental standpoint. 
The intent of this Chapter is to calculate encounter and contact probabilities for each of 
the single and clustered multi-well systems identified. In addition, each system will be 
evaluated and defined further based on the probability of iceberg contact and required 
target levels of safety. Summary results for all cases presented are included in Tables 16 
& 17, Section 7.4. 
For the initial layout of the well systems, it will be assumed that any direct iceberg 
contact with an Xmas tree or wellhead component will be considered to result in a 
blowout. In the case of a unprotected well with a downhole weak shear joint or caisson 
wellhead completion system, blowout is only considered to occur if the scour depth 
exceeds the depth of the weak shear joint I plane. 
In order to account for sub-scour soil deformation effects, a sub-scour deformation 
allowance of one scour depth beneath the scouring iceberg keel will be assumed when 
specifying the location of weak shear planes I joints below the seabed level for particular 
installations. Thus, the shear planes and joints for installations such as cased holes and 
caissons will be placed at a depth twice that of the scour feature with the appropriate 
exceedance probability. 
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Relatively low iceberg collision probabilities indicate that there is little justification from 
an economic or environmental perspective for locating manifolds and other non-critical 
wellhead equipment below the influence of scouring icebergs for clustered multi-well 
developments. Although existing subsea developments such as Terra Nova and White 
Rose have located their manifolds inside open glory holes, other non-critical subsea 
equipment such as flowlines and risers do not have the same protection and are 
essentially sacrificial. For the purpose of this work, with exception to Case 2c, where 
the manifold is placed in a large open glory hole, all manifolds are assumed to be located 
above seabed level. 
It must also be emphasized that the layout options presented in this Section are not fully 
optimized but are considered representative and adequately defined for the purpose of 
this high-level evaluation. 
Conservatisms and limitations related to the iceberg calculations for well blowout will 
also be addressed in Section 7.5, followed by a detailed discussion in Section 7.6. 
7.2 Single Satellite Well Development 
7.2.1 Unprotected Well (Case la) 
A conventional well with an unprotected Xmas tree located at seabed level is considered 
as the base case for this investigation. Specifications for this concept are as follows: 
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• 3.5 m x 4.5 m plan dimensions of the Xmas tree; 
• An Xmas tree height of 5.5m above seabed level. 
Details of Case la) are illustrated in Figure 51. 
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Figure 51 Case la- Conventional Xmas Tree Installed at Seabed Level (Base 
Case) 
The conventional Xmas tree installed at seabed level has an effective structure diameter 
of 5.1 m, assuming equally likely incoming iceberg directions. For this arrangement, the 
Xmas tree may be impacted from both freely floating and scouring icebergs. The annual 
probability of contact from freely floating and scouring icebergs is 9.2 x 10-4 and 3.7 x 
10-5, respectively, for a total probability of contact of 9.6 x 104 (based on Figures 45 & 
46). 
Assuming that iceberg contact with the Xmas tree results in a blowout (i.e. SCSSV fails 
to perform), it is clear that unprotected wells located at seabed level do not alone provide 
adequate protection from iceberg contact assuming a target level of safety equal to 1 o-s 
per annum. 
7.2.2 Unprotected Well with Downhole Weak Shear Joint (Case lb) 
Similar to the base case, a conventional well with an unprotected Xmas tree is installed at 
seabed level but has an added feature located downhole in the form of a weak shear joint 
located in the well conductor pipe. Specifications for this concept are as follows: 
• 3.5 m x 4.5 m plan dimensions of Xmas tree; 
• An Xmas tree height 5.5m above seabed level; 
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• Downhole weak shear joint located in the well conductor pipe located at a 
specified minimum depth beneath seabed level. 
Details of Case 1 b) are illustrated in Figure 52. 
Figure 52 
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Case lb - Conventional Xmas Tree Installed at Seabed Level With 
Downhole Weak Shear Joint 
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As for Case 1a, the a total probability of contact to the conventional Xmas tree from both 
from freely floating and scouring icebergs is 9.6 x 10"4• In order to satisfy the required 
target level of 1 o·5 per annum, the weak shear joint must be located at a minimum depth 
of 0.6m below the mudline, allowing for 0.3 m scour depth (based on Figure 48) and an 
equivalent clearance between the bottom of the scour and the shear joint to allow for sub-
scour soil deformation. For this particular condition, it is assumed that the Xmas tree and 
wellhead facilities located at seabed level are sacrificial, while the integrity of the well 
downhole relies on proper performance of the weak shear joint. 
7.2.3 Open Glory Hole (Case lc) 
For this protection concept, the Xmas tree is installed below the mudline in a large 
diameter open glory hole. The top of the tree is sufficiently deep to minimize the risk 
from scouring icebergs. Specifications for this concept are as follows: 
• 7 m deep hole; 
• Mudline glory hole dimensions of 52m x 52m; 
• 10 m by 10 m glory hole base dimensions (allows adequate ROV clearance 
around tree at operational level); 
• Slope for sides of glory hole - 3H: 1 V; 
• 3.5 m x 4.5 m plan dimensions of Xmas tree; 
• Xmas tree height 5.5m above base ofhole; 
• Top of Xmas tree 1.5 m below mudline. 
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Details of Case 1 c) are illustrated in Figure 53. 
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Figure 53 Case lc - Conventional Xmas Tree Installed in an Open Glory Hole 
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The open glory hole with mudline plan dimensions of 52 m by 52 m has an effective 
diameter of 66.2 m, assuming equally likely incoming iceberg directions. The open glory 
hole concept can only be affected by scouring icebergs. The annual probability of a 
scouring iceberg entering the open glory hole is 5.6 x 10-5• In order to satisfy the 
required target level of 1 o-s per annum, the minimum depth of the top of the Xmas tree 
below the mudline is 1.45 m (based on Figure 49). 
7.2.4 Cased Glory Hole (Case ld) 
In this installation, the Xmas tree is installed below the mudline in a drilled and cased 
glory hole. The top of the tree is sufficiently deep to reduce the risk from scouring 
icebergs. The casing has a weak shear plane above the top of the tree. Specifications for 
this concept are as follows: 
• 10m deep hole; 
• 7.3 m outside diameter casing; 
• Casing extends 1 m above mudline; 
• Casing weak shear plane located at a minimum depth beneath seabed level; 
• 3.5 m x 4.5 m plan dimensions of Xmas tree; 
• Xmas tree height 5.5m above base ofhole. 
Details of Case 1d) are illustrated in Figure 54. 
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Figure 54 
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Case ld - Conventional Xmas Tree Installed in a Cased Glory Hole 
The cased hole, with a diameter of 7 .3m and a height of 1 m above the mudline may be 
impacted from both freely floating and scouring icebergs. The annual encounter 
probability from freely floating and SCOUring icebergs is 1.7 X 10-4 and 2.6 X 10-5, 
respectively, for a total probability of 2 x 1 o-4 (based on Figures 45 & 46). In order to 
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satisfy the required target level of 1 o·5 per annum, the weak shear plane is located at a 
minimum depth of 0.8 m below the mudline, allowing for 0.4 m scour depth (based on 
Figure 48) and an equivalent clearance between the bottom of the scour and the shear 
joint to allow for sub-scour soil deformation. 
7.2.5 Modified Cased Glory Hole (Case le) 
Similar to the cased glory hole, the Xmas tree is installed below the mudline in a 
modified cased glory hole. The top of the tree is sufficiently deep to reduce the risk from 
scouring icebergs. The vertical casing for this concept only extends to 1.0 m above the 
Xmas tree, thereby eliminating any requirements for a shear plane. Specifications for this 
concept are as follows: 
• 1 0 m deep hole; 
• 7 .3m outside diameter casing; 
• Hole plan dimensions of 16 m dia. at mudline and 7.3 m dia. at base; 
• Vertical casing up to 6.5 m from the base of the hole; 
• Side slopes equal to 40 degrees will be assumed for the top 3.5 m portion of 
the hole; 
• Soil reinforcement fabric installed on upper side slopes (if required); 
• Inner protective shield installed 1m above the Xmas tree; 
• 3.5 m x 4.5 m plan dimensions of Xmas tree; 
• An Xmas tree height of 5.5m above base of hole; 
• Top of Xmas tree located at 4.5m beneath seabed level. 
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Details of Case le) are illustrated in Figure 55. 
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Figure 55 Case le - Conventional Xmas Tree Installed in a Modified Cased 
Glory Hole 
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The modified cased hole, with a diameter of 16 m can only be affected from scouring 
icebergs. The annual probability of a scouring iceberg entering the cased glory hole is 2.5 
X 1 o-5. In order to satisfy the required target level of 1 o-5 per annum, the minimum depth 
of the top of the Xmas tree below mudline is 0.5 m (based on Figure 48). 
7.2.6 Caisson Wellhead System (Case lt) 
The shearable caisson system with the sacrificial tree has a conventional tree installed at 
the mudline with a caisson that extends approximately 5 m below the mudline. The 
caisson has a weak shear joint located at sufficient depth to minimize the probability of 
iceberg damage to the wellhead below it. Specifications for this concept are as follows: 
• 1.5 m outside diameter caisson; 
• Weak shear joint located at a minimum depth below the mudline; 
• Top of the wellhead is located 4.5 m below seabed level; 
• Top of Xmas tree 5.5 m above mudline; 
• 3.5 m x 4.5 m plan dimensions of Xmas tree. 
Details of Case If) are illustrated in Figure 56. 
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Case 1f- Caisson Wellhead Completion System With Sacrificial Xmas 
Tree 
The caisson completion system Xmas tree, with 3.5 m by 4.5 m plan dimensions, has an 
effective structure diameter of 5.1 m, assuming equally likely incoming iceberg 
directions. The 5 .5m high Xmas tree may be impacted from both freely floating and 
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scouring icebergs. The annual probability of contact from freely floating and scouring 
icebergs is 9.2 x 104 and 3.7 x 10-5, respectively, for a total probability of contact of9.6 x 
1 o-4 (based on Figures 45 & 46). In order to satisfy the required target level of 1 o-5 per 
annum, the weak shear joint in the caisson must be located a minimum depth of 0.6 m 
below the mudline, allowing for 0.3m scour depth (based on Figure 48) and an equivalent 
clearance between the bottom of the scour and the shear joint to allow for sub-scour soil 
deformation. For this condition, it is assumed that the Xmas tree and wellhead facilities 
located at seabed level are sacrificial and the integrity of the well relies on proper 
performance of the weak shear joint. 
7.3 Clustered Multi-well Development 
7.3.1 Unprotected Wells (Case 2a) 
Six conventional wells with unprotected Xmas trees at the mudline represent the base 
case for the clustered multi-well development. The six conventional wells and Xmas 
trees are placed in two rows of three around a common manifold at seabed level. 
Specifications for this concept are as follows: 
• 6 wells in total (2 rows of 3); 
• Each well system as per Case 1 a; 
• Manifold plan dimensions equal to 10 m x 5 m; 
• Manifold located at seabed level central to well cluster; 
• A minimum distance of 25 m between Xmas trees and all other permanent 
equipment. 
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Details of Case 2a) are illustrated in Figure 57. 
CASE 2a) 
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Figure 57 Case 2a- Clustered Wells with Unprotected Xmas Trees Placed at 
Seabed Level (Base Case) 
The total plan layout area for the cluster of six unprotected wells is 63.5 m by 62 m. 
Assuming equally likely incoming iceberg directions, this equates to an effective 
diameter of 80 m. The unprotected wells may be impacted from both freely floating and 
scouring icebergs. The annual probability of encountering the well cluster and making 
contact with one or more wells from freely floating and scouring icebergs is 2.5 x 1 o-3 
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and 8.4 X 10"5, respectively, for a total probability of 2.6 X 10"3 (based on Figures 45 & 
46). 
Assuming that iceberg contact with the Xmas tree results in a blowout (i.e. SCSSV fails 
to perform), it is clear that an unprotected multi-well cluster located at seabed level do 
not alone provide adequate protection from iceberg contact assuming a target level of 
safety equal to 1 o-s per annum. 
7.3.2 Unprotected Wells With Downhole Weak Shear Joint (Case 2b) 
Similar to the base case multi-well concept (Case 2a), six conventional wells with 
unprotected Xmas trees are installed at seabed level but a weak shear plane located 
downhole in the well conductor pipe is incorporated. The six conventional wells and 
Xmas trees are placed in two rows of three around a common manifold. Specifications 
for this concept are as follows: 
• 6 wells in total (2 rows of3); 
• Each well system as per Case 1 b; 
• Downhole weak shear joint in each well conductor pipe located at a minimum 
depth beneath seabed level; 
• Manifold plan dimensions equal to 10 m x 5 m; 
• Manifold located at seabed level central to well cluster; 
• A minimum distance of 25 m between Xmas trees and all other permanent 
equipment. 
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Details of Case 2b) are illustrated in Figure 58. 
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Figure 58 Case 2b- Clustered Wells with Xmas Trees Unprotected Placed at 
Seabed Level 
As for Case 2a, the a total probability of encountering the well cluster and making contact 
to one or more conventional Xmas trees from both from freely floating and scouring 
icebergs is 2.6 X 1 0"3. In order to satisfy the required target level of 1 0"5 per annum for 
the well cluster, the weak shear joints in the conductor pipes must be located at a 
minimum depth of 3.2 m below the mudline, allowing for 1.6 m scour depth and an 
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equivalent clearance between the bottom of the scour and the shear joint to allow for sub-
scour soil deformation. 
7.3.3 Open Glory Hole (Case 2c) 
For this protection concept, six Xmas trees are installed below the mudline in a large 
diameter open glory hole. The six conventional wells and Xmas trees are placed in two 
rows of three around a common manifold. The top of the trees is sufficiently deep 
enough to minimize the risk from scouring icebergs. Specifications for this concept are 
as follows: 
• Clustered multi-well system as per Case 2a positioned in an 8 m deep glory hole; 
• Mudline glory hole dimensions of 122m x 120m; 
• 74 m by 72 m glory hole base dimensions (allows adequate ROV clearance 
around tree at operational level); 
• Slope for sides of glory hole - 3H: 1 V; 
• Top of Xmas tree 2.5 m below mudline; 
• Manifold plan dimensions equal to 1 0 m x 5 m; 
• Manifold located in open glory hole central to well cluster; 
• A minimum distance of 25 m between Xmas trees and all other permanent 
equipment. 
Details of Case 2c) are illustrated in Figure 59. 
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Figure 59 Case 2c- Clustered Wells with Xmas Placed in a Large Open Glory 
Hole 
The open glory hole has mudline dimensions of 122m by 120m, equating to an effective 
structure diameter of 154 m, assuming equally likely incoming iceberg directions. The 
open glory hole concept can only be affected by scouring icebergs. The annual 
probability of a scouring iceberg entering the open glory hole is 1.1 x 10-4. In order to 
satisfy the required target level of 1 o-s per annum, the minimum depth of the top of the 
Xmas tree below the mudline is 2 m (based on Figure 49). 
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7.3.4 Cased Glory Holes (Case 2d) 
Six conventional wells are placed in cased glory holes for this protection concept. The 
six cased holes are placed in two rows of three and tied into a common manifold. Each 
well and Xmas tree arrangement is identical to the Case 1 c system. Specifications for 
this concept are as follows: 
• 6 wells in total (2 rows of 3); 
• Each well system as per Case 1 d; 
• Casing weak shear plane located at a minimum depth beneath seabed level; 
• Manifold plan dimensions equal to 1 0 m x 5 m; 
• Manifold located at seabed level central to well cluster; 
• A minimum distance of 25 m between holes and all other permanent equipment. 
Details of Case 2d) are illustrated in Figure 60. 
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Figure 60 Case 2d- Clustered Wells with Xmas Trees Placed in Cased Glory 
Holes 
The cluster of six 7.3 m diameter cased glory holes occupies a plan area measuring 72 m 
by 70 m, for an effective diameter of 90 m assuming equally likely incoming iceberg 
directions. The cased holes may be impacted from both freely floating and scouring 
icebergs. The annual probability of encountering the well cluster and making contact 
with one or more wells from freely floating and scouring icebergs is 5.7 x 10-4 and 7.7 x 
w-5, respectively, for a total probability of 6.5 X 10-4 (based on Figures 45 & 46). To 
achieve the annual target level of safety of 1 o-5 for one or more wells, the shear plane of 
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the casing must be a minimum of 3.4 m below the mudline. This includes equal 
provisions for scour and sub-scour deformations. 
7.3.5 Modified Cased Glory Holes (Case 2e) 
Similar to the cased glory holes, the six Xmas trees are installed below the mudline in 
modified cased glory holes. The six cased holes are placed in two rows of three and tied 
into a common manifold. Each well and Xmas tree arrangement is identical to the Case 
1d system. Specifications for this concept are as follows: 
• 6 wells in total (2 rows of 3); 
• Each well system as per Case 1 e; 
• Top of Xmas tree located at 4.5m beneath seabed level; 
• Manifold plan dimensions equal to 10 m x 5 m; 
• Manifold located at seabed level central to well cluster; 
• A minimum distance of 25 m between holes and all other permanent 
equipment. 
Details of Case 2e) are illustrated in Figure 61. 
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Case 2e - Clustered Wells with Xmas Trees Placed in Modified Cased 
Glory Holes 
The cluster of six modified cased holes, with a diameter of 16 m occupies a plan area 
measuring 87 m by 98 m, for an effective diameter of 118 m assuming equally likely 
incoming iceberg directions. The modified cased holes may be impacted from scouring 
icebergs only. The annual probability of encountering the well cluster and entering one 
or more wells is 8.8 x 10-5. To achieve the annual target level of safety of 10-5 for one or 
more wells, the top of the Xmas trees must be a minimum of 1.8 m below the mudline. 
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7.3.6 Caisson Wellhead Systems (Case 2f) 
This installation consists of six shearable caisson systems in two rows of three tied into a 
common manifold. Each of the caisson completion systems are identical to the one 
described for Case 1 f. Specifications for this concept are as follows: 
• 6 wells in total (2 rows of 3); 
• Each well system as per Case lf; 
• Weak shear plane located at a minimum depth below mudline; 
• Manifold plan dimensions equal to 1 0 m x 5 m; 
• Manifold located at seabed level central to well cluster; 
• A minimum distance of 25 m between Xmas trees and all other permanent 
equipment. 
Details of Case 2t) are illustrated in Figure 62. 
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Figure 62 Case 2f- Clustered Wells with Caisson Wellhead Completion Systems 
The cluster of six caisson completion systems occupies an area measuring 62 m by 63.5 
m, for an effective diameter of 80 m assuming equally likely incoming iceberg directions. 
The caisson systems may be impacted from both freely floating and scouring icebergs. 
The annual probability of encountering the well cluster and making contact with one or 
more caissons from freely floating and scouring icebergs is 2.5 x 10-3 and 8.4 x 10-5, 
respectively, for a total probability of 2.6 x 10-3 (based on Figures 45 & 46). To achieve 
the annual target level of safety of 1 o-5 for one or more wells, the shear plane of the 
caisson must be a minimum of 3.2 m below the mudline. This includes equal provisions 
for scour and sub-scour deformations. 
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7.4 Summary of Iceberg Encounter Results 
The approach taken in this Chapter with respect to probability of iceberg encounter 
accounts for the expected range of iceberg and environmental conditions for the study 
area (defined by degree square 46° to 4 7° N and 48° to 49° W) and the physical features 
of the installations. As outlined in Chapter 5, an annual target level of safety of 1 o-s 
against blowout was established for both the single well and clustered multi-well 
developments. A summary of the iceberg encounter results for the single and multi-well 
systems as evaluated in Sections 7.2 & 7.3 are presented below in Tables 16 & 17, 
respectively. 
The effectiveness of iceberg management for reducing the likelihood of iceberg 
encounter has also been considered in the results presented in Tables 16 & 17 by 
applying an overall success rate of 85%. Iceberg management essentially reduces the 
probability of iceberg contact by an amount proportional to the probability of success. 
For this investigation, calculations of contact probability with iceberg management has 
assumed that physical management would only be effective for floating icebergs as it is 
unlikely that a scouring iceberg would respond to existing iceberg deflection techniques. 
The scouring component in the calculation for overall annual encounter probability is 
therefore not reduced. 
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Table 16 Summary of Iceberg Encounter Results- Single Satellite Well 
Developments 
Iceberg Annual Required Depth:l to 
Case Description Management Encounter1 Satisfy TLS Against 
Effectiveness Probability Blowoue 
0% 9.6 X 10-4 -
1a Unprotected Well 
85% 1.8 X 10-4 -
Unprotected Well w/ 0% 9.6 X 10-
4 
1b 0.6m Weak Shear Joint 85% 1.8 X 10-4 
0% 5.6 X 10-' 
1c Open Glory Hole4 1.45 m 
85% 5.6 X 10-5 
0% 2 X 10-4 
1d Cased Glory Hole 0.8m 
85% 5.2 X 10-' 
0% 2.5 X 10-5 
1e Modified Cased Hole4 0.5 m 
85% 2.5 X 10-:> 
Caisson Wellhead 0% 9.6 X 10
4 
1f 0.6m System 85% 1.8 X 10-4 
Notes: 
1. "Encounter" occurs when a scouring iceberg enters an open glory hole or modified cased hole, or 
when a floating or scouring iceberg contacts a cased glory hole or the Xmas tree of a caisson system, 
or unprotected tree. 
2. The "Required Depth" is the minimum depth required to the top of the Xmas tree, shear plane or 
shear joint in order to satisfy the annual target level of safety (TLS) of 1 o-5• 
3. "Blowout" occurs when a scouring iceberg penetrates deep enough into an open or glory hole or 
modified cased hole to contact the protected Xmas tree, scours deep enough to impact below the 
shear joint/plane in the unprotected well with downhole shear joint, caisson system or cased glory 
hole, or contacts an unprotected Xmas tree. 
4. Open glory hole and modified cased hole installations are only affected by scouring icebergs. 
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Table 17 Summary of Iceberg Encounter Results - Clustered Mulit-well 
Developments 
Iceberg Mgnt Annual Required Depth:L to Case Description Encounter1 Satisfy TLS Against Effectiveness Probability Blowoue 
0% 2.6 x w-j -
2a Unprotected Wells 
85% 4.6 x 10·4 -
Unprotected Wells w/ 0% 
2.6 x w-j 
2b 3.2m Weak Shear Joint 85% 4.6 X 10"4 
0% 1.1 x 10·4 
2c Open Glory Hole 4 2.0m 
85% 1.1 x 10·4 
0% 6.5x 10-4 
2d Cased Glory Holes 3.4m 
85% 1.6 x w-4 
Modified Cased 0% 
8.8 X 10"' 
2e 1.8 m Holes4 85% 8.8 X 10"' 
Caisson Wellhead 0% 
2.6 X 10"3 
2f 3.2m Systems 85% 4.6 X 10"4 
Notes: 
1. "Encounter" occurs when a scouring iceberg enters an open glory hole or modified cased hole, or 
when a floating or scouring iceberg contacts a cased glory hole or the Xmas tree of a caisson system, 
or unprotected tree. 
2. The "Required Depth" is the minimum depth required to the top of the Xmas tree, shear plane or 
shear joint in order to satisfy the annual target level of safety (TLS) of 1 o-5• 
3. "Blowout" occurs when a scouring iceberg penetrates deep enough into an open or glory hole or 
modified cased hole to contact the protected Xmas tree, scours deep enough to impact below the 
shear joint/plane in the unprotected well with downhole shear joint, caisson system or cased glory 
hole, or contacts an unprotected Xmas tree. 
4. Open glory hole and modified cased hole installations are only affected by scouring icebergs. 
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In contrast to single well developments, it is possible for more than one well to be 
contacted by an iceberg that encroaches into the area occupied by a multi-well 
development. Determining an average number of hits is difficult and depends on a 
number of factors including: 
• Layout ofthe multi-well cluster; 
• Dimensions ofXmas tree; 
• Iceberg varying keel width; 
• Iceberg travel condition (i.e. free floating or scouring); 
• Orientation of iceberg motion with respect to the cluster; 
• Mass of the iceberg; and 
• Iceberg Response when contact is made with one or more wells. 
Although the probability is quite low, it is possible that all six wells of a clustered multi-
well development could be hit during one iceberg event. Based on the layouts presented 
in Section 7.3 and iceberg keel characteristics as presented in Section 6.2.1.3, it is 
physically possible for an encroaching iceberg to sweep through the area and contact all 
six wells. For example, the area occupied by the well clusters in Section 7.3 consists of 
two rows of three wells, separated by a dimension equal to 55 m. A scouring iceberg 
with the base of its keel 0.5 m beneath seabed has an effective keel width of 55 mat a 
position 5.5 m above seabed level (height of Xmas tree), making this scenario possible. 
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7.5 Conservatisms and Limitations in Well Blowout Calculations 
For all well systems considered, it was assumed that any iceberg contact with an Xmas 
tree was to result in a blowout. For unprotected wells with a downhole shear joint, 
caisson completion systems and cased glory holes, contact or influence of the iceberg 
below the shear joint/plane was also assumed to result in a blowout. This is quite 
conservative considering that any substantial damage caused by iceberg contact with an 
Xmas tree or well will result in the activation of reliable failsafe systems such as 
SCSSV's. As a result, a significant amount of conservatism was introduced into the 
results presented in Tables 16 and 17 by assuming blowout upon iceberg contact and by 
not considering the effectiveness of SCSSV's. This is possibly the greatest source of 
conservatism in the iceberg encounter calculations. 
No provisions have been made in the calculations to account for the mechanical strength 
of the installations or the possibility of ice failure upon contact. For all systems, there is 
a probability of an iceberg "glancing" upon contact causing only minimal damage to the 
facilities and no loss of hydrocarbons. Direct impacts may only result in damage to 
secondary components, leaving key components such as the wellhead or master valves 
structurally unaffected. If this effect were to be included in the calculations, a reduced 
probability of blowout could be achieved. 
For the systems with weak shear planes and joints located below the mudline, they have 
been assumed to work perfectly for iceberg contacts above the shear plane/joint 
(assuming some allowance of sub-scour deformations). While this is a realistic 
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assumption, perfect operation of these weak planes/joints cannot be guaranteed. On the 
other hand, iceberg incursion below the shear plane will most likely result in loss of 
pressure and activation of the SCSSV and/or the master valve. The net effect of these 
factors is expected to result in a substantially reduced blowout probability than stated in 
Tables 16 and 17. 
The influence of both bathymetric filtering and bathymetric shielding has not been taken 
into consideration in the probability of encounter calculations. A conservative approach 
has been taken by not modifying the distribution of iceberg drafts to account for icebergs 
with drafts greater that the water depth that will ground and be filtered out of the keel 
population. In addition, installations are assumed to be exposed to incoming icebergs 
right down to the mudline. In practice, there will be bathymetric shielding at some 
locations that will reduce the overall probability of iceberg contact. 
Values of iceberg areal density ranging from 0.6 to 0.77 icebergs I year I degree square 
have been documented based on data collected over different time periods (1960-2000 vs. 
1981-2000). The more conservative value of 0.77 for areal density has been used in the 
calculations for the purpose of this investigation. 
Iceberg drift directionality has not been considered. A non-directional approach has been 
taken with respect to iceberg drift data, which assumes that the probability of contact 
with a subsea facility is equal from all compass directions. By considering the 
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distribution of iceberg drift directions, the probability of contact can be potentially be 
reduced. 
For scouring icebergs with installations below seabed, the effective keel width Ld has 
been assumed to be equal to 24m. This value corresponds to the mean scour width in 
water depths ~ 11Om on the Grand Banks (Croasdale et al., 2000). This is a somewhat 
conservative approach because it corresponds to the width of a scouring iceberg at seabed 
level. The width of an iceberg at any point below the mudline could be less, especially at 
the very base of an iceberg keel, which would result in an overall lower probability of 
contact for scouring icebergs. 
In calculating encounter and contact probabilities for open glory holes, the actual 
footprint of the wellhead installation at the base of the hole is much smaller than the 
mudline dimensions. While it is possible that an iceberg enters the hole without damaging 
the wellhead, this possibility has not been taken into consideration. Similarly, when 
calculating the depth of a shear planes or shear joints for multi-well clusters, the total 
occupied plan area of the installation is assumed. While it is possible that an iceberg 
enters the occupied area of the multi-well installation without making contact with any 
one or more wells, this possibility has also not been considered. Both of these 
assumptions increase calculated impact probabilities. 
The effect of iceberg management has been factored into the iceberg encounter 
calculations summarized in Tables 16 and 17. Although successful iceberg management 
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systems are currently in place on the Grand Banks, the achievable success rates for 
satellite type developments may be somewhat lower due to the larger coverage areas and 
additional amount of required resources. Although iceberg management will have an 
effect to reduce overall risk, success rates less than 85% could be expected for satellite 
type developments. 
As more data is collected relating to iceberg drift and scour on the Grand Banks, the trend 
seems to be pointing towards an overall reduction in interaction probabilities. This is due 
to a number of factors including access to a larger sample of data over a longer period of 
time and refinement of existing conservatisms through additional research in key areas, 
both resulting in the refinement of existing prediction methods to determine risk to 
subsea facilities. 
As a result of the issues discussed above, it is apparent that there is a high degree of 
conservatism inherent in the iceberg encounter and subsequent well blowout estimates 
calculated for the systems presented in this Chapter. 
7.6 Discussion 
As summarized in Section 7.5, there is a large amount of conservatism built into the 
calculations performed for the various well systems presented. Making such allowances 
may not always be practical, especially from a commercial, economic and project 
development standpoint. Although the environmental and economic consequences of an 
uncontrolled blowout, for example, are extreme, the risk estimates of such an event 
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occurring must be realistic, even while taking a conservative approach and "erring on the 
side of caution". 
The intent of this discussion is to investigate two key issues presented in Section 7.5 that 
offer a high level of conservatism, in an attempt to further understand and illustrate the 
level of conservatism built-in current probability estimates associated with subsea 
installations in general. 
7.6.1 Effectiveness of SCSSV's 
The effectiveness of SCSSV's and other existing fail-safe systems should not be ignored 
when assessing the overall probability of blowout to a well from iceberg contact. As 
presented in Section 4.2, under normal operating conditions SCSSV's are quite reliable 
with a MTTF of 36.7 years, which corresponds to an overall reliability of 0.973. 
However, during events such as an iceberg contact with a well, the reliability of these 
safety devices comes into question due to the potential for load transfer to components 
downhole such as the conductor, casings and production tubing. 
C-CORE (2001b) conducted an investigation in order to determine the potential damage 
effects to a well in the case of iceberg contact with a conventional Xmas tree and 
wellhead located above seabed. Annual contact frequencies from free floating and 
scouring icebergs were calculated and combined with structural response calculations to 
yield annual frequencies for events likely to result in permanent damage to the well outer 
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36" conductor and 20" casings downhole. A schematic of the well installation considered 
for this study is presented below in Figure 63. 
4m 
1-= :.1 
t Top ofWellhead 
5.5m 
36" Conductor 
300m 
20" Casing 
5 Yz" Tubing 
Figure 63 Schematic of Well Installation (C-CORE, 200lb) 
Although a number of conservative assumptions were made, the annual frequencies 
associated with iceberg events that caused permanent damage to the outer well 
conductors (damage events) ranged between 5 x 10-5 and 2 x 10-4• It was concluded that 
corresponding strains to this inner 5 Yz" production tubing would be quite small and 
would not likely be compromised under these conditions. Furthermore, even large 
deformations of the outer casing are not likely to damage the SCSSV, positioned some 
180 
300 m below. The only situation of concern is if the tubing string is pulled out of the 
hole a significant amount. Further work concluded that by considering the stiffening 
effect of the guide base at the mudline and the beneficial effect of an additional 48" 
conductor extended to a depth of 20m, the likelihood of plastic deformation of the 
constructor string reduced significantly. Resulting annual frequencies of damage events 
ranged from 1.5 x 10-5 to 2.9 x 10-5 per well installation, assuming an ice management 
effectiveness of 86% (C-CORE, 2001c). 
Applying the results of the C-CORE (200 1 c) study to a conventional unprotected well 
reveals some interesting trends. Assuming a level of ice management of 86%, the annual 
contact frequency for C-CORE (200 1 b) was approximately 3 x 104 per well installation. 
By dividing the annual frequency of a damage event occurring by this value, the 
probability of permanent damage given that contact has occurred can be calculated. 
Using this approach, the probability of permanent damage given that contact has occurred 
ranges between 5 x 10-2 and 9.7 x 10-2 per annum. For a conventional unprotected well 
located on the Grand Banks in 100 m of water as presented in Section 7 .2.1, the 
necessary maximum probability of downhole damage in order to satisfy an annual target 
level of safety of 10-5 is roughly 1.1 x 10-2 per annum (assuming an annual probability of 
contact of 9.6 x 10-4 per well as calculated in Section 7.2.1 and an SCSSV reliability of 
0.973). If one were to assume that permanent damage to the upper wellbore causes 
failure to the SCSSV, which in practice is unlikely to be the case, the annual target level 
of safety against blowout is nearly achieved in this case without relying on any form of 
wellhead protection or considering the conservatisms presented in Section 7.5. 
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7.6.2 Refinement of Safety Class Designation 
As presented in Chapter 5, the target level of safety of 1 o-5 was established based on a 
Safety Class 1 designation as outlined in the CSA S4 71-04 standard. For Safety Class 1, 
the consequence of failure would result in great risk to life or a high potential for 
environmental damage. In this case, great risk of human life is not a concern, however, 
high potential of environmental damage is. The standard also states, "If loading hazards 
can be predicted sufficiently ahead of time to carry out a predefined emergency response 
plan that ensures personnel safety and environmental protection, then, for that particular 
loading condition, the structure may be Safety Class 2." Furthermore, " ... a structure 
designated Safety Class 1 as a whole may have certain of its structural elements 
designated Safety Class 2." 
In terms of predicting an iceberg contact (or encroachment) sufficiently ahead of time, 
this could be achieved to a certain degree through iceberg detection and management 
techniques that currently exist in the region. However, although iceberg detection and 
management does provide a level of protection against iceberg risk, there is insufficient 
justification to re-classify a subsea installation as Safety Class 2 based solely on the 
current effectiveness of iceberg management and further uncertainties associated with 
undeveloped satellite type developments in the region. 
As for the designation of safety classes for subsea installations such as a conventional 
unprotected well, all exposed elements of the Xmas tree and wellhead up to now have 
been classified as Safety Class 1. Plan and profile dimensions have been selected for 
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probability estimates performed in section 7.2 & 7.3, which make no distinction between 
critical and secondary components of the installation. This approach however, is 
considered conservative as the outer perimeter of typical subsea Xmas trees generally 
consists of primary components I members that if damaged or destroyed, will not have a 
significant impact on the integrity of the well causing an uncontrolled blowout. 
Figure 64 proposes a more refined breakdown of Safety Class for an unprotected Xmas 
tree installation, which assumes a decrease of 1.0 m for the overall length, width and 
height dimensions for the Safety Class 1 area. 
Plan 
View 
Profile 
View 
2.5m 
Safety Class 1 (TLS = 1 o-5) 
Safety Class 2 (TLS = 1 o-3) 
Figure 64 Breakdown of Xmas Tree into Safety Classes 
The overall dimensions of the installation stays the same but the outer 0.5 m perimeter 
falls into the Safety Class 2 category. Based on this approach, a reduction in overall 
contact probability from freely floating and scouring icebergs equal to 17% is achieved 
for the safety Class 1 designated area. Similarly, if plan and profile overall dimensions 
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are reduced by 2.0 m for the Safety Class 1 area, a decrease in overall contact probability 
of 35% is achieved. 
7.6.3 Subsea Equipment Layout 
As presented in 7.3, layouts for the proposed clustered multi-well developments were 
established based on a minimum subsea well spacing of 25m from any other permanent 
equipment. Although this distance has been established to ensure that wellheads are 
protected from falling drilling and workover equipment, in many cases wells are located 
in much closer proximity to other permanent equipment. 
The decision to locate wells in close proximity is largely driven by overall cost savings 
relating to subsea equipment, construction and drilling operations. For multi-well 
installations incorporating an open glory hole protection scheme, reducing the wellhead 
spacing would have a considerable impact on the glory hole based dimensions. This in 
turn would reduce the overall volume to be excavated, thus resulting in significant overall 
cost savings. 
In addition, the effect of optimizing the layout for multi-well clusters will ultimately 
reduce the overall risk from free floating and scouring icebergs. By reducing the spacing, 
aspect ratio and effective diameter of the installation, the overall probability of a well 
blowout can be reduced. For example, if a minimum well spacing of 1Om were assumed 
for each of the multi-well development layouts as presented in Section 7.3, the reduction 
in overall probability of contact to each installation is presented in Table 18. 
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Table 18 Reduction in Contact Probability for 10m Well Spacing 
Original Revised Reduction in Overall Installation Installation Contact Case Description Effective Effective Probability to Diameter Diameter 
(m) (m) Installation (%) 
2a Unprotected Wells 80 42 47 
2b 
Unprotected Wells w/ 
Weak Shear Joint 80 42 47 
2c Open Glory Hole 154 116 21 
2d Cased Glory Holes 95.5 52 32 
2e Modified Cased Holes 118 80 26 
Caisson Wellhead 
2f 80 42 47 Systems 
Based on results of Table 18, it can be seen that the greatest risk reduction is associated 
with unprotected wells whereby the overall probability of blowout is reduced by almost 
50%. This information is quite valuable when deciding upon the layout and well spacing 
for clustered multi-well developments. 
7.6.4 Results 
By considering the results of Sections 7.6.1 & 7.6.2, the reduction in overall probability 
of iceberg contact to a conventional unprotected well and subsequent blowout is 
considerable. This is demonstrated below in Table 19. 
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Table 19 Refinement to the Probability of Blowout for a Conventional 
Unprotected Well Located Above Seabed Level 
Description Unit Probability Comments 
Original Probability of per well-year 9.6 x w-4 As calculated in Blowout Section 7 .2.1 
A reduction in overall 
Reduction in Contact contact probability of 
Probability Due to per tree 17% from freely 
Refinement of Safety Class 0.83 floating and scouring 
Designation icebergs assuming a 1m 
reduction in Xmas tree 
overall dimensions 
Probability of Permanent 
Damage to SCSSV Given per contact 0.097 Reference C-CORE Iceberg Contact has (2001b & 2001c) 
Occurred 
SCSSV Probability of per SCSSV SCSSV Reliability = 
Failure 0.027 0.973, Reference Moines (2000) 
Assumes that downhole 
Revised Probability of permanent damage is per well-year 9.7 X 10-S required in order to Blowout 
affect the operation of 
the SCSSV 
In this case, a reduction in the annual probability against blowout by a full order of 
magnitude is achieved. This is without considering any effectiveness relating to iceberg 
management and neglecting all the other conservatisms in the calculations as presented in 
Section 7.5. Although aspects of this evaluation require further investigation and 
research, by considering realistic allowances for existing failsafe systems and refining the 
safety class designation, a significant effect on the overall risk to subsea installations 
against blowout can be achieved. 
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By incorporating additional well safety features such as positioning the SCSSV at great 
depths ( ~ 1 OOOm), employing dual SCSSV' s on production wells and implementing a 
weak shear joint in the conductor pipe located downhole as for Case 1&2b, the likelihood 
of blowout can be further reduced. It is envisioned that a reduction in the overall 
probability against blowout by a full order of magnitude can be comfortably achieved 
over the current estimates. 
It shall be noted that the probabilities of blowout calculated only relate to iceberg impact 
events, while the safety classes presented in CSA S471-04 pertain to all causes of 
installation failure. Thus, for any given subsea installation, the probability of well 
blowout as a result of iceberg events shall be added to all other installation failure causes 
to ensure the overall TLS of 1 x 1 o-5 is achieved. 
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8.0 CONSEQUENCE SCENARIOS 
There are numerous consequences resulting from an iceberg encounter or contact with 
subsea facilities ranging from minor damage requiring repairs to major damage leading to 
blowout of one or more wells. Damage to critical well components such as Xmas trees, 
wellheads and master value assemblies could potentially arise from such an event, which 
could require repair, re-entry and/or re-drilling of a well and environmental clean-up. 
Estimating the damage extent from a particular incident is difficult to quantify and will 
not be addressed as part of this investigation. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to identify the potential consequences of an iceberg 
encounter or contact as it relates to each of the wellhead systems evaluated in Chapter 
7.0. The subsequent cost evaluation and comparison of each concept, given the various 
consequence scenarios as presented in this Chapter, will be addressed in Chapter 9.0. 
Flowcharts associated with the different scenarios are presented in Figures 65 through 70. 
In addition, a summary of the consequence scenarios resulting from an iceberg encounter 
or contact for both single satellite well developments and clustered mulit-well 
developments are presented in Tables 20 and 21, respectively. Unlike the risk 
calculations performed in Section 7.2 & 7.3, consideration will be given in each scenario 
to the performance ofSCSSV's. 
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8.1 Unprotected Well (s) 
For the conventional unprotected Xmas tree installed at seabed level, two contact 
scenarios have been identified. The first scenario assumes that upon iceberg contact with 
the Xmas tree, the tree and well are damaged beyond repair; however, the SCSSV 
performs properly and shuts the well in. In the second scenario, the iceberg contacts the 
tree resulting in destruction of the tree; however, the SCSSV does not perform, resulting 
in a blowout. 
For a multi-well development, a single iceberg has the potential to contact between one 
and six wells during the same event. The manifold is assumed to be sacrificial for this 
and all similar well arrangements where the manifold is located at the mudline. 
A flowchart illustrating the consequences of iceberg contact is presented in Figure 65. 
8.2 Unprotected Well (s) With Downhole Weak Shear Joint 
For the conventional unprotected Xmas with downhole weak shear joint, three contact 
scenarios have been identified. The first scenario assumes that upon iceberg contact with 
the Xmas tree, the tree is damaged beyond repair; however, the weak shear joint separates 
correctly and ensures the SCSSV performs properly and shuts the well in. For this case, 
it is assumed that when a conductor shears successfully, the SCSSV will perform and 
shut the well in. For the second scenario, the weak shear joint does not separate 
correctly, however, the SCSSV does perform and shuts the well in. In the third scenario, 
189 
the iceberg contacts the Xmas tree resulting in destruction of the tree, but failure of both 
the weak shear joint and the SCSSV to operate correctly results in a blowout. 
For a multi-well development, a single iceberg has the potential to contact between one 
and six wells during the same event. 
A flowchart illustrating the consequences of iceberg contact is presented in Figure 66. 
8.3 Open Glory Hole 
For the Xmas tree installed m a large diameter open glory hole, three potential 
consequences of iceberg impact have been identified. The first assumes that the iceberg 
enters the hole, but does not penetrate deep enough to hit the top of the Xmas tree. In this 
instance, soil will be pushed into the hole with no damage to the Xmas tree. Only clean-
up costs to clear the hole of debris are incurred. For the second, the iceberg contacts the 
Xmas tree resulting in destruction of the tree, however, the SCSSV performs and the well 
is shut-in. In the third scenario, the iceberg contacts the Xmas tree resulting in 
destruction of the tree, but failure of the SCSSV results in a blowout. 
For a multi-well development, a single iceberg has the potential to contact between one 
and six wells during the same event. The manifold in this case is assumed to be 
sacrificial as it is situated at the base of the glory hole. 
A flowchart illustrating the consequences of iceberg contact is presented in Figure 67. 
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8.4 Cased Glory Hole(s) 
For the Xmas tree installed in a cased glory hole, three scenarios have been identified. 
The first assumes that the casing is contacted by a scouring iceberg above the shear point 
resulting in proper separation of the casing weak shear plane. In this event, the casing 
requires substantial repairs while the Xmas tree and wellhead suffer no damage. In the 
second scenario, the casing shears improperly as a result of a deep scouring iceberg and 
the Xmas tree is damaged beyond repair; however, the SCSSV performs properly and 
shuts the well in. The third scenario is similar to the second; however, the SCSSV fails 
to operate properly, resulting in destruction to Xmas tree and a well blowout. 
For a multi-well development, a single iceberg has the potential to contact between one 
and six casings in a single event. 
A flowchart illustrating the consequences of iceberg contact is presented in Figure 68. 
8.5 Modified Cased Glory Hole(s) 
For the Xmas tree installed in a modified cased glory hole, three scenarios have been 
identified. The first assumes that a scouring iceberg enters the hole above the casing and 
inner protection shield. In this instance, soil will be pushed into the hole with no damage 
to the Xmas tree. Only clean-up costs to clear the hole of debris are incurred. In the 
second scenario, the casing is contacted as a result of a deep scouring iceberg and the 
Xmas tree is damaged beyond repair; however, the SCSSV performs properly and shuts 
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the well in. The third scenario is similar to the second; however, the SCSSV fails to 
operate properly, resulting in destruction to the Xmas tree and a well blowout. 
For a multi-well development, a single iceberg has the potential to contact between one 
and six modified cased holes in a single event. 
A flowchart illustrating the consequences of iceberg contact is presented in Figure 69. 
8.6 Caisson Wellhead System(s) 
For the caisson wellhead system, three scenarios have been developed. In the first 
scenario, the iceberg impacts the mudline tree resulting in a proper shearing of the 
sacrificial section of the caisson assembly. The first scenario assumes that upon iceberg 
contact with the Xmas tree, the tree is damaged beyond repair; however, the weak shear 
joint separates correctly and ensures the SCSSV performs properly and shuts the well in. 
In the event of this type of failure, the well can be tied back in once the caisson is 
repaired and the lost sacrificial tree has been replaced before restarting the well. In the 
second scenario, a deep scouring iceberg impacts the caisson in such a manner as to fail 
the caisson in a mode other than shear. In this instance, the impact results in loss or 
extensive damage to the Xmas tree, however, proper performance of the SCSSV shuts the 
well in. The third scenario is similar to the second, however, failure of the downhole 
master valve and SCSSV results in a blowout of the well. 
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For a multi-well development, a single iceberg has the potential to contact between one 
and six caisson wellhead systems during the same event. 
A flowchart illustrating the consequences of iceberg contact is presented in Figure 70. 
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Figure 66 Flowchart- Unprotected Well(s) With Downhole Weak Shear Joint 
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Figure 67 Flowchart - Open Glory Hole 
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Figure 68 Flowchart- Cased Glory Hole(s) 
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Figure 69 Flowchart- Modified Cased Glory Hole(s) 
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Figure 70 Flowchart- Caisson Wellhead System(s) 
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8.7 Summary of Consequence Scenarios 
A summary of the consequence scenarios resulting from iceberg contact for both single 
satellite well developments and clustered mulit-well developments are presented below in 
Tables 20 and 21. Consequences indicate only if the well incurs a blowout. 
Table 20 Single Satellite Well Consequence Scenario Summary 
System Case Scenario Consequence 
Unprotected Iceberg Contacts Xmas Tree - SCSSV Performs No Blowout 
la 
Well Iceberg Contacts Xmas Tree - SCSSV Doesn't Perform Blowout 
Iceberg Contacts Xmas Tree - Conductor Shears 
No Blowout Properly 
Unprotected 
Iceberg Contacts Xmas Tree - Conductor Doesn't Shear 
Well w/ Shear lb No Blowout 
Joint 
- SCSSV Performs 
Iceberg Contacts Xmas Tree- Conductor Doesn't Shear 
Blowout 
- SCSSV Doesn't Perform 
Iceberg Enters Glory Hole No Blowout 
Open Glory 
Hole 
lc Iceberg Contacts Xmas Tree - SCSSV Performs No Blowout 
Iceberg Contacts Xmas Tree- SCSSV Does't Perform Blowout 
Iceberg Contacts Casing Above Shear Plane - Casing 
No Blowout 
Shears Successfully 
Cased Glory 
ld 
Hole 
Iceberg Contacts Casing Below Shear Plane & Shears 
No Blowout 
into Xmas Tree - SCSSV Performs 
Iceberg Contacts Casing Below Shear Plane & Shears 
Blowout 
into Xmas Tree - SCSSV Doesn't Perform 
Iceberg Contacts Above Casing No Blowout 
Modified Iceberg Contacts Below Top of Casing & Shears into 
Cased le Xmas Tree - SCSSV Performs No Blowout 
Glory Hole Iceberg Contacts Below Top of Casing & Shears into 
Blowout 
Xmas Tree - SCSSV Doesn't Perform 
Iceberg Contacts Xmas Tree - Caisson Shears Properly No Blowout 
Caisson Iceberg Contacts Caisson Below Shear Joint & Caisson 
Wellhead 1f Fails- SCSSV Performs 
No Blowout 
System Iceberg Contacts Caisson Below Shear Joint & Caisson 
Blowout 
Fails- SCSSV Doesn't Perform 
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Table 21 Clustered Multi-well Consequence Scenario Summary 
System Case Scenario Consequence 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Xmas Trees- SCSSV's No Blowout 
Unprotected Perform 
2a Iceberg Contacts One or More Xmas Trees- SCSSV's Wells Blowout 
Doesn't Perform 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Xmas Trees - Conductor 
No Blowout 
Unprotected 
Shears Properly 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Xmas Trees - Conductors 
Wellsw/ 2b No Blowout 
Shear Joint Doesn't Shear - SCSSV's Perform 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Xmas Trees - Conductors 
Blowout 
Don't Shear - SCSSV's Doesn't Perform 
Iceberg Enters Glory Hole No Blowout 
Open Glory Iceberg Contacts One or More Xmas Trees- SCSSV's No Blowout 2c Perform Hole 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Xmas Trees- SCSSV's 
Blowout 
Doesn't Perform 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Casings Above Shear 
No Blowout 
Plane- Casing Shears Successfully 
Cased Glory 2d Iceberg Contacts One or More Casings Below Shear Plane No Blowout 
Holes & Shears into Xmas Tree- SCSSV's Perform 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Casings Below Shear Plane 
Blowout 
& Shears into Xmas Tree- SCSSV's Doesn't Perform 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Installation Above Casing No Blowout 
Modified Iceberg Contacts One or More Installation Below top of No Blowout 
Cased 2e Casing & Shears into Xmas Tree- SCSSV's Perform 
Glory Holes Iceberg Contacts One or More Installation Below top of 
Casing& Shears into Xmas Tree- SCSSV's Doesn't Blowout 
Perform 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Xmas Tree - Caisson No Blowout 
Caisson 
Shears Properly 
Wellhead 2f 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Caisson Below Shear Plane No Blowout 
Systems 
& Caisson Fails- SCSSV's Perform 
Iceberg Contacts One or More Caisson Below Shear Plane 
Blowout 
& Caisson Fails- SCSSV's Doesn't Perform 
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9.0 COST ANALYSIS 
9.1 General 
The cost of doing business on the Grand Banks is considerably higher than in many other 
offshore areas of the world, largely due to the presence of icebergs and pack ice. The 
economic and risk trade-offs that are associated with protecting wellheads from the threat 
of icebergs make it a key issue for oil and gas development in this region. The aim of 
this section is to undertake a cost analysis in order to support the selection and decision 
making process when considering wellhead protection concepts for subsea marginal 
developments on the Grand Banks. 
The methodology used in this analysis for the selection of a wellhead protection concept 
involves a full comparison of capital expenditure (CAPEX) including those costs 
associated with equipment installation. More uniquely, the selection process incorporates 
the risks associated with iceberg contact. Consequences resulting from an iceberg 
contact such as lost production, environmental cleanup and replacement I repair costs are 
factored by the probability of that event occurring. This approach is further detailed 
under Section 9.2. Life of field operation expenditure (OPEX) and major 
repair/maintenance costs for the various protection concepts have not been taken into 
consideration in this cost analysis. 
All costs presented herein are in money of the day based on 2nd quarter, 2006. Because 
the amount of detailed cost data available in the public domain is limited, notional rates 
and norms acquired from local oil and gas companies and other reliable sources have 
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been used. Where cost information is available but is dated, the costs are inflated to 
arrive at a present value (PV) by assuming an annual inflation rate of 5%. It must also be 
noted that all costs relating to this evaluation are assessed in 2006 Canadian dollars. 
The input parameters associated with the various protection concepts are outlined in 
Section 9.3 with a summary of results presented in Section 9.4 & 9.5. In addition, the 
sensitivity of the cost comparisons to various parameters is explored in Section 9.6. 
9.2 Analysis Methodology 
The basis of comparison for the various wellhead protection options is the incremental 
costs over and above those of a conventional unprotected well system (i.e. Base Case). 
For a single well, an unprotected system consists of a conventional Xmas placed at the 
mudline. For multiple wells, the unprotected system consists of an arrangement of 
conventional Xmas trees distributed around a single manifold at seabed level. 
The net cost of a particular system can be calculated from the following expression: 
(9.1) 
Where N is the net incremental system cost, C is the incremental CAP EX (or upfront 
development cost) and CR is the cost of risk resulting from iceberg events. The cost of 
risk can be expressed as: 
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(9.2) 
Where p 1 is the annual probability of the iceberg event, R is the equipment repair I 
replacement cost, E is the environmental and equipment cleanup cost, LPis the cost of 
lost production and Tis the life of the field. 
As presented in Chapter 8.0, there are a number of possible iceberg event consequence 
scenarios associated with each wellhead protection concept. Consequences range from 
contact causing minor damage to a complete well blowout event requiring killing of a 
well andre-drilling and spill clean- as summarized in Tables 20 & 21. For example, the 
entry of an iceberg into an open glory hole would induce only minor damage, while 
contact with an Xmas tree could result in activation of the downhole SCSSV or even 
worst, a well blowout. Each consequence scenario associated with an iceberg event 
varies in annual probability of occurrence and comes with different repair I replacement, 
clean-up and lost production costs. The overall cost of risk is the sum of the annual 
probability of the iceberg event times the associated repair/replacement, cleanup and lost 
production costs, all multiplied by the life of field. Thus, the relationship for cost of risk 
becomes: 
CR = I[Pfi(R; +E; +LPJ+ ... + pfn(Rn +En +LPJ].r (9.3) 
i=l 
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The analysis presented herein has also incorporated provisions for iceberg management, 
assuming an overall success rate of 85% as presented in Section 6.5. Calculations of risk 
with iceberg management has assumed that iceberg management would only be effective 
for floating icebergs as it is unlikely that a scouring iceberg would respond to iceberg 
management. The scouring risk component in the calculation for overall annual 
probability of contact is therefore not reduced. 
9.3 Input Parameters 
In order to undertake the cost analysis a variety of key input parameters are required. 
These include: 
• Annual Probability of an Iceberg Event 
• Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 
• Repair I Replacement Costs 
• Cleanup Costs 
• Lost Production Costs 
9.3.1 Annual Probability of an Iceberg Event 
As presented in Chapter 8.0, there are a number of possible iceberg consequence 
scenarios associated with each wellhead protection concept. The consequence scenarios 
can be broken down into three distinct iceberg events, each having its own annual 
probability of occurrence. These include: 
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A: Iceberg Encounter: occurs when a scouring iceberg enters an open glory hole 
or modified cased hole, or that a floating or scouring iceberg contacts the Xmas 
tree of a caisson system, cased glory hole or unprotected Xmas tree. 
B: Contact (SCSSV Performs): occurs when a scouring iceberg penetrates deep 
enough into an open or glory hole or modified cased hole to impact the protected 
Xmas tree, scours deep enough to impact below the shear joint/plane in the 
unprotected well w/ downhole shear joint, caisson system or cased glory hole, or 
contacts an unprotected Xmas tree. For this iceberg event, the SCSSV performs 
properly and shuts the well in. 
C: Contact (SCSSV Don't Perform- "Blowout"): occurs when a scouring iceberg 
penetrates deep enough into an open or glory hole or modified cased hole to 
impact the protected Xmas tree, scours deep enough to impact below the shear 
joint/plane in the unprotected well w/ downhole shear joint, caisson system or 
cased glory hole, or contacts an unprotected Xmas tree. For this iceberg event, 
the SCSSV does not perform, resulting in a well blowout. 
Refer to Appendix A (Tables Al & A2) for a summary of the annual probabilities 
associated with each iceberg event as identified above. Provisions for iceberg 
management, assuming an overall success rate of 85% are also included. The basis 
behind the calculation for iceberg annual contact probability is also presented in 
Appendix A (Tables A3 & A4). 
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9.3.2 CAPEX 
CAPEX includes those costs associated with equipment and installation and, in general, 
make up the majority of the overall net system cost. The incremental CAPEX associated 
with the various well development options for both single and multi-well developments 
are summarized below in Tables 22 & 23. Additional details that include a breakdown of 
rates and norms associated with equipment requirements and subsea construction 
activities associated with the various wellhead protection concepts can be found in 
Appendix B (Table B 1 ). In addition, duration estimates for various offshore operations 
are also presented. 
Table 22 Incremental CAPEX- Single Well Developments 
Case Description Incremental CAPEX [$MMCDN] 
la Unprotected Well 0 
lb Unprotected Well w/ Weak Shear Joint 1.3 
lc Open Glory Hole 8.5 
ld Cased Glory Hole 2.0 
le Modified Cased Hole 2.0 
1f Caisson Wellhead System 3.0 
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Table 23 Incremental CAPEX - Clustered Multi-well Developments 
Case Description Incremental CAPEX 
r$MMCDNl 
2a Unprotected Wells 0 
2b Unprotected Wells w/ Weak Shear Joint 7.5 
2c Open Glory Hole 24.1 
2d Cased Glory Holes 12.0 
2e Modified Cased Holes 12.0 
2f Caisson Wellhead Systems 18.0 
Note: For each of the clustered multi-well developments, protection for all six wells (3 x 
production & 3 x water injection) has been assumed. 
For the Grand Banks region, there is likely to be more uncertainty with the costs 
associated with cased hole concepts compared to those of open glory hole and caisson 
wellhead systems. This is because open glory hole and caisson wellhead completions 
have been successfully implemented on the Grand Banks previously and these costs have 
been documented. Based on previous experience in the region uncertainties relating to 
soil conditions add to the cost uncertainties for excavated systems such as open and cased 
glory holes and shall be taken into consideration for evaluating such systems. 
Consideration must also be given to the fact that while standard drilling tools can be used 
for the caisson completion systems, specialized dredging equipment is required for 
excavation of the cased and open glory hole concepts. 
Subsea equipment installation and construction works make up a significant portion of 
the overall capital cost for typical subsea development projects. Costs associated with 
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installation generally range anywhere from 20 - 50% of the overall capital cost of the 
subsea development. 
Currently, the East coast of Canada does not have the required infrastructure in place to 
support the local availability of large specialized offshore construction-type vessels that 
are required for development of subsea marginal fields for the region. Vessels that are 
hired for subsea installation and construction works will likely require mobilization from 
the North Sea, Gulf of Mexico or other regions around the world. Considering the high 
day-rate of these vessels, and the lengthy transit durations, mobilization/demobilization 
costs are accordingly very high. 
Semi-submersible drilling vessels will most likely be active in the region during the 
anticipated development and operating life of the field. Thus, there is potential for these 
drilling vessels to be used for initial wellhead protection system construction or even 
equipment installation, thereby offering considerable cost savings in terms of 
mobilization/demobilization. 
Costs associated with sacrificial subsea equipment such as flowlines, control umbilicals 
and control systems have not been included because they are common to each system 
proposed. 
9.3.3 Repair I Replacement Costs 
Costs associated with repair I replacement include those associated with such activities as 
drilling a new production well, replacement of the well protection system, re-entering a 
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well and performing repairs. The rates and norms such as unit costs and activity 
durations associated with repair I replacement of single and multi-well developments are 
presented in Appendix B (Table B 1 ). It should be noted that Costs associated with repair 
I replacement include those associated with mobilization of vessel, equipment, and 
manpower required to complete the works. 
In order to undertake the cost analysis, a number of assumptions have been made in 
relation to damage and subsequent repair I replacement of both single and multi-well 
subsea installations. These assumptions include: 
1) Any contact between an iceberg and Xmas tree results in damage of the Xmas tree 
hardware beyond repair and must be replaced. 
2) The weak shear joint of a caisson always shears properly except in the case of 
deeply scouring icebergs. 
3) When a blowout occurs, a relief well must be drilled to stop the flow of oil, the 
original well is then killed, and the original and relief wells are capped before a 
new production well is drilled. 
4) The weak shear plane of a cased glory hole will shear properly without damaging 
the wellhead except in the case of deeply scouring icebergs. 
5) When a Xmas tree or system is hit, the flowline connected to it breaks away 
without damage at a weak link connection to the Xmas tree. Tie-in costs reflect 
the costs incurred in reconnecting a flowline to the tree and/or manifold. Cost of 
the flowline(s) or manifold(s), iflost, are not accounted for. 
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6) Any backfill of an open or cased hole with debris does not damage the Xmas tree. 
The hole requires only removal of debris and subsequent cleanup. 
9.3.4 Cleanup Costs 
Costs associated with cleanup include those relating to equipment, debris and the 
environment. The rates and norms such as unit costs and activity durations associated 
with cleanup of single and multi-well developments are presented in Appendix B (Table 
Bl). 
Cleanup associated with equipment, debris and the environment is required for a number 
of scenarios. These include: 
• Iceberg contact with an Xmas tree and/or any other equipment making up the 
subsea installation whereby damage is incurred; 
• Iceberg scouring results in a hole being partially filled with debris; 
• Any contact between an iceberg and an installation, which results in a well 
blowout and subsequent oil spill. 
Blowout consequence costs are mainly a function of oil spill volume and spill location. 
Spill volume can be estimated as spill rate (see Table 24 below) times duration of the 
spill. It can take several weeks to locate and mobilize a mobile offshore drilling unit 
(MODU) to drill a relief well. A relief well kill operation would take at least two or three 
months and could require up to a year, which means the spill volume could be several 
million barrels (Goldsmith, 2005). 
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9.3.5 Lost Production Costs 
The cost of lost production as a result of an iceberg event has also been considered in this 
analysis. Lost production is expressed as a function of the consequence scenario assumed 
and factored by the time required to restore production. In order to calculate the 
financial loss due to lost production a netback per barrel of $1 0 CDN has been assumed 
which is multiplied by both the peak daily production rate and the number of days of lost 
production. 
In the case of a blowout, the well blowout rate has been taken as five times the peak daily 
well production rate. Table 24 presents production data for both single and multi-well 
developments (Case 1 & 2). 
Table 24 Production Data 
Description Case 1 Case2 
Peak Daily Well Production Rate (bopd) 15,000 40,000 
Spill/Blowout Rate (bopd) 75,000 200,000 
Netback per Barrel ($ CDN per barrel) 10 10 
Notes: 
Blowout rate for the multi-well development assumes that three wells result in a blowout 
condition for a single iceberg encounter. 
Durations for activities associated with a well blowout, environmental cleanup and 
subsequent lost production are presented in Appendix B (Table B 1 ). 
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9.4 Consequence Scenario Costs 
Based on the list of assumptions presented above and unit costs, activity durations and 
production data presented in Appendix B, costs associated with the various consequence 
scenarios were computed for both single and multi-well developments. These results for 
the various wellhead protection systems chosen are presented in Appendix C (Tables C 1 
through C6). A summary of these results are presented below in Tables 25 and 26. 
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Table 25 Summary of Consequence Scenario Costs - Single Well Development 
Consequence Scenario Cost 
($MMCDN) 
Case Description A: Iceberg B: Contact C: Contact 
Encounter (SCSSV (SCSSV Don't 
Performs) Perform) 
1a Unprotected Well 99.0 99.0 
1b 
Unprotected Well w/ Weak 
Shear Joint 76.5 99.0 
lc Open Glory Hole 11.6 115.1 302.0 
ld Cased Glory Hole 19.0 115.6 
1e Modified Cased Hole 15.5 112.1 
If Caisson Wellhead System 36.3 85.2 
Table 26 Summary of Consequence Scenario Costs -Multi-well Development 
Consequence Scenario Cost 
($MMCDN) 
Case Description A: Iceberg B: Contact C: Contact 
Encounter (SCSSV (SCSSV Don't 
Performs) Perform) 
2a Unprotected Wells 349.5 349.5 
2b 
Unprotected Wells w/ 
Weak Shear Joint 282.0 349.5 
2c Open Glory Hole 21.1 369.1 975.6 
2d Cased Glory Holes 74.5 406.9 
2e Modified Cased Holes 58.8 401.7 
2f Caisson Wellhead Systems 135.0 276.6 
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9.5 Summary of Results & Cost Comparison 
As discussed in Section 9.2, evaluation of the different wellhead protection systems is 
based on the incremental CAPEX incurred over and above the cost for the base case 
installation plus the cost of repair I replacement, cleanup and lost production costs which 
are all factored by the probability of an iceberg event and the life of the field. 
A detailed summary of the net incremental system cost results for the proposed single and 
multi-well protection concepts are presented in Appendix C, Tables C7 & C8. 
9.5.1 Single Well Development 
A summary of the net system costs for single well developments are presented in Table 
27. 
Table 27 Summary of Net System Costs- Single well Development 
Net System Cost 
Case Description Net System Cost 85% Iceberg Mgnt 
($MMCDN) ($MMCDN) 
la Unprotected Well1 2.28 1.24 
lb Unprotected Well w/ Weak Shear Joine 3.40 2.47 
lc Open Glory Hole 9.55 9.55 
ld Cased Glory Hole 3.19 3.05 
le Modified Cased Hole 3.02 3.02 
lf Caisson Wellhead System 4.85 4.16 
Notes: 
1. Does not meet established TLS = 10"5 
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Although Cases 1 a has the lowest net system cost at $2.28 MM, it is unacceptable in 
terms of probability of iceberg contact as established in Chapter 5.0. With a net system 
cost of$3.02 MM, the modified cased hole is the most cost effective solution using a cost 
of risk approach when compared to all other solutions. The open glory hole with a net 
system cost of $9.55 MM does not appear to be feasible option for a single well 
development. 
As expected, the Net System Costs reduced in magnitude when assuming an iceberg 
management overall success rate of 85%. However, the overall cost benefits of providing 
iceberg management for a single well development is relatively low and may not be 
economically desirable. Cases 1c and 1e remained unchanged because they consist only 
of a scouring iceberg component and do benefit from the effectiveness of iceberg 
management. 
In order to further understand the contribution of each component to the net incremental 
system cost, a graph presenting unit normalized values of both the incremental CAPEX 
and cost of risk components have been presented in Figure 71. 
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As can be concluded, the modified cased hole concept offers the optimum solution for a 
single satellite well development in terms of normalized CAPEX and cost of risk 
components. Although the unprotected well has the lowest CAPEX, its cost of risk 
however is substantially higher than all other alternatives. In comparison, the open glory 
hole concept has the highest CAP EX but its cost of risk is relatively low compared with 
all other concepts. 
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9.5.2 Multi-well Development 
The net system costs for clustered multi-well well developments are presented in Table 
28. For all multiple well options excluding the open glory hole, the CAPEX is essentially 
6 times the costs for that of a single well. In addition, although quite unlikely it is 
assumed that all six wells of a clustered multi-well development are contacted during one 
iceberg event (as discussed in Section 7.4). 
Table 28 Summary of Net System Costs- Multi-well Development 
Net System Cost 
Case Description Net System Cost 85% Iceberg Mgnt 
($MMCDN) ($MMCDN) 
2a Unprotected Wells1 17.12 3.85 
2b Unprotected Wells w/ Weak Shear Joine 23.22 10.10 
2c Open Glory Hole 25.55 25.55 
2d Cased Glory Holes 15.86 13.71 
2e Modified Cased Holes 13.37 13.37 
2f Caisson Wellhead Systems 29.33 20.83 
Notes: 
1. Does not meet established TLS = 1 o·5 
A similar trend for the multi-well developments was observed using the same approach. 
This is primarily due to the large influence of CAPEX on the sensitivity of the overall 
results. With a net system cost of $13.37 MM, the modified cased hole development is 
once again the most optimum solution from a cost of risk basis assuming the unprotected 
wells (Cases 2a & 2b) are unacceptable in terms of probability of iceberg contact. 
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It can be concluded from Table 28 that the influence of iceberg management on multi-
well developments has a greater influence on reducing the overall Net System Cost in 
comparison to single wells. Thus, iceberg management becomes more important from an 
economic standpoint for developments with a large number wells. 
A graph presenting the unit normalized values of both cost components for the multi-well 
development options are presented in Figure 72. 
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As concluded for single well developments, the modified cased hole concept also offers 
the most optimum solution for multi-well developments in terms of normalized CAPEX 
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and cost of risk components. The open glory hole has the highest CAP EX but its cost of 
risk is equal to that of the modified cased hole. 
9.6 Cost Sensitivity 
As presented in Section 9.5, the net system cost of the various protection systems is 
driven primarily by the incremental CAPEX. This is because the repair/replacement, 
cleanup and lost production costs are all factored by very low probability of iceberg 
contact and subsequent damage. 
Based on the results utilizing the cost of risk approach, it is clear that much effort should 
be spent defining assumptions and estimates relating to CAPEX as it is the key driver 
when determining the net system cost. 
9.7 Discussion 
Although the analysis presented in this section focuses on costs associated with 
somewhat defined repair and clean-up operations in the event of a major incident such as 
a blowout, the real cost to an operator is very difficult to quantify and can potentially be 
significant. Disasters such as the Exxon Valdez and more recently the fire at BP's Texas 
refinery fire bare classic examples of this. The damage to reputation in itself can be even 
more significant from a financial perspective than those associated with repair, clean-up 
and loss production costs. Repercussions from an uncontrolled well blowout on the 
Grand Banks could also result in the following: 
• Consumer rejection of products; 
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• Loss of share value; 
• Penalties; 
• Payouts to affected stakeholders (i.e. the fishing industry); 
• Investor loss of confidence for future prospects; 
• Higher standards (and therefore costs) for future developments; 
• Longer and more difficult approval process for future projects; 
• Requirements for retrofits/modifications to existing infrastructure; 
• Requirements for more stringent (and costly) operating procedures; 
• Shut down of adjacent facilities until containment and cleanup are complete; 
• Reduced tourism to the Province. 
Although implications such as these are readily identifiable, the associated costs are very 
difficult to quantify and have thus not been incorporated into the cost analysis. It is also 
worth noting that such repercussions apply equally across all concepts presented and will 
not have a significant impact on concept comparisons. 
While much of the emphasis of this investigation was focused on physical solutions for 
wellhead protection, one option for subsea developments in the region is to adopt a 
"unprotected" well installation approach, wherein the small probability of contact from 
freely floating and scouring icebergs to subsea facilities (i.e. wellheads, trees, manifolds 
etc.) is accepted. In addition, reliance on existing failsafe systems such as SCSSV's (as 
analyzed in Section 7 .6) and the implementation of downhole weak shear joints to reduce 
downhole structural responses shall be considered when evaluating such systems. In 
doing so, large reductions in development CAPEX can be realized, thus improving the 
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overall development economics, especially when considering marginal subsea fields. 
This approach obviously has its drawbacks when considering the potential repercussions 
that could unfold if something were to go seriously wrong. As a minimum, these include: 
• Overall business/financial consequence (i.e. Lost production, damage repair and 
replacement costs); 
• Adverse environmental consequences due to potential well blowout; 
• Negative public perception, media exposure and tarnished public image of local 
oil and gas industry. 
In deciding to implement an "unprotected" well installation on the Grand Banks, potential 
oil and gas developers need to be reminded of the basic equation developed by Peter 
Sandman, a pre-eminent risk communication consultant: 
Risk = Hazard + Outrage 
"Hazard" refers to the technical risk engineers are trained to assess. "Outrage" is the 
public's perception of risk. "Outrage" is made up of factors such as trust, responsiveness, 
control, etc. Clearly, with the difficulties experienced by the developers of some projects 
in obtaining local approval, a successful approach must balance technical and economic 
feasibility with political realities specific to each location. In the case of a subsea well 
installation, the "Outrage" factor of the risk equation must be managed as effectively as 
the "Hazard" factor (Rankin & Mick, 2005). A blowout or loss of life impacts everyone 
and tarnishes the image of the whole industry. The cost to cleanup an oil spill and 
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outrage costs associated with the lost sales and a tarnished public image can vary from a 
few hundred dollars per barrel to tens of thousands (Goldsmith, 2005). 
Even though a number of issues require further research and evaluation in order justify 
implementing an "unprotected" well installation, the topic definitely deserves serious 
consideration by operators and regulatory authorities alike. The questions must be asked, 
"Are we too conservative in our technical requirements for existing subsea systems?" and 
"As a developing oil and gas province, how much risk are we willing to take in our 
pursuit for exploitation of the vast reserves located on the Grand Banks?". 
Although not addressed as part of this work, an overall life cycle cost associated with 
each of the protection concepts should also be addressed and incorporated into the 
decision making process. This would involve taking into account OPEX, well workover 
costs and Abandonment Expenditure (ABEX) for each of the options. Each of these 
costs will be phased over the life of the field or occur at a later date and shall be 
discounted to arrive at a Net Present Value (NPV). In addition, drilling expenditure 
(DRILLEX) and well costs for multi-well developments may be phased over the life of 
the field to maintain plateau rather than drilled all at once shall also be considered. 
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10.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the work performed as part of this study, a number of conclusions have been 
reached. They are as follows: 
• Reliance on SCSSV's & other fail-safe systems offers an obvious solution for 
reduction in overall risk & up-front development costs for subsea well 
installations. 
• Effective ice management has potential to reduce overall risk levels by approx 
one order of magnitude but is alone unlikely to justify the safe operation of 
unprotected satellite wells. 
• Refinements to areas such as safety class designation & well spacing's within 
clustered developments offer reductions to overall iceberg contact probability. 
• The cost analysis performed indicates that the "Modified Cased Hole" protection 
concept to be the most attractive protection solution from a combined cost & risk 
approach for both single and multi-well developments. 
• The influence of iceberg management has a greater effect on reducing the overall 
Net System Cost for multi-well developments in comparison to single wells. This 
is important from an economic standpoint for developments with a large number 
wells. 
• Using a cost of risk approach, Net incremental system costs for both single and 
clustered satellite well developments are primarily driven by CAPEX. 
• A conventional "unprotected" subsea well installation for the Grand Banks may 
prove to be a feasible development scenario given further research and analysis. 
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• The economic and risk trade-offs that are associated with protecting subsea 
wellheads from the threat of icebergs is important to understand in order to 
support design and the decision making process. 
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11.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations that have been drawn from this work have been broken down into 
a number of key areas as presented below. 
11.1 Analysis, Testing and Research 
In order to fully understand well downhole structural response mechanisms given iceberg 
contact with a conventional Xmas tree and/or wellhead system, it is recommended that a 
finite element analysis model be undertaken for a typical well installation. As a 
minimum, the following parameters associated with a conventional well installation 
installed on the Grand Banks shall be considered and incorporated into the model: 
• Typical Xmas tree and wellhead design configurations (i.e. main components, 
dimensions, layout etc.); 
• Well design (i.e. foundation, conductors, casings and tubing etc.); 
• Bond strength between conductor and grout; 
• Strength of Xmas tree and connection to wellhead (i.e. force, moment, shear 
torsion); 
• Soil properties. 
To complement this analysis work, it is also recommended that a physical model test be 
undertaken in order to cross-reference and refine the results obtained from the finite 
analysis work. Ideally, full scaled modeling of the well installation that was fully 
instrumented could be performed. 
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The reliability of SCSSV's have improved dramatically over the past decade, however, 
further study and research is required in order to determine the limit states that affect the 
operability and reliability of these units that are located 1 00' s or even 1000's of meters 
beneath the seabed. Innovative technology such as electrically operated SCSSV's are 
currently being developed and may offer some added advantages to the existing 
hydraulically operated units which also warrants research. In addition, it is recommended 
that the use of dual SCSSV's situated downhole be studied in order to determine the 
effect to the overall reliability of the system given this redundancy. 
Identification and better understanding of the inherent conservatisms & limitations 
related to well blowout probability calculations should be given considerable attention. 
This understanding could have a significant impact on the probability estimates for 
iceberg contact with well installations and subsequent risk of well blowout. 
Ongoing monitoring of icebergs using aerial surveys, satellite or radar is recommended in 
order to add to the current database associated with iceberg frequency, drift speeds, 
iceberg size distributions etc. The ongoing collection of data such as high quality seabed 
survey data is also very important for building a more comprehensive data set associated 
with iceberg sour depth distribution and other important scour characteristics such as 
length and width. 
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An overall life cycle cost estimate incorporating additional cost components such as 
OPEX, ABEX and DRILLEX shall also be undertaken for each of the protection 
concepts and incorporated into the overall decision making process. For multi-well 
developments, the analysis should take into account that the development may be phased 
over the field life and costs discounted to arrive at a NPV to enable comparison of 
options. 
11.2 Establishment of Criteria 
Acceptable levels of risk specifically dealing with ice effects on sea floor facilities such 
as wellheads need specific attention as it is not covered explicitly by any of the existing 
national/international codes and standards or by the local regulatory authority. It is thus 
recommended that fully defined risk acceptance criteria be established by local oil & gas 
operators and regulatory bodies for subsea installations specific to the iceberg infested 
waters of the Grand Banks. 
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Appendix A 
Iceberg Annual Probability Summary 
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Table A 1: Summary of Iceberg Event Annual Probabilities - Single Satellite Well Developments 
Annual Annual Contacf Annual Contacf 
Encounter1 Probability Probability (A) - 85% Iceberg (B) - 85% Iceberg (C) - 85% Iceberg Case Description 
Probability (SCSSV (Blowout) Mgnt Mgnt Mgnt Performs) (A) (B) (C) 
1a Unprotected Well 9.60E-04 8.43E-04 1.17E-04 1.80E-04 1.58E-04 2.18E-05 
1b Unprotected Well w/ Weak Shear Joint 9.60E-04 8.43E-04 1.17E-04 1.80E-04 1.58E-04 2.18E-05 
1c Open Glory Hole 5.60E-05 4.92E-05 6.80E-06 5.60E-05 4.92E-05 6.80E-06 
1d Cased Glory Hole 2.00E-04 1.76E-04 2.43E-05 5.20E-05 4.57E-05 6.31E-06 
1e Modified Cased Hole 2.50E-05 2.20E-05 3.03E-06 2.50E-05 2.20E-05 3.03E-06 
1f Caisson Wellhead System 9.60E-04 8.43E-04 1.17E-04 1.80E-04 1.58E-04 2.18E-05 
~--
Table A2: Summary of Iceberg Event Annual Probabilities - Clustered Multi-well Developments 
Annual Annual Contacf Annual Contacf 
Encounter1 Probability Probability (A) - 85% Iceberg (B) - 85% Iceberg (C) - 85% Iceberg Case Description 
Probability (SCSSV (Blowout) Mgnt Mgnt Mgnt i Performs) (A) (B) (C) 
1a Unprotected Well 2.60E-03 2.28E-03 3.16E-04 4.60E-04 4.04E-04 5.58E-05 
1b Unprotected Well w/ Weak Shear Joint 2.60E-03 2.28E-03 3.16E-04 4.60E-04 4.04E-04 5.58E-05 
1c Open Glory Hole 1.10E-04 9.66E-05 1.34E-05 1.10E-04 9.66E-05 1.34E-05 
1d Cased Glory Hole 6.50E-04 5.71E-04 7.89E-05 1.60E-04 1.41E-04 1.94E-05 
1e Modified Cased Hole 8.80E-05 7.73E-05 1.07E-05 8.80E-05 7.73E-05 1.07E-05 
1f Caisson Wellhead System 2.60E-03 2.28E-03 3.16E-04 4.60E-04 4.04E-04 5.58E-05 
Notes: 
1. "Encounter'' occurs when a scouring iceberg enters an open glory hole or modified cased hole, or when a floating or scouring iceberg contacts a cased glory hole 
or the Xmas tree of a caisson system, or unprotected tree. 
I 
i 
I 
2. "Contact" occurs when a scouring iceberg penetrates deep enough into an open or glory hole or modified cased hole to impact the protected Xmas tree, scours deep enough 
to impact below the shear joint/plane in the unprotected well w/ downhole shear joint, caisson system or cased glory hole, or contacts an unprotected Xmas tree. 
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Table A3: Basis for Calculation for Iceberg Risk -Single Satellite Well Developments 
Description Annual Probability Comments 
1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 
I tAl- Oriainal Risk of Iceberg Encounter 9.60E-04 9.60E-04 5.60E-05 2.00E-04 2.50E-05 9.60E-04 As perTable16 
(A)- 85% Iceberg Mgnt Effectiveness for Original Risk of Blowout 1.80E-04 1.80E-04 5.60E-05 5.20E-05 2.50E-05 1.80E-04 Assumes iceberg management overall success rate 
equal to 85% 
Risk of Permanent Damage Given That Iceberg Contact with a 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 Reference C-CORE (2001 b & 2001 c) Unprotected Well Installation has Occurred 
SCSSV Reliability 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 SCSSV Reliability= 0.973, Reference Moines {2000) 
(B)- Revised Risk- Iceberg Contact, No Blowout (SCSSV 8.43E-04 8.43E-04 4.92E-05 1.76E-04 2.20E-05 8.43E-04 Assumes that downhole permanent damage is required Performs) in order to affect the operation of the SCSSV 
(C) - Revised Risk - Iceberg Contact, Blowout (SCSSV Don't 1.17E-04 1.17E-04 6.80E-06 2.43E-05 3.03E-06 1.17E-04 Assumes that downhole permanent damage is required Perform) in order to affect the operation of the SCSSV 
(B) - 85% Iceberg Management Effectiveness 1.58E-04 1.58E-04 4.92E-05 4.57E-05 2.20E-05 1.58E-04 Assumes iceberg management overall success rate 
eaual to 85% 
(C) - 85% Iceberg Management Effectiveness 2.18E-05 2.18E-05 6.80E-06 6.31E-06 3.03E-06 2.18E-05 Assumes iceberg management overall success rate 
eaual to 85% 
Table A4: Basis for Calculation for Iceberg Risk- Clustered Multi-well Developments 
Description Annual Probabilitv Comments 
2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 
A) - Oriainal Risk of lcebera Encounter 2.60E-03 2.60E-03 1.10E-04 6.50E-04 8.80E-05 2.60E-03 As per Table 17 
(A)- 85% Iceberg Mgnt Effectiveness for Original Risk of Blowout 4.60E-04 4.60E-04 1.10E-04 1.60E-04 8.80E-05 4.60E-04 Assumes iceberg management overall success rate 
eaual to 85% 
Risk of Permanent Damage Given That Iceberg Contact with 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 9.70E-02 Reference C-CORE (2001 b & 2001 c) Unprotected Well Installations has Occurred 
SCSSV Reliability 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 9.73E-01 SCSSV Reliabilitv = 0.973, Reference Moines (2000) 
(B)- Revised Risk - Iceberg Contact, No Blowout (SCSSV 2.28E-03 2.28E-03 9.66E-05 5.71E-04 7.73E-05 2.28E-03 Assumes that downhole permanent damage is required Performs) in order to affect the operation of the SCSSV 
(C) - Revised Risk - Iceberg Contact, Blowout (SCSSV Don't 3.16E-04 3.16E-04 1.34E-05 7.89E-05 1.07E-05 3.16E-04 Assumes that downhole permanent damage is required Perform) in order to affect the operation of the SCSSV 
(B) - 85% Iceberg Management Effectiveness 4.04E-04 4.04E-04 9.66E-05 1.41E-04 7.73E-05 4.04E-04 Assumes iceberg management overall success rate 
equal to 85% 
(C) - 85% Iceberg Management Effectiveness 5.58E-05 5.58E-05 1.34E-05 1.94E-05 1.07E-05 5.58E-05 Assumes iceberg management overall success rate 
equal to 85% 
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Table 81: Rates and Norms 
Item Description Cost ($CON) I Unit Comments Rate 
Equipment Costs 
1 Replacement of Conventbnal Xmas tree $13,500,000 per tree included in cost of new well (base case). includes installation and hardware costs 
2 Replacement of Caisson Sacrificial $8,000,000 per well includes installation and hardware costs 
3 Construction Vessel clw WROV $350,000 per day repa~ casing 
4 Dredge Vessel clw WROV $340,000 per day excavate dredged open hole and cleanup of dredged open hole 
5 Dive Support Vessel (DSV) clw WROV $315,000 per day includes diving spread 
6 Drill Rig clw ROV $1,000,000 I per day used for installing caisson and cased systems 
Constnlction Costs 
7 Caisson Tree Hole Prep $3,000,00( per hole incremental costs over base case; includes incremental rig time, tree costs, drilling components & downhole weak 
shear plane 
8 Cased Glory Hole Prep $2,000,00( per hole incremental costs over base case- assumes holes drilled using 7.3m b~ 
9 Modified Cased Glory Hole Prep $2,000,00( per hole incremental costs over base case- assumes holes drilled using 7.3m b~ 
10 Downhole Weak Shear Joint Prep $1,250,00( per well includes 1 day extra drill rig time and $CON 250,000 in extra equipment costs 
11 Open Glory Hole Excavation (single weD) $8,500,00( per hole includes constuction vessel and mob I demob costs 
12 Open Glory Hole Excavation (multi-well) $24,140,00( per hole includes constuction vessel and mob I demob costs 
13 Drill a Production Well $82,000,000 per well includes all costs incurred in drilling and completing new production well. The Xmas tree cost is included. Hole 
preparation costs are added incrementaUy as indicated above 
14 Drill a Relief Well $50,000,000 per well includes all costs associated w~ drilling and completing a relief well 
15 Re-enter Well & Repair $50,000,000 per well includes all costs associated with re-entering a weD and performing repairs 
16 Re-enter Well & Repair Conductor $27,500,000 per well includes all costs associated with re-entering a weD and performing repairs to upper portion of conductor 
17 Repair Casing $2,450,00( Each includes casing - assumes construction vessel will be used 
18 Tie-In Costfor a Well in a Cased Hole $1145 00( erwell includes DSV and tie-in materials for 3 davs 
Services 
19 Spill Clean Up Rate (single well) $1 ,500,~~:~ day assume spill does not reach land 
20 Spill Clean Up Rate (mu~iple wells) $3 000 00 r day assume spill does not reach land 
Activity Duration Times 
21 Vessel Mob I De-mob 2C days assumes 10 day transit each way from e~her North Sea I Gulf of Mexico 
22 Drill a Relief Well : days costs covered under construction cos1s for drill relief well 23 Drill a New Production Well days costs covered under construction cos1s for production well 
24 Kill a Well 4! days account for rig time only 
25 Re-enter Well & Repair 4! days costs covered under construction cos1s for re-enter well and repair 
26 Install a New Tree 1C days accounts for rig time only 
27 Tie-in a well 3days account for DSV clw WROV, services and equipment only 
28 Clean Out a Dredged Open Glory Hole 1 days assume dredge vessel clw WROV 
29 Clean Out a Cased Glory Hole 1C days assume DSV clw WROV 
30 Clean Out a Caisson Hole ! days assume drill rig clw WROV 
31 Repair /Install a New Caisson Sacrificial ! days upper caisson, upper HP riser, surface Xmas tree 
32 Excavate Open Glory Hole (single weD) ! days dredge vessel clw WROV assuming an average excavation rate of 1500 m3/d for a theroetical volume of 7756 m3 
33 Excavate Open Glory Hole (multi-well) 51 days dredge vessel clw WROV assuming an average excavation rate of 1500 m3/d for a theroetical volume of 76800 m3 
34 Repair Casing ?days construction Vessel clw WROV 
35 Spill Cleanup 6C days assuming a weD blowout cond~ion 
36 Cleanup Damaged Tree 1 days assumes tree is contacted but blowout does not occur & drill rig is used to perform cleanup 
Production Data 
Case 1 -Single Wei/Installation: 
37 Peak Daily Well Production Rate 15,00( bbVday used to cabulate loss production costs 
38 Spill/Blowout Rate 75,00( bbVday used to account for production lost to spill 
39 Netback per Barrel $1( perbbl used to cabulate loss production costs 
Case 2- Multi-wei/Installation: 
49 Peak Daily Well Production Rate $40,00( bbVday usad to cabulate loss production costs 
41 Spill/Blowout Rate $200,00( bbVday used to account for production lost to spill 
42 Netback per Barrel $1( perbbl used to cabulate loss production costs 
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Table C1: Consequence Scenario Costs: Case 1&2a- Unprotected Well(s) 
Item 
Iceberg Encounter 
8: Contact- SCSSV Performs (No 'Biowout7 
C: Contact- SCSSV Don't Perform ('Biowout7 
Tie flowline back into tree loacted at mudline. 
$12.0 $36.0 
$50.0 $150.0 
$23.5 $70.5 
$3.0 $9.0 I Tie flowline back into tree loacted at mudline. 
SCSSV does not perform, resulting in a blowout. 
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nnwAv<"r, the 
Table C2: Consequence Scenario Costs: Case 1&2b- Unprotected Well(s) w/ Weak Shear Joint 
flowline back into tree loacted at rrudline. 
not separate correctly, however, the SCSSV does 
flowline back into tree loacted at rrudline. 
Contact- SCSSVDon't Perform ('Blowout' 
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Table C3: Consequence Scenario Costs: Case 1&2c- Open Glory Hole 
Iceberg Encot.nter 
Contact- SCSSV Performs (No 'Biowout7 
C: Contact- SCSSV Don f Perform ('Biowout7 
flowline back into tree loacted inside glory hole .. 
the iceberg contacts the Xmas tree resulting i1 destruction of the tree, but 
of the SCSSV results in a blowout. 
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Table C4: Consequence Scenario Costs: Case 1&2d- Cased Glory Hole(s) 
lilcrementatrDeve~t~ost::~ \'iff~~ 0S · ·.•. ···. Case 1.~~ ·· ' \ CaSe 21:; :~ i • .if;J:+js<iii) 'r~·~ •. ~ii·ii, :;~ •·•iii {.!$ fi.ri,~+r'! +~. '''· ~JiiY ~ '" "i¥ii~~.~,~~~~~i~ ~ 
Item Cost Cost Comments 
($MM CON) ($MM CON) 
Cased glory hole excavation $2.0 $12.0 Incremental cost to excavate cased olorv hole. 
CoriS'iQue~ Scemtrio:'(r;. ';:; •:~:: ~;iii·<lf' ii~ ..• •>¥ 'i!A •.if'£ ;. ~,,, , ,, '~"' ·'~"''~:s:;$0~'2~• .. s···.·';l¢.¥ti·~tHUt~·~·· ; :1 .11:1" I I 
A: Iceberg Encounter Assumes that the casing is contacted by a scouring iceberg above the shear point 
resulting in proper separation of the casing weak shear plane. The casing requires 
substantial repairs while the Xmas tree and wellhead suffer no damage. 
Mob I De-mob DSV c/w WROV $6.3 $6.3 Assumes 10 day transit each way from either North Sea I Gulf of Mexico. 
Clean-up $3.2 $9.5 Clean out of glory hole after iceberg event. 
Repair casing $2.5 $7.4 
Tie-in well $1.1 $3.4 Tie flowline back into tree loacted in cased hole. 
Lost Production $6.00 $48.00 
B: Contact- SCSSV Performs (No 'Blowout') Assumes the casing shears improperly as a result of a deep scouring iceberg and the 
Xmas tree is damaged beyond repair; however, the SCSSV performs properly and shuts 
the well in. 
Cleanup $29.0 $87.0 
Re-enter Well & Repair $50.0 $150.0 
Install New Tree $23.5 $70.5 
Tie-in $1.1 $3.4 Tie flowline back into tree loacted in cased hole. 
Lost Production $12.0 $96.0 
C: Contact- SCSSV Don't Perform ('Blowout') Assumes the casing shears improperly as a result of a deep scouring iceberg and the 
Xmas tree is damaged beyond repair. The SCSSV fails to operate properly, resulting in 
destruction to Xmas tree and a well blowout. 
Environmantal spill cleanup $90.0 $180.0 
Drill Relief Well & Kill $95.0 $285.0 
Drill New Production Well & Tie-in $85.0 $255.0 
Lost Production $32.0 $255.6 
'IOtlls: ... i 'I 
.1. 
.' 
•': ... , )i.l?+'f ·• £"; I i: I it 'I ., ·•·- 4 +t~£4~~~·~~~~ •. ~~jdL~'t; ~~.l'~:_,.,:.t;: 
A: Iceberg Encounter $19.0 $74.5 
B: Contact- SCSSV Performs (No 'Biowout7 $115.6 $406.9 
C: Contact- SCSSV Don't Perform ('Biowout7 $302.0 $975.6 
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Table C5: Consequence Scenario Costs: Case 1&2e- Modified Cased Glorv Hole(s) 
Mob I De-mob DSV c/w WROV $6.3 $6.3 Assumes 10 day transit each way from either North Sea I Gulf of Mexico. 
Cleanup hole $3.2 $9.5 Clean out of cased glory hole after iceberg event. 
Tie-in well $1.1 $3.4 Tie flowline back into tree loacted in modified cased hole. 
Lost Production $4.95 $39.60 
8: Contact- SCSSV Performs (No '8/owout'l Assumes the casing is contacted as a result of a deep scouring iceberg and the Xmas 
tree is damaged beyond repair; however, the SCSSV performs properly and shuts the 
well in. 
Cleanup $22.0 $66.0 
Repair casing $2.5 $7.4 
Re-enter Well & Repair $50.0 $150.0 
Install New Tree $23.5 $70.5 
Tie-in $1.1 $3.4 Tie flowline back into tree loacted in modified cased hole. 
Lost Production $13.1 $104.4 
C: Contact- SCSSV Don't Perform ('8/owout'l Assumes the casing is contacted as a result of a deep scouring iceberg and the Xmas 
tree is damaged beyond repair. The SCSSV fails to operate properly, resulting in 
destruction to the Xmas tree and a well blowout. 
$180.0 
$285.0 
$255.0 
$255.6 
A: Iceberg Encounter $58.8 
8: Contact- SCSSV Performs (No 'Biowout1 $401.7 
C: Contact- SCSSV Don't Perform ('Biowout1 $302.0 $975.6 
246 
Table C6: Consequence Scenario Costs: Case 1&2f- Caisson Wellhead System(s) 
tnc:tementaiPev:elopment ~·· ..... . ''r r+; f.• l"·i~ if· 7:0ase1 Case2 .. ; ;;,~li.J:t:i!7~~~ ,;; . • ~ .•••. :· ... · ~31:2'5:·· .~ '; '. ?:'• ~ .• ; ; ' ; 
Item Cost Cost Comments 
($MM CON) ($MM CON) 
Caisson wellhead system installation $3.0 $18.0 Incremental cost to install a caisson wellhead system. 
OOiseauenee Scenario: •· . .. ;; '•·:·:· . i.L ~: ~·~;·~ ~: . : " ·~ .~ 1:·1 ~ '¥'.~{ ~~·~.:~ 'f · · • r ;~. ·~l'•'ftl·~i.~~ . ·~ ~·~·~ 11 ,,~ · ·~fi~~ir:,~ t·Ull f.• f 
A: Iceberg Encounter Assumes that upon iceberg contact with the Xmas tree, the tree is damaged beyond 
repair; however, the weak shear joint seperates correctly and ensures the SCSSV 
performs properly and shuts the well in. 
Cleanup $5.0 $15.0 
Repair caisson $5.0 $15.0 
Install new sacrifical tree $18.0 $54.0 
Tie-in well $3.0 $9.0 Tie flowline back into sacrificial tree loacted at mud line. 
Lost Production $5.25 $42.00 
B: Contact- SCSSV Performs (No 'Blowout') Assumes a deep scouring iceberg impacts the caisson in such a manner as to fail the 
caisson in a mode other than shear, however, proper performance of the SCSSV shuts 
the well in. 
Cleanup $5.0 $15.0 
Re-enter Well & Repair $50.0 $150.0 
Repair caisson $5.0 $15.0 
Install new sacrifical tree $18.0 $54.0 
Tie-in well $3.0 $9.0 Tie flowline back into sacrificial tree loacted at mudline. 
I Lost Production $4.20 $33.60 
C: Contact- SCSSV Don't Perform ('Blowout'! Assumes a deep scouring iceberg impacts the caisson in such a manner as to fail the I 
caisson in a mode other than shearfailure of the downhole master valve and SCSSV 
results in a blowout of the well. 
Environmantal spill cleanup $90.0 $180.0 
Drill Relief Well & Kill $95.0 $285.0 
Drill New Production Well & Tie-in $85.0 $255.0 
Lost Production $32.0 $255.6 i 
tetals:A ·~ ~ f .. ' ;; ; ·. ; \;.!. ; ~ "' ·~ t . ·~ ; f ~5 ;!::: ...• ' ·~.~· ¥.;:;~.~ t 
A: Iceberg Encounter $36.3 $135.0 
B: Contact- SCSSV Performs (No 'Blowout) $85.2 $276.6 
C: Contact- SCSSV Don't Perform ('Blowout' $302.0_,,, $975.6 
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Table C7: Comparison of Net Costs for Single Well Developments 
Case Description Incremental Annual Consequence Field Life Cost of Risk Net System 
CAP EX Probability o Cost (T) (Cr) Cost 
(C) Iceberg (R+E+ Lp) [Years] [$MM CON] (N= C + Cr) 
[$MM CON] Event [$MM CON] [$MM CON] 
(Pf) 
A: 9.60E-04 99.0 
1a Unprotected Well 1.0 8: 8.43E-04 99.0 6 1.282 2.282 
C: 1.17E-04 302.0 
A: 9.60E-04 76.5 
1b Unprotected Well w/ Weak Shear Joint 2.3 8: 8.43E-04 99.0 6 1.153 3.403 
C: 1.17E-04 302.0 
A: 5.60E-05 11.6 
1c Open Glory Hole 9.5 8: 4.92E-05 115.1 6 0.050 9.550 
C: 6.80E-06 302.0 
A: 2.00E-04 19.0 
1d Cased Glory Hole 3.0 8: 1.76E-04 115.6 6 0.189 3.189 
C: 2.43E-05 302.0 
A: 2.50E-05 15.5 
1e Modified Cased Hole 3.0 8: 2.20E-05 112.1 6 0.023 3.023 
C: 3.03E-06 302.0 
A: 9.60E-04 36.3 
1f Caisson Wellhead System 4.0 8: 8.43E-04 85.2 6 0.851 4.851 
C: 1.17E-04 302.0 
Notes: 
1. Annual Probability of Iceberg Event: A: Iceberg Encounter, B: Contact (SCSSV Performs), C: Contact (SCSSV Don't Perform -"Blowout''). 
2.A 6-year and 8-year life of field has been assumed for both the single well and multi-well development, respectively. 
Unit Unit 
Normalized C Normalized 
Cr 
0.105 1.000 
0.237 0.899 
1.000 0.039 
0.316 0.147 
0.316 0.018 
0.421 0.664 
~-
3. The "Cost of Risk" is the sum of the annual probability of iceberg events times the total repair/replacement, cleanup and lost production costs, all multiplied by the life of field. 
4. In order to undertake a unit normalized comparison of options, a value of $1.0 MM has been added to incremental CAPEX for each option 
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Table CS: Comparison of Net Costs for Multi-well Developments 
Case Description Incremental Annual Consequence Field Life Cost of Risk 
CAP EX Probability o Cost (T) (Cr) 
(C) Iceberg (R+E+ Lp) [Years] [$MM CON] 
[$MM CON] Event [$MM CON] 
(Pf) 
A: 2.60E-03 349.5 
2a Unprotected Wells 1.0 B: 2.28E-03 349.5 8 16.120 
C: 3.16E-04 975.6 
A: 2.60E-03 282.0 
2b Unprotected Wells w/ Weak Shear Joint 8.5 B: 2.28E-03 349.5 8 14.716 
C: 3.16E-04 975.6 
A: 1.10E-04 21.1 
2c Open Glory Hole 25.1 B: 9.66E-05 369.1 8 0.408 
C: 1.34E-05 975.6 
A: 6.50E-04 74.5 
2d Cased Glory Holes 13.0 B: 5.71E-04 406.9 8 2.863 
C: 7.89E-05 975.6 
A: 8.80E-05 58.8 
2e Modified Cased Holes 13.0 B: 7.73E-05 401.7 8 0.373 
C: 1.07E-05 975.6 
A: 2.60E-03 135.0 
2f Caisson Wellhead Systems 19.0 B: 2.28E-03 276.6 8 10.326 
C: 3.16E-04 975.6 
Notes: 
1. Annual Probability of Iceberg Event: A: Iceberg Encounter, B: Contact (SCSSV Performs), C: Contact (SCSSV Don't Perform - "Blowout"). 
2.A 6-year and 8-year life of field has been assumed for both the single well and multi-well development, respectively. 
Net System Unit Unit 
Cost Normalized C Normalized 
(N= C+ Cr) Cr 
[$MM CON] 
17.120 0.040 1.000 
23.216 0.338 0.913 
25.548 1.000 0.025 
15.863 0.517 0.178 
13.373 0.517 0.023 
29.326 0.756 0.641 
3. The "Cost of Risk" is the sum of the annual probability of iceberg events times the total repair/replacement, cleanup and lost production costs, all multiplied by the life of field. 
4. In order to undertake a unit normalized comparison of options, a value of $1.0 MM has been added to incremental CAPEX for each option 
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Table C9: Comparison of Net Costs for Single Well Developments (85% Ice berg Mgnt Effectiveness) 
Case Description Incremental Annual Consequence Field Life Cost of Net System 
CAP EX Probability of Cost (T) Risk Cost 
(C) Iceberg (R+E+Lp) [Years] (Cr) (N=C+Cr) 
[$MM CON] Event [$MM CON] [$MM CON] [$MM CON] 
(Pf) 
A: 1.80E-04 99.0 
1a Unprotected Well 1.0 B: 1.58E-04 99.0 6 0.240 1.240 
C: 2.18E-05 302.0 
A: 1.80E-04 76.5 
1b Unprotected Well w/ Weak Shear Joint 2.3 B: 1.58E-04 99.0 6 0.216 2.466 
C: 2.18E-05 302.0 
A: 5.60E-05 11.6 
1c Open Glory Hole 9.5 8: 4.92E-05 115.1 6 0.050 9.550 
C: 6.80E-06 302.0 
A: 5.20E-05 19.0 
1d Cased Glory Hole 3.0 B: 4.57E-05 115.6 6 0.049 3.049 
C: 6.31E-06 302.0 
A: 2.50E-05 15.5 
1e Modified Cased Hole 3.0 B: 2.20E-05 112.1 6 0.023 3.023 
C: 3.03E-06 302.0 
A: 1.80E-04 36.3 
1f Caisson Wellhead System 4.0 B: 1.58E-04 85.2 6 0.160 4.160 
C: 2.18E-05 302.0 
Notes: 
1. Annual Probability of Iceberg Event: A: Iceberg Encounter, B: Contact (SCSSV Performs), C: Contact (SCSSV Don't Perform- "Biowouf'). 
2.A 6-year and 8-year life of field has been assumed for both the single well and multi-well development, respectively. 
Unit Unit 
Normalized C Normalized 
Cr 
0.105 1.000 
0.237 0.899 
1.000 0.209 
0.316 0.204 
0.316 0.094 
0.421 0.664 
-------
3. The "Cost of Risk" is the sum of the annual probability of iceberg events times the total repair/replacement, cleanup and lost production costs, all multiplied by the life of field. 
4. In order to undertake a unit normalized comparison of options, a value of $1.0 MM has been added to incremental CAPEX for each option 
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Table C10: Comparison of Net Costs for Multi-well Developments (85% Iceberg Mqnt Effectiveness) 
Case Description Incremental Annual Consequence Field Life Cost of Net System Unit 
CAP EX Probability of Cost {T) Risk Cost Normalized C 
{C) Iceberg {R+ E+ Lp) [Years] (Cr) (N=C+ Cr) 
[$MM CON] Event [$MM CON] [$MM CON] [$MM CON] 
(Pf) 
A: 4.60E-04 349.5 
2a Unprotected Wells 1.0 B: 4.04E-04 349.5 8 2.852 3.852 
C: 5.58E-05 975.6 
A: 4.60E-04 282.0 
2b Unprotected Wells w/ Weak Shear Joint 8.5 B: 4.04E-04 349.5 8 2.604 11.104 
C: 5.58E-05 975.6 
A: 1.10E-04 21.1 
2c Open Glory Hole 25.1 B: 9.66E-05 369.1 8 0.408 25.548 
C: 1.34E-05 975.6 
A: 1.60E-04 74.5 
2d Cased Glory Holes 13.0 B: 1.41E-04 406.9 8 0.705 13.705 
C: 1.94E-05 975.6 
A: 8.80E-05 58.8 
2e Modified Cased Holes 13.0 B: 7.73E-05 401.7 8 0.373 13.373 
C: 1.07E-05 975.6 
A: 4.60E-04 135.0 
2f Caisson Wellhead Systems 19.0 B: 4.04E-04 276.6 8 1.827 20.827 
C: 5.58E-05 975.6 
Notes: 
1. Annual Probability of Iceberg Event: A: Iceberg Encounter, B: Contact (SCSSV Performs), C: Contact (SCSSV Don't Perform- "Blowout"). 
2.A 6-year and 8-year life of field has been assumed for both the single well and multi-well development, respectively. 
0.040 
0.338 
1.000 
0.517 
0.517 
0.756 
Unit 
Normalized 
Cr 
1.000 
0.913 
0.143 
0.247 
0.131 
0.641 
3. The "Cost of Risk" is the sum of the annual probability of iceberg events times the total repair/replacement, cleanup and lost production costs, all multiplied by the life of field. 
4. In order to undertake a unit normalized comparison of options, a value of $1.0 MM has been added to incremental CAP EX for each option 
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